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Abstract 
Firms’ Financial Flexibility and the Profitability of Style Investing 
By: Viet Nga Cao 
This thesis examines how firms’ financial flexibility affects the 
profitability of three of the most commonly used style investing strategies. They 
are the value-growth trading strategy (going long on stocks with high Book-to-
Market ratio and short on stocks with low Book-to-Market ratio), the momentum 
trading strategy (going long on stocks that have performed well and short on stocks 
that have performed poorly recently), and the accruals based trading strategy 
(going long on stocks with low accruals and short on stocks with high accruals).  
The findings suggest the value premium exists when controlling for risks 
using the Fama and French three factor model. However, it is explained when the 
risk factors are conditioned on firms’ investment irreversibility and the business 
cycle. Next, the momentum profit can be explained by (a) adjusting returns for 
risks using the Fama and French model that is conditioned on firms’ financial 
constraints and the business cycle, and (b) accounting for the interaction between 
the momentum profit and firms’ investments beyond the risk-return relationship. 
Finally, the accruals based trading strategy is most successful at the two ends of the 
financial inflexibility spectrum, supporting both an explanation based on the risk-
return relationship and an explanation based on the catering theory. When 
controlling for the cyclicality in stock returns, the strategy ceases to be profitable. 
The results suggest that the understanding of corporate investment 
decisions can help improve the understanding of securities markets and portfolio 
investment strategies. There are a few lessons that investors can learn from the 
findings of this thesis. Value-growth investors should focus on value and growth 
firms with high investment irreversibility gap. Momentum investors should pursue 
the trading strategy among firms with high financial constraints and during 
economic upturns. They could also benefit from forming their portfolio from past 
winners and past losers with high investment gaps. Accruals based investors would 
benefit from pursuing the strategy among firms with high investment and financing 
flexibility and during economic upturns. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
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The first philosophical discussion about categorisation starts in 
“Categories”1 by Aristotle (B.C. 384 – 322). In the context of the financial markets, 
categorisation of financial instruments is particularly useful as it helps investors 
process the huge amount of information available more easily. Investors view 
assets in groups such as stocks with small capitalisation and large capitalisation, 
value stocks and growth stocks. The expectation of stock returns depends on which 
category the stock is classified into.  
According to Barberis and Shleifer (2003), classifying assets into groups 
and allocating funds across the groups is a popular approach in portfolio 
management. The asset groups can be referred to as styles and the allocation 
process, style investing. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) concede that a new 
investment style can emerge due to two drivers, i.e. (a) financial innovations, and 
(b) the discovery that a particular group of securities can generate superior returns. 
The focus of this thesis is on the second channel, i.e. the discovery of a style’s 
outperformance.  
A style can become out of favour2 when the market becomes more efficient 
with regards to that particular style. Along this line, Schwert (2003) suggests that it 
happens due to more active practitioners pursuing the investment strategies to 
                                                     
1
 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2412/2412-h/2412-h.htm, Accessed on 12th September 
2010. 
2
 According to Barberis and Shleifer (2003), a style disappears when it has poor 
performance for a long time. The poor performance might be due to the deterioration of the 
fundamentals, for example the poor performance of the railroad companies which might 
partially explain why railroad bonds became out of favour in the early 20th century, or the 
current subprime mortgage crisis might render mortgage backed securities less attractive to 
investors. When a style disappears in this way, it is more likely to initially arise due to 
financial innovations. 
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exploit the anomalies that have been discovered and published. Alternatively, a 
style might disappear as the studies originally documenting it use biased samples. 
Schwert (2003) reports several anomalies which have become weaker since the 
publication of the papers that discovered them. The Barberis and Shleifer (2003) 
and the Mullainathan (2002) models on how investment styles appear and 
disappear have several predictions that are consistent with the existing empirical 
evidence. 
Investment styles have been playing important roles to industry 
practitioners. The fund management industry has developed a preference for 
“specialty” managers who focus on an asset class to a single balanced manager 
(Bailey and Arnot, 1986). According to Bogle (2005, p.16), the “middle-of-the-
road” funds in diversified blue chips companies that resembled the volatility of the 
whole stock market once dominated the equity mutual funds in 1945. They have 
now been taken over by funds specialised in different styles. Finally, Kumar (2006) 
and Froot and Teo (2008) document that styles drive individual and institutional 
investors’ trades.   
The popularity of style investing can be traced back to the importance of 
the portfolio allocation decision. Brinson et al. (1986) suggest that 93.6% of the 
actual variation in returns of a typical institutional investor can be attributed to the 
asset mix. The remaining variation of less than 7% is due to other factors such as 
the skills of investment managers and market timing. Investment styles are useful 
as they help simplify the portfolio allocation process. Managers that do not adhere 
to their designated styles will expose a portfolio to unnecessary risks (Gallo and 
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Lockwood, 1997)3. In addition, being specialised in a particular style helps fund 
managers save the cost of gathering information about individual securities 
(Sharpe, 1987). A fund manager can save cost by utilising its financial analysts’ 
comparative advantages and enjoy the economies of scale. 
Furthermore, because of the demand for specialised fund managers, 
investment styles have become a useful tool for fund managers’ marketing 
activities. According to Cronqvist (2006), fund managers’ advertising activities 
affect investors’ portfolio choice towards active management and hot sectors. 
Investment styles also help evaluate the performance of specialised fund managers. 
To help with identifying the true styles of a fund manager beyond any marketing 
material, and to determine the appropriate benchmarks, Sharpe (1988, 1992) 
develops style analysis, a simple technique to identify a fund manager’s styles. 
Based on the styles identified, a benchmark can be constructed using the 
appropriate style indices and weights. The distance from the fund manager’s 
performance and the benchmark would reflect the manger’s skill. Sharpe’s 
technique has gained popularity in the late 1990s due to its efficiency and accuracy 
in determining the combination of styles that a fund manager pursues (Hardy, 
2003). 
This thesis investigates whether certain style based trading strategies are 
profitable. Of several trading strategies designed to follow different investment 
styles, this thesis examines the profitability of the value-growth, the momentum, 
                                                     
3
 However, investment styles can sometimes cause misallocation of funds. Both models of 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Mullainathan (2002) predict that investment styles cause 
too much co-movement within a style and too little co-movement across styles and these 
co-movements might not necessarily be supported by fundamentals. 
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and the accruals based trading strategies. The three styles are chosen due to their 
popularity and profitability robustness. Value and growth are known in the 
investing public as the most popular styles. Momentum and accruals styles are 
known in the market efficiency literature as generating the most robust profits 
(Fama and French, 2008). Furthermore, this thesis investigates how the 
profitability of these strategies is affected by the extent to which firms can adjust 
their investments and get access to financing.  
Research into the profitability of these style based trading strategies is 
meaningful to industry practitioners. Dupleich et al. (2010) analyse the exposures 
of hedge funds between 1995 and 2008 using the value-growth, momentum and 
accruals styles. The value-growth and the momentum styles turn out to be 
dominant but not the accruals style. Similarly, Ali et al. (2008) report that very few 
mutual funds employ the accruals based trading strategy. By contrast, Green et al. 
(2009) suggest that the accruals style is actively deployed among hedge funds. 
Trammel (2010) points out that the industry practitioners’ interest in the accruals 
based trading strategy goes further than its profitability. They are interested in 
whether the success of the trading strategy is due to earnings manipulation or 
future growth of firms with high accruals. Such an understanding of accruals is 
important in determining a firm’s intrinsic value – a central task of an investment 
analyst. 
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1.1. The Trading Strategies and the Research 
Motivations 
Although the profitability of the value-growth, momentum, and accruals 
based trading strategies is well researched and numerous studies have attempted to 
explain possible sources of the gains from these trading strategies but their success 
has been limited. This section provides a snapshot on the existing literature, 
highlights the gaps, and the potential contributions of the thesis towards examining 
and testing the success of the aforementioned trading strategies. 
1.2.1. The Value-Growth Trading Strategy  
Value and growth are known to the investing public as early as the 
beginning of the 20th century. According to Graham and Dodd (1940, reprinted in 
2009, p.61), during the period after the World War I up to the market peak during 
1927 – 1929, investors pursued the “new era” investment theory that favours stocks 
with high growth, or growth stocks. Graham and Dodd’s classic work “Security 
Analysis” is often referred to as the first comprehensive support for investment in 
value stocks (Klarman, 2009). Value style has since become one of the most 
important investment styles.  
Subsequent academic studies tend to simplify the definition of value 
(growth) stocks down to stocks of firms with high (low) ratios of fundamentals to 
price. They study the profitability of the value-growth trading strategy, i.e. the 
strategy that goes long in value stocks and short in growth stocks. The information 
needed to pursue this strategy is historical and public. In the language of the 
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efficient market hypothesis, the success of the value-growth trading strategy 
violates the semi-strong form market efficiency, hence the value anomaly. 
The empirical evidence on the success of the value-growth trading strategy 
starts in the U.S. markets with Graham and Dodd (1934, reprinted in 1940, 2009). 
It is subsequently examined in Basu (1977), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), 
Rosenberg et al. (1985), Fama and French (1992), and Lakonishok et al. (1994), to 
name a few. It is also widely documented in several markets with different 
accounting practices. Chan et al. (1991) document that the value-growth trading 
strategy is profitable in the Japanese market over the 18 year period from 1971 to 
1988. Subsequently, Capaul et al. (1993) report the profitability of the value-
growth trading strategy (here after the value premium) in six developed markets 
including Japan over the 12-year period from 1981 to 1992. Fama and French 
(1998) extend the investigation to several international markets over an extended 
period of 20 years from 1975 to 1995. They find that value stocks outperform 
growth stocks in thirteen markets, including both developed and emerging markets. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that the value premium is the result of the 
error-in-expectation as investors rely too heavily on past returns when forecasting 
future returns. The literature also suggests that the value premium could arise due 
to information asymmetry, divergence of opinions and/or short sale constraints. 
Given that growth stocks are often followed more closely by analysts, while value 
stocks are often unpopular stocks (Ibbotson and Riepe, 1997), value investors are 
compensated for bearing the extra costs and risks due to the higher degree of 
information asymmetry (Bhardwaj and Brooks, 1992). In addition, Doukas et al. 
(2004) advocate that divergence of opinions is a risk factor, and value (growth) 
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firms have positive (negative) and significant (insignificant) coefficient on this 
factor in the augmented Carhart (1997) model. Finally, there is evidence that the 
value premium is more pronounced in the presence of short sale constraints (Ali et 
al., 2003, and Nagel, 2005). 
The most often cited and risk based explanation for the value premium is 
the relative distress of value and growth stocks. Fama and French (1995) suggest 
that the high Book-to-Market ratio of value stocks signals persistent poor earnings 
whereas the low Book-to-Market ratio of growth stocks signals persistent strong 
earnings. However, Dichev (1998) finds that the relationship between value firms 
and the bankruptcy risk is not a monotonic one, casting doubt on the distress risk as 
an explanation for the value premium.  
A turning point in the search for a rational explanation for the value 
premium comes from the pioneering work of Berk et al. (1999). This study links 
the expected stock returns with firms’ investment activities. This paper lays the 
foundation for the theoretical models of Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006) and Carlson 
et al. (2004) in explaining the value premium. In the Zhang (2005) model, firms 
face higher costs in cutting their production capacity than in expanding it4. Value 
firms are burdened with more unproductive capital stocks. In bad times they will 
face more difficulty in cutting their capital stocks compared to growth firms. 
Consequently, value stocks have less flexibility to survive in the adverse 
environment during the bad state of the business cycle. Together with the 
                                                     
4
 The difference in the costs is due to the extent to which firms’ investments can be 
reversible, i.e. the degree of investment irreversibility.  
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countercyclical price of risk, this process attributes the difference in the returns of 
value and growth stocks to the difference in risks.  
In the Cooper (2006) model, when a firm has experienced adverse shocks 
to its productivity, if the capital investment is largely irreversible, the book value of 
the firm’s assets remains fairly constant. As the market value of this firm falls, its 
Book-to-Market ratio rises. Value firms with high Book-to-Market ratios are more 
sensitive to the shocks to the aggregate productivity. They can benefit from 
positive aggregate shocks because with their existing excess capacity, they do not 
need to undertake any costly new investment to exploit the opportunities during 
economic upturns. On the other hand, growth firms with low Book-to-Market 
ratios would need to undertake costly investment to fully benefit from the positive 
aggregate shocks. Compared to value firms, growth firms would have lower 
systematic risks because they do not co-move much with the business cycle during 
economic upturns. 
In the Carlson et al. (2004) model, a firm’s investments may result in 
higher operating leverage through long term commitments such as the fixed 
operating costs of a larger plant, labour contract commitments and commitments to 
suppliers. Furthermore, when demand for a firm’s product decreases, the firm’s 
future operating profits are lower, leading to a lower equity value relative to its 
capital stocks. If the fixed operating costs are proportional to the capital stocks, it 
translates into higher operating leverage, or higher systematic risks. If the book 
value of equity is considered as a proxy for the firm’s capital stocks, the Book-to-
Market ratio would describe the operating leverage component of a firm’s risks. 
10 
 
Thus, value firms with higher Book-to-Market ratios are riskier and earn higher 
expected returns than growth firms with lower Book-to-Market ratios.  
The aforementioned theoretical models share a common feature, i.e. the 
value premium can be explained by how easily firms can flexibly adjust their 
physical capital investments in response to aggregate shocks. Empirical tests on the 
relationship between a firm’s physical investments and the value premium are 
limited so far. Anderson and Garcia Feijo (2006) document that value and growth 
firms have different capital expenditure levels. Their results, although shedding 
light on the value and growth firms’ investment behaviours, cannot be considered 
as the direct evidence on the effect of (in)flexibilities in firms’ investments as 
articulated in the three aforementioned theoretical models in explaining the value 
premium. 
Gulen et al. (2008) report that the expected value premium exhibits a 
counter-cyclical behaviour. Also, there is a systematic difference in firms’ 
investment and financing flexibility between value and growth stocks. Moreover, 
firms’ inflexibility positively affects their cost of equity capital. This thesis takes 
the work of Gulen et al. (2008) a step further and provides evidence on whether the 
success of the value-growth trading strategy can be explained by the firm level 
flexibility. In addition, this thesis uses a more comprehensive and improved set of 
variables to describe investment flexibility. More specifically this is the first study, 
to the author’s knowledge, that provides empirical evidence on the implications of 
investment flexibility on the success of the value-growth trading strategy.  
Furthermore, this thesis considers the interaction between investment 
flexibility and the states of the economy, a critical component in all the theoretical 
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models of Zhang (2005), Carlson et al. (2004) and Cooper (2006). Finally, Caggese 
(2007) suggests that financial constraints, which describe the ability of firms to 
mobilise funds, can interact with investment irreversibility to influence firms’ 
investments. Hence, this thesis provides evidence on whether financial constraints 
affects the success of the value-growth trading strategy directly through its 
influence on the risk profiles of value and growth firms, or indirectly through its 
influence on the relationship between firms’ investment irreversibility and their 
investment activities. 
1.2.2. The Momentum Trading Strategy 
The next strategy to be examined is based on the stock price momentum, a 
popular technical analysis tool. In the academic literature, the first evidence on the 
profitability of the momentum trading strategy, i.e. the strategy to buy past winners 
and sell past losers, was documented in Levy (1967). However, Jensen and 
Benington (1970) report that the strategy is not better than a simple buy-and-hold 
one. Over 20 years later, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) revisit the stock price 
momentum phenomenon. They report that winner (loser) stocks, i.e. those 
performing well (badly) in the last six to twelve months, will continue to perform 
well (badly) in the following six to twelve months. The return to the momentum 
trading strategy (here after the momentum profit) cannot be explained by the 
CAPM related risk (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), or the Fama and French three 
factor model (Fama and French, 1993, 1996). In the language of the efficient 
market hypothesis, the success of such a simple trading strategy based purely on 
past stock returns violates the weak form market efficiency, hence the momentum 
anomaly. 
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The momentum trading strategy also proves to be robustly profitable over 
time and across the markets. According to Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999), the 
momentum profit also exists in several developed and emerging markets outside 
the US. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) update the evidence reported in their 1993 
article. The momentum profit in the U.S. market is positive and significant during 
the nine years following the period originally examined in Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). More importantly, its economic significance during the extended period is 
comparable to that during the period in the original study. Known as the 
momentum anomaly in the market efficiency literature, it is the most robust one 
among several anomalies examined in Fama and French (2008). Grundy and 
Martin (2001) report that the momentum profit exists in several sub-periods back to 
1926. 
To explain the momentum profit, Daniel et al. (1998) propose a model in 
which investors are overconfident about their private signals and subject to the self-
attribution bias, i.e. attributing success to their own competence and failure to bad 
luck. As more public information is released, the self-attribution bias causes 
investors to continue to be overconfident and over-react to their private 
information, causing stock price momentum. Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and 
Stein (1999) attribute the momentum to investor under-reaction to news. In 
Barberis et al. (1998), under-reaction is due to investor conservatism, whereas in 
Hong and Stein (1999) it is due to the gradual diffusion of news. Grinblatt and Han 
(2005) attribute the momentum profit to the disposition effect, i.e. the tendency that 
investor “hold on to their losing stocks too long and sell their winners too soon” (p. 
312).  
13 
 
Fama and French (1996) concede that their three factor model cannot 
explain the momentum profit. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) document that the 
momentum profit varies across the business cycle, is positive and significant during 
expansions and turns insignificant during contractions. They suggest that the 
momentum profit is linked to the common factors in the macro economy. However, 
Griffin et al. (2003) find that the momentum profit in several international markets 
is positive and significant in both economic upturns and downturns, challenging the 
view 5 in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). 
A few studies examine whether the momentum profit can be explained by 
firms’ investments. The Berk et al. (1999) model, when calibrated with realistic 
project life and depreciation parameters, generates a positive momentum profit for 
a period of five years, more persistent than the one observed empirically in several 
studies. Despite this mismatch, the Berk et al. (1999) model embarks a promising 
direction into the relationship between firms’ investment activities and the 
momentum profit. Similar to the Berk et al. (1999) model, the Johnson (2002) 
model on firms’ growth related risk, when calibrated, generates too persistent 
momentum profits. Empirically, Liu and Zhang (2008) document that half of the 
momentum profit can be explained by the growth rate risk proxied by the growth 
rate of industrial production. 
                                                     
5
 Lakonishok et al. (1994), Petkova and Zhang (2005), and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) 
argue that the necessary condition for the value premium to be driven by risks is that value 
stocks outperform growth stocks in good states and underperform in bad states of the 
business cycle. By the same token, Griffin et al. (2003) argue that the necessary condition 
for the momentum profit to be driven by risks is that it is positive during economic upturns 
and negative during downturns. Hence, they concede that the momentum profit is not 
driven by macroeconomic risks, given the evidence of the momentum profit in both states 
of the business cycle. 
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In a related line of research, Morck et al. (1990) provide a comprehensive 
analysis on different channels through which stock prices could affect firms’ 
investments. Recent studies extend the evidence in Morck et al. (1990). In Baker et 
al. (2003), equity dependent firms, i.e. firms that need to rely on external equities 
to finance their investments, would under-invest when their stocks are undervalued. 
Such firms would have to issue equities at a price below the fundamental value to 
finance for all the profitable investments in the pipeline. In Polk and Sapienza 
(2009), if stocks are overpriced according to their existing level of investments, 
managers who hold a short term view might invest further to cater investors’ 
sentiment and maintain the recent stock price trend. Bakke and Whited (2010) 
support the proposition that stock prices contain private information that managers 
use when making investment decisions, particularly among less financially 
constrained firms. On the other hand, Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) 
concede that increasing stock prices reflect the better quality of growth 
opportunities.  
In short, the literature suggests that firms’ investments are related to their 
risks, which might predict future stock returns. On the other hand, stock prices are 
likely to influence firms’ investments. Hence, it is possible that past stock prices 
are related to future stock prices through firms’ current investments. The research 
into the relationship between stock price momentum and firms’ investments is 
limited mainly to the theoretical works of Berk et al. (1999) and Johnson (2002), 
and the empirical work of Liu and Zhang (2008). None of these studies fully 
explains the momentum profit pattern observed in the existing literature. There is a 
gap to extend this research direction in light of the recent studies on stock prices 
and firms’ investments. This thesis aims to fill in this gap by extending the 
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understanding on whether the momentum profit can be explained by the investment 
patterns of past winners and past losers. It contributes to the understanding of the 
relationship between corporate policy decisions and the stock price momentum. 
The explanations for the momentum profit suggested in this thesis can help 
reconcile several findings documented in the literature. 
This thesis suggests a new explanation, to the author’s knowledge, for the 
momentum profit based on the concept of the credit multiplier effect of Kiyotaki 
and Moor (1997) and the conjecture of Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009). The 
latter study concedes that higher stock prices reflect the better quality of growth 
opportunities. Hence, past winners would invest more than past losers because they 
have better investment opportunities. According to Hahn and Lee (2009), among 
financially constrained firms, those with higher debt capacity are more exposed to 
the credit multiplier effect, and this exposure is priced. Therefore, among 
financially constrained firms, past winners are more exposed to the credit 
multiplier effect, are riskier and have higher expected returns than past losers.  
This thesis also extends the literature on the mispricing of past winners and 
past losers by attributing it to investors’ interpretation of their investments. Along 
this line, this thesis argues that the equity issuance channel in Baker et al. (2003) 
would suggest past winners invest more than past losers. This is because they can 
issue more overpriced shares to finance their investments that would not otherwise 
be undertaken. As investors welcome the new efficient investments, past winners 
might be further mispriced, and the return continuation might be maintained. 
Alternatively, along the lines of Polk and Sapienza (2009), if past winners and past 
losers are mispriced due to investors misjudging their investments, past winners 
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might continue to invest to maintain their upward price movement, hence the return 
continuation. 
1.2.3. The Accruals based Trading Strategy 
Finally, this thesis examines the success of the accruals based trading 
strategy, (the strategy of buying stocks that have low accruals and selling stocks 
that have high accruals) in generating excess returns. First documented in Sloan 
(1996), this strategy is reported to generate positive and significant returns that 
cannot be explained by the CAPM related risk. Similar to the value trading 
strategy, the accruals based trading strategy uses the historical and public 
information. In the language of the efficient market hypothesis, the success of the 
accruals based trading strategy violates the semi-strong form market efficiency, 
hence the accruals anomaly. 
The evidence for the profitability of the accruals based trading strategy is 
mixed in the international market. Pincus et al. (2007) report that among 20 
developed countries the return to the accruals based trading strategy (here after the 
accruals premium) is significant only in the US, the U.K., Canada and Australia. 
On the other hand, La Fond (2005) reports that the accruals premium is a global 
phenomenon, given its significance in 15 out of 17 developed countries. Known as 
the accruals anomaly in the market efficiency literature, it is one of the most robust 
anomalies examined in Fama and French (2008). Although Green et al. (2009) 
claim that the accruals premium has disappeared in the last few years, other authors 
such as Wu et al. (2010), Gerard et al. (2009), Livnat and Petrovits (2009), and Ali 
and Gurun (2009) show its time varying characteristic and suggest that it is likely 
to reemerge in the future. 
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Sloan (1996) first explains the return to the accruals based trading strategy 
with the functional fixation hypothesis. In his hypothesis investors are irrational 
and ignore the difference in the persistence of cash based versus accrual based 
earnings when making their earnings forecasts. As the cash based earnings are 
more persistent than the accrual based earnings, accruals are mispriced. Firms with 
high accruals are overpriced whereas those with low accruals are underpriced.  
Some studies attribute the accruals premium to investor irrationality in 
understanding firm growth. Fairfield et al. (2003) argue that accruals contribute to 
both the overall growth of a firm through net operating assets, and its profitability. 
As investors fail to recognise that the association between growth and future 
profitability is weaker than that between current earnings and future profitability, 
firms with high (low) accruals are overpriced (underpriced).  
Other studies attribute the accruals premium to the behaviours of firms’ 
managers. Richardson et al. (2006) suggest that the difference in the persistence of 
the cash based and accruals based earnings is due to managers’ earnings 
manipulation. Alternatively, Kothari et al. (2006) suggest that the mispricing of 
accruals might be due to managers of overpriced firms distorting earnings upwards 
to nurture investors’ expectations. 
Wei and Xie (2008) suggest that managers genuinely accumulate 
inventories and other working capital items to anticipate high future growth, and 
make errors in extrapolating past high growth into the future. This explanation can 
account for the return predictability of both accruals and fixed capital investments. 
However, Chan et al. (2006) argue that if the accruals premium is driven by 
changes in the business conditions, then it should be roughly uniform across 
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accrual components and industries. They report that the predictability of accounts 
receivable and inventories are different, and the accruals premium varies in 
different industries. 
Some studies seek to explain the accruals premium by the relative distress 
risk. According to Khan (2008), firms with low accruals possess the characteristics 
of distress stocks such as negative earnings, high leverage, low sales growth, and 
high bankruptcy risks. Ng (2005) also reports that distress risks affect the accruals 
premium and controlling for distress risks lowers the premium. On the other hand, 
Wu et al. (2010) argue that the discount hypothesis explains the accruals premium. 
When the discount rate is lower, more investment projects become profitable, 
hence firms would invest in presumably both fixed capitals and working capitals. 
Furthermore, lower discount rates mean lower expected returns going forward. 
Hence, to the extent that accruals reflect working capital investments, higher 
accruals are followed by lower expected stock returns.  
The existing literature on the accruals premium leaves several gaps to be 
filled. Firstly, given the evidence in Wei and Xie (2008) that the return 
predictability of accruals is related to but not subsumed by the return predictability 
of fixed capital investments, there should be a process by which changes in 
working capital investments are dependent on changes in fixed capital investments 
but the relationship is not a monotonic one. The implication of such a process on 
the accruals premium has yet to be discussed in the literature. This thesis extends 
the work of Wei and Xie (2008) to examine the implication of such a process on 
the accruals premium.  
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Secondly, Wu et al. (2010) suggest that the accruals premium should 
follow the business cycle pattern6, given that (a) the accruals based trading strategy 
shares some common characteristics with the value-growth trading strategy (Desai 
et al., 2004), (b) both are related to firms’ investments, and (c) the value premium 
is cyclical mainly due to firms’ investment irreversibility (Zhang, 2005). This 
thesis extends the work of Wu et al. (2010) to examine how the accruals premium 
varies across the business cycle due to the factors identified in Zhang (2005) as 
driving the value premium cyclical. 
Thirdly, the explanation for the accruals premium in Kothari et al. (2006) 
rely on the initial overvaluation of stocks and managements’ subsequent 
investments to maintain the overvaluation. Given that stocks are more likely to be 
overvalued when the sentiment is high, and managements are more likely to 
purposely invest to cater for this sentiment (Polk and Sapienza, 2009), this thesis 
extends the work of Kothari et al. (2006) to examine whether an explanation for the 
accruals premium based on the catering theory would also predict that the premium 
varies with the investor sentiment cycle7. 
Finally, the accruals premium is predicted to vary systematically, either 
with the business cycle pattern (Wu et al., 2010) or with the investor sentiment 
cycle (conjectured in this thesis). To evaluate the importance of the cyclicality of 
the accruals premium, this thesis is the first to examine whether the accruals 
premium exists after removing the cyclical component of returns. Such an 
                                                     
6
 i.e. the systematic variation across the periods of economic upturns and downturns, which 
correspond to the expansion and contraction of economic activities respectively. 
7
 i.e. the systematic variation across the periods of high and low investor sentiment.  
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understanding would benefit investors who attempt to exploit the accruals based 
trading strategy. 
1.2. The Research Questions, Findings, and 
Implications 
1.2.1. The Research Questions 
This thesis aims to fill in the gaps identified from the literature by 
investigating how the information on firms’ investments can help explain the 
profitability of the value-growth, momentum and accruals based trading strategies. 
The two related research questions that this thesis addresses are: 
(1) can the value-growth, momentum, and accruals based trading 
strategies generate positive and significant profit to investors? and 
(2) how firms’ investment and financing flexibility affect the profitability 
of these trading strategies? 
This research extends our understanding on how the decisions of firm 
management can affect the profitability of investors’ trading strategies in the stock 
market. Furthermore, answers to the second question would help the investors who 
pursue these trading strategies improve their profitability. The investigation in each 
of the three trading strategies, i.e. the value-growth, momentum, and accruals based 
trading strategies, would also contributes to the literature specific to these 
strategies. The hypotheses about the financial flexibility and the profitability of the 
value-growth trading strategy are discussed in section 2.3 (p. 52), of the 
momentum trading strategy, section 3.3 (p. 146), and of the accruals based trading 
strategy, section 4.3 (p. 228). 
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1.2.2. The Main Findings 
This thesis supports the conjecture that investment irreversibility is 
relevant to the success of the value-growth trading strategy. While this evidence is 
closely related to the model in Zhang (2005), it is also broadly consistent with 
Cooper (2006) and Carlson et al. (2004). Firms’ financial constraints affect the 
profitability of the value-growth trading strategy through their influence on the 
relationship between investment irreversibility and the value premium. The value 
premium can be explained by the Fama and French three factor model conditioned 
on financial constraints, investment irreversibility and the business cycle. 
 Next, this thesis finds that the success of the momentum trading strategy 
can be explained by a combination of the explanations based on Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell (2009), Baker et al. (2003), and Polk and Sapienza (2009). Past winners 
invest more than past losers, and the investment gap is higher during economic 
upturns. The momentum profit is only positive and significant among firms with 
high financial constraints. It can be explained (a) by adjusting returns for risks 
using the Fama and French three factor model conditioned on the financial 
constraints and the business variables, and (b) by accounting for the interaction 
between the momentum profit and firms’ investments as suggested in the 
explanations based on Baker et al. (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
Finally, this thesis finds that the accruals based trading strategy is most 
successful at the two ends of the inflexibility spectrum. The pronounced accruals 
premium among firms with high investment and financing inflexibility support the 
explanation advocated in Wu et al. (2010) that the accruals premium is due to the 
difference in risks between firms with high and low accruals. The evidence at the 
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low end supports the explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009) that the 
accruals premium is due to investors mispricing firms’ working capital 
investments. The accruals premium is also more pronounced during economic 
upturns among firms at the high end. These patterns are concentrated in the 
manufacturing industries, to which the investment and financing environments are 
crucial. When controlling for the cyclicality in stock returns, the accruals premium 
ceases to exist, suggesting that wrong timing can cost investors dearly. 
1.2.3. The Implications of the Findings 
This thesis reports that the sources of the profitability of the trading 
strategies can be traced back to a risk-return relationship based on the fundamental 
information about the firm and the economy. In the context of the market 
efficiency literature, the market is efficient with regards to the information about 
the Book-to-Market ratio, since future stock returns cannot be predicted using this 
ratio when risks are taken into account. However, future returns can be predicted 
using information about past stock returns and firms’ accruals even when returns 
are adjusted for risks. This return predictability can be explained by the 
management’s behaviours. Hence the market is not fully efficient with regards to 
the information about past stock returns and firms’ accruals. The findings also 
suggest that our understanding of corporate investment decisions can help extend 
our understanding of the securities markets and portfolio investment strategies.  
Furthermore, the findings can help investors in improving the profitability 
of these trading strategies. Investors can be better off when pursuing the value-
growth trading strategy on value and growth firms with bigger gap to the extent to 
which firms’ assets are irreversible. Similarly, they would benefit from pursuing 
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the momentum trading strategy among firms with high financial constraints and in 
economic upturns than among those with low financial constraints and in economic 
downturns. Implementing the momentum trading strategy among past winners and 
past losers that are far different in their current investment activities can also 
improve the  profitability of this trading strategy. Finally, investors would benefit 
from pursuing the accruals based trading strategy among firms that are either 
highly inflexible or highly flexible in investment and financing (i.e. at the two 
extremes of financial constraints). They also benefit from pursuing the strategy 
during economic upturns among firms that are highly inflexible. The profits can be 
either completely or partially explained when risks are controlled for using the 
asset pricing model conditioned on these financial inflexibility characteristics. 
Hence investors should bear in mind that all or part of the improved performance 
of the trading strategies might just be a compensation for higher risks.  
1.3. Thesis Outline 
The inquiry into the relationship between financial flexibility and the 
profitability of the value-growth trading strategy is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 
3 investigates its relationship with the profitability of the momentum trading 
strategy. The relationship with the profitability of the accruals based trading 
strategy is examined in Chapter 4. Although the thesis uses the same approach, i.e. 
investigating the influence of firms’ investment and financing flexibility on the 
profitability of the three trading strategies, three chapters deal with three different 
trading strategies, addressing different gaps in the literature of each strategy. 
Therefore, each chapter is presented independently. They start with an introduction 
of the relevant trading strategy, highlighting the gaps in the literature and how an 
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investigation of firms’ investment and financing flexibility can fill in such gaps, 
and identifying the contributions of the respective investigations into the relevant 
strategy.  
Each empirical chapter then follows the usual sequence of literature 
review, hypothesis development, methodologies and data, results, and conclusions. 
It is unavoidable that when similar methodologies are used to investigate different 
issues about the three trading strategies, the discussions of the methodologies in the 
three chapters have some overlaps. However attempts have been made to minimise 
the duplications. Finally, chapter 5 provides the concluding remarks on the findings 
in each of the three investigations, their implications, and the directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 – Firms’ Investment, Financing Flexibility 
and the Value-Growth Trading Strategy 
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2.1. Introduction 
Investing in value and growth stocks has been known to the investing 
public since the early 20th century. Investors in the early days believed that “good 
common stocks are those which have shown a rising trend of earnings” (Graham 
and Dodd, 1940, reprinted in 2009, p.29). However, the principle of “the best 
companies make the best stocks” is now widely recognised in the market as one of 
the market myths (Dorfman, 2009). The early work of Graham and Dodd (first 
edition in 1934, reprinted in 1940, 2009) promoted the idea of investing in value 
stocks, which they define as those with solid fundamentals, at a price which gives 
investors sufficient margin of safety.  
Academic studies tend to simplify the definition of value stocks down to 
stocks of firms with a high ratio of fundamentals to price such as the Book-to-
Market ratio (book value of equity / market value of equity), the earnings yield or 
E/P ratio (firms’ earnings / market value of equity), the cash flow yield (cash flow / 
market value of equity), or the dividend yield (dividend / market value of equity). 
Stocks of firms with a low ratio of fundamentals to price are classified as growth 
stocks8.  
There is extensive empirical evidence on the higher returns of value stocks 
relative to growth stocks. Research on the profitability of the value-growth trading 
strategy, i.e. the strategy that goes long in value stocks and short in growth stocks, 
                                                     
8
 The selection of these variables, as noted by Chan et al. (1991), is based on intuition and 
their popularity among practitioners. Firms with a high ratio of fundamentals to stock prices 
are often perceived as priced relatively cheaper compared with their “intrinsic value” or 
other comparable firms with a lower corresponding ratio. Therefore the ratios of 
fundamentals to stock prices are often used as value indicators. 
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started in the U.S. market9. The phenomenon, also known as the value anomaly in 
the market efficiency literature, appears to be also widely documented in several 
markets with different accounting practices. Chan et al. (1991) document that 
despite the differences in the accounting practices between the U.S. and the 
Japanese markets, e.g. the popularity of accelerated depreciation method among the 
Japanese firms, there is evidence that the value premium (or the profitability of the 
value-growth trading strategy) exists in the Japanese market over the 18 year 
period from 1971 to 1988. Stock returns exhibit a positive relationship with the 
value indicators such as the Book-to-Market ratio and the cash flow yield but not 
with the earnings yield. Capaul et al. (1993) report the strong value premium in six 
developed markets over 12 years period from 1981 to 1992. Fama and French 
(1998) extend the investigation to several international markets over an extended 
period of 20 years from 1975 to 1995. They find evidence that using the Book-to-
Market ratio, the dividend yield, the cash flow yield and the earnings yield to 
classify value and growth stocks, value stocks outperform growth stocks in thirteen 
markets, including both developed and emerging markets. 
Research into the relative performance of value stocks vs. growth stocks 
attributes the superior return of value stocks to several factors. With the emergence 
of the asset pricing literature, starting with the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Litner 
(1965), studies on the value and growth stocks since the 1970s account for the 
difference in risks in explaining the difference in the returns. Basu (1977), 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), Rosenberg et al. (1985), Fama and French 
                                                     
9
 Graham and Dodd (1934, reprinted in 1940, 2009), Basu (1977), Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979), Rosenberg et al. (1985), Fama and French (1992), Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), to name a few. 
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(1992), Lakonishok et al. (1994) find that value stocks generate higher returns than 
growth stocks after accounting for the difference in returns that are due to the 
difference in risks. Fama and French (1995) attribute the value premium to the 
financial distress risk of value firms. On the other hand, Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
suggest that it is due to investors making errors when forming their expectation 
based on the extrapolation of past growth into the future.  
Recent theoretical development, led by Berk et al. (1999), links the 
expected stock returns with the investment activities of the underlying firm. These 
theoretical papers lay the foundation for several theoretical papers aiming to 
explain the profitability of trading strategies by modeling the relationship between 
firms’ investment activities and their stock prices. To explain the value premium, 
Zhang (2005) develops an equilibrium model in which firms face higher costs in 
cutting their production capacity than in expanding it. Firms are assumed to adjust 
their capital investments to achieve the optimal level across the business cycle. 
Value firms are burdened with more unproductive capital stocks. They will face 
more difficulty in cutting their capital stocks in bad times compared to growth 
firms. On the other hand, in good times, growth firms will face higher adjustment 
costs than value firms.  
In the Zhang (2005) model, due to the asymmetry of the costly 
reversibility, the expansion is easier than the reduction of capital stocks. 
Consequently, value firms have less flexibility than growth firms to survive in the 
adverse environment during the bad state of the business cycle. In addition, the 
model also assumes that discount rates are time varying, higher in bad states and 
lower in good states. As a result, more assets will become redundant in bad states, 
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exposing value firms to even more pressure to disinvest, and reinforcing their 
inflexibility relative to growth firms. With this mechanism, the Zhang (2005) 
model attributes the difference in the returns of value and growth stocks to the 
difference in risks. 
Closely related to the Zhang (2005) model are the two models of Cooper 
(2006) and Carlson et al. (2004). The Cooper (2006) model explains the 
outperformance of value over growth stocks based on firms’ excess capacity. When 
a firm has experienced adverse shocks to its productivity, if the capital investment 
is largely irreversible, the book value of the firm’s assets remains fairly constant. 
As the market value of this firm falls, its Book-to-Market ratio rises. Those firms 
with high Book-to-Market ratios, i.e. value firms, are more sensitive to aggregate 
shocks, i.e. shocks to aggregate productivity. They can benefit from positive 
aggregate shocks as their existing excess capacity allows them to exploit the 
opportunities during economic upturns without undertaking any costly new 
investment. On the other hand, firms with low Book-to-Market ratios, i.e. growth 
firms, would need to undertake costly investments to fully benefit from the positive 
aggregate shock. Growth firms would therefore not co-move much with the 
business cycle during economic upturns, hence lower systematic risks. 
In Carlson et al. (2004), a firm’s investments may result in higher 
operating leverage through long term commitments such as the fixed operating 
costs of a larger plant, labour contract commitments and commitments to suppliers. 
In this model, when the demand for a firm’s product decreases, the firm’s future 
operating profits are lower, leading to a lower equity value relative to its capital 
stocks. If the fixed operating costs are proportional to the capital stocks, the decline 
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in the product demand could result in higher operating leverage. As the book value 
of equity can be considered as a proxy for the firm’s capital stocks, the Book-to-
Market ratio describes the operating leverage component of risks that reflects the 
state of the product market demand conditions relative to invested capitals. Thus, 
value firms with higher Book-to-Market ratios are riskier and generate higher 
returns than growth firms with lower Book-to-Market ratios.  
The three models of Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006) and Carlson et al. 
(2004) share a common feature - the value premium is rooted in the difference in 
the extent to which firms can flexibly adjust their physical capital investments in 
response to aggregate shocks. Empirical tests on the relationship between a firm’s 
physical investments and the value premium are limited so far. Anderson and 
Garcia Feijo (2006) test the effect of firms’ investments on stock returns. Their 
results, although shedding light on the investment and disinvestment activities of 
value and growth firms, cannot be considered as direct evidence for the 
explanatory power of investment inflexibility to the value premium. Gulen et al. 
(2008) report a counter-cyclical pattern of the expected value premium. The 
authors also find that there is a systematic difference in the firm level investment 
and financing inflexibility of value and growth stocks, and a positive relationship 
between firms’ costs of equity capital and these measures.  
There is a gap in the literature to empirically test whether the inflexibility 
in firms’ physical capital investments can account for the value premium. This 
chapter aims to fill in this gap by empirically investigating (a) whether the value 
premium actually exists, and if yes, (b) whether it is affected by the inflexibility of 
firms’ physical capital investments. The Zhang (2005) model suggests that the 
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value premium arises as value and growth firms respond to positive and negative 
aggregate shocks differently due to their difference in the irreversibility of physical 
capital investment. Therefore, this chapter hypothesises that firms’ investment 
irreversibility and its interaction with the business cycles affect the value premium.  
The closely related model of Cooper (2006) employs excess capacity, a 
consequence of investment irreversibility when firms face adverse productivity 
shocks, to explain the value premium. The Cooper (2006) model suggests that due 
to the difference in excess capacity, value and growth firms co-move differently 
with the business cycles, resulting in their different systematic risks. Therefore this 
chapter hypothesises that firms’ excess capacity and its interaction with the 
business cycle affect the value premium.  
Long term commitments from firms’ physical investments at the same time 
make the investments difficult to reverse and contribute to firms’ operating 
leverage. The Carlson et al. (2004) model suggests that value and growth firms 
have different operating leverage, which reflects the relation between the product 
market demand conditions and the invested capital. As the product market demand 
tends to vary with the business cycle, this chapter hypothesises that firms’ 
operating leverage and its interaction with business cycles affect the value 
premium. 
In adjusting their physical capital investments across the business cycle, 
firms need to consider not only the reversibility nature of the physical investments, 
but also their financing flexibility or financial constraints, i.e. the ease of accessing 
sufficient financial resources in a timely manner. Hence, this chapter also examines 
the role of financing flexibility in explaining the value premium. Along the lines of 
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Hahn and Lee (2009), Livdan et al. (2009), and Gulen et al. (2008), financial 
constraints could play a direct role in the existence of the value premium, i.e. value 
firms are subject to higher financial constraints and earn higher returns to 
compensate for investors’ exposure to higher level of risks. In this case, this 
chapter hypothesises that the gap in the financial constraints of value and growth 
firms affects the value premium. 
On the other hand, financial constraints can indirectly affect the value 
premium. In the Caggese (2007) model, financial constraints amplify the impact of 
investment irreversibility on firms’ investment activities. If investment 
irreversibility drives the value premium, financial constraints can play an indirect 
role to explain the value premium through its influence on the relationship between 
firms’ investment irreversibility and their decision to adjust the physical investment 
stocks. In this case, this chapter hypothesises that firms’ financial constraints and 
their interaction with investment irreversibility affect the value premium. 
The chapter makes the following main contributions. This chapter takes the 
work of Gulen et al. (2008) a step further and provides evidence on whether the 
success of the value-growth trading strategy can be explained by the firm level 
flexibility. In addition, this chapter uses a more comprehensive and improved set of 
variables to describe investment flexibility. More specifically this is the first study, 
to the author’s knowledge, that provides empirical evidence on the implications of 
investment flexibility on the success of the value-growth trading strategy. 
Furthermore, this chapter considers the interaction between investment 
flexibility and the macro environment, a critical component in all the theoretical 
models of Zhang (2005), Carlson et al. (2004) and Cooper (2006). Finally, Caggese 
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(2007) suggests that financial constraints can interact with investment 
irreversibility to influence firms’ investments. Hence, this chapter provides 
evidence on whether financial constraints affect the success of the value-growth 
trading strategy directly through their influence on the risk profiles of value and 
growth firms, or indirectly through their influence on the relationship between 
firms’ investment irreversibility and their investment activities. 
Consistent with the literature, this chapter finds strong evidence of the 
outperformance of value stocks over growth stocks of firms listed on NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1972 to 2006. The outperformance of value stocks 
holds even when the returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French 
model, which contains a value factor. The empirical evidence supports the 
predictions of Zhang (2005) that firms’ investment irreversibility helps explain the 
value premium. It is also broadly consistent with the conjecture in Carlson et al. 
(2004) and Cooper (2006) that firms’ investment inflexibility helps explain the 
value premium. However, when measuring investment inflexibility using operating 
leverage and excess capacity, i.e. the two variables describing investment 
flexibility in Carlson et al. (2004) and Cooper (2006) respectively, the findings 
reject the claim that these measures explain the value premium. The findings 
suggest that financial constraints affect the value premium indirectly through their 
interaction with firms’ investment irreversibility.  
The findings in this chapter have several implications for both academics 
and practitioners. This chapter reports that the sources of the profitability of the 
value-growth trading strategy can be traced back to a risk-return relationship based 
on the fundamental information about the firm and the economy. In the language of 
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the market efficiency literature, future stock returns cannot be predicted based on 
the Book-to-Market ratio after controlling for risks. Hence the evidence suggests 
that the market is efficient with regards to the Book-to-Market ratio. Furthermore, 
the findings suggest that the profitability of the value-growth trading strategy is 
affected by the inflexibility in the investment and financing environment at the firm 
level. In other words, our understanding of corporate finance can help extend our 
understanding of the securities markets.  
The results from this chapter can benefit investors who attempt to profit 
from the value-growth trading strategy. The profit from the value-growth trading 
strategy can be improved if investors use the value and growth firms with bigger 
gap to the extent to which firms’ assets are irreversible. The value premium can be 
completely explained when risks are controlled for using the asset pricing model 
conditioned on these characteristics. Hence the improved performance might just 
be a compensation for higher risks. 
2.2. Literature Review 
Investing in value and growth stocks is an old stock market wisdom that 
motivates extensive academic research. During the booming period from the end of 
World War I to the market rally of 1927 – 1929, right before the 1930 Great 
Depression, investing in stocks with high growth was considered among investors 
as the investment theory of the new era, according to Graham and Dodd (1940, 
reprinted in 2009). Formal studies into the returns of growth stocks might have 
started in this period with the book by Edgar Lawrence Smith (1925), who argued 
that common stocks tended to increase in value over years as companies retained 
earnings for reinvestment (Graham and Dodd, 1940, reprinted in 2009). 
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The subsequent Great Depression cast doubt on not only the investment 
theory of investing in growth, but also on the general investing activity in the stock 
market. Graham and Dodd (1934, reprinted in 1940, 2009) re-established the 
confidence in investing in the stock market by providing a discipline to investing. 
Their classic book Security Analysis (1934, reprinted in 1940, 2009) is often cited 
as the first comprehensive defense for investing in value stocks, i.e. stocks with 
prices below the company fundamentals (Graham and Dodd, 1940, reprinted in 
2009) to leave investors with a margin of safety.  
While Graham and Dodd offered a framework to identify value stocks 
since the 1930s, there has been no universal agreement among industry 
practitioners on the definition of value and growth stocks (Ibbotson and Riepe, 
1997). Instead, the general consensus is on the broad characteristics of value and 
growth investing. Growth style refers to investments in companies experiencing 
rapid growth in earnings, sales or return on equity. Value style often refers to 
investments in unpopular stocks (such as stocks in mature industries), turn-around 
opportunities (such as stocks of companies experiencing problems, but that are 
expected to recover, including bankruptcy restructuring). More generally, it refers 
to investments in stocks whose assets are undervalued by the market.  
The norm in the investment community is to recommend stocks based on 
the ratios of fundamentals to prices, e.g. the Book-to-Market ratio, or the reciprocal 
ratio of price to fundamentals, e.g. the P/E ratio (market value of equity / firms’ 
earnings). These ratios are widely used in the academic research on value and 
growth stocks (Subrahmanyam, 2010). According to Poitras (2005), there is a 
subtle difference between the original Graham and Dodd’s concept of value stocks, 
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i.e. stocks with stock price falling below their intrinsic value, and the modern 
finance’s definition of value stocks, i.e. stocks with high ratios of fundamentals to 
price. The more mechanical definition of value stocks by academics serves the 
purpose of classifying a large number of stocks into value and growth stocks, as 
academics are more concerned with the average returns across stocks rather than 
the evaluation of individual stocks. 
Early academic studies focused on the relationship between the P/E ratio 
and stock returns observed by practitioners. Although investors buy stocks with 
high P/E ratios for growth and stocks with low P/E ratios for income, stocks with 
low P/E ratios tend to provide not only income but also capital appreciation. 
Nicholson (1960, 1968) suggested that while the P/E ratio reflected investor 
satisfaction of company growth, if prices were pushed to extreme, they would 
eventually reverse. On the other hand, stocks with low P/E ratios on average would 
perform better as their prices have not been pushed to a vulnerable level. Breen 
(1968) also found the dominant effect of P/E ratios compared to the industry 
association in predicting future returns.  
These early studies are subject to several drawbacks on the samples’ 
characteristics. The samples are often limited to a small number of firms, e.g. 100 
stocks in Nicholson (1960), 189 stocks in Nicholson (1968). Alternatively they 
might be constrained to short periods of time, e.g. five year intervals within a total 
of twenty years in Nicholson (1960) or thirteen years in Breen (1968). More 
importantly, given the early stage of the asset pricing literature, not surprisingly 
these early studies did not adjust returns for risks. Any difference in returns 
between stocks with high and low P/E ratios might be due to the difference in risks. 
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Finally, according to Basu (1977), early studies failed to account for (a) selection 
bias, (b) market frictions and (c) the availability of earnings information after the 
reporting date, which cast doubt on their conclusions. 
2.2.1. The Value Premium and the CAPM 
It is possible that any difference in returns of value and growth stocks is 
the result of the difference in risks. While the early studies suffered from the failure 
to adjust returns for risks, with the proliferation of the asset pricing literature, 
pioneered by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), later studies use different asset 
pricing models to adjust returns for risks. Studies in the 1970s and 1980s use the 
CAPM to adjust returns for risks and investigate whether and why the ratios of 
price to fundamentals can help identify outperforming stocks.  
Basu (1977) uses the CAPM to adjust returns for risk and finds that the 
portfolio with low P/E ratios earns higher risk adjusted returns than the portfolio 
with high P/E ratios, which is often referred to as the P/E effect. On the other hand, 
Reinganum (1981) documents that using the CAPM to adjust returns for risks, the 
portfolios ranked based on the E/P ratio experience abnormal returns but it is 
subsumed by the size effect10. Extending the sample period beyond the earlier 
studies, avoiding data selection bias and accounting for the January effect, Jaffe et 
al. (1989) later find that the effect is significant. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
(1979) report that stocks with high dividend yields earn higher before-tax returns 
than stocks with low dividend yields.  
                                                     
10
 I.e. the evidence that small stocks earn higher returns than big stocks (Banz, 1981). 
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Beside the earnings related ratios, researchers also document similar 
evidence with regards to other ratios of prices to other fundamentals. Rosenberg et 
al. (1985) first test the relationship between stock returns and the Book-to-Market 
ratio. They report that the value trading strategy based on the Book-to-Market ratio 
generates positive and significant returns. In short, using the CAPM to adjust for 
risks, value stocks with high Book-to-Market ratios, high dividend yields, or high 
earnings yields earns higher risk adjusted returns than growth stocks with low 
corresponding ratios. Along the lines of the Roll (1977) critique, the evidence 
suggests either (a) an anomaly that value stocks outperform growth stocks, or (b) 
the CAPM used to adjust returns for risks is misspecified. 
2.2.2. The Value Premium, Financial Distress and the Fama and French 
Three Factor Model 
The literature on the value premium experiences a twist with the study by 
Fama and French (1992). The authors find that the CAPM is not supported by the 
data, i.e. the relationship between betas and average returns is too flat to comply 
with the CAPM. Fama and French (1992) document that stock returns are better 
explained by a combination of size and the Book-to-Market ratio. First proposed in 
Chan and Chen (1991) as the explanation for the size effect, the financial distress 
argument is also employed in Fama and French (1992) for the value premium. The 
rationale is that stocks in distress or with poor prospects should face higher costs of 
capital than stocks with strong prospects. 
Fama and French (1993) report that the factors relevant to stock returns are 
the excess market return, the size factor (SMB11) and the value factor (HML12) 
                                                     
11
 i.e. the difference between the returns on small and big stock portfolios. 
39 
 
based on the Book-to-Market ratio. In Fama and French (1996), the three-factor 
model is interpreted as either the Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) or the Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (APT). Fama and French (1995) argue that the high Book-to-
Market ratio signals persistent poor earnings whereas the low Book-to-Market ratio 
signals strong earnings. Stock prices forecast the reversion of earning growth after 
firms are ranked based on size and Book-to-Market ratios. Hence stocks with high 
Book-to-Market ratios have lower prices and higher subsequent returns than stocks 
with low Book-to-Market ratios. 
Along the lines of Fama and French (1995), the difference in the returns of 
stocks with high and low Book-to-Market ratios is driven by risks only if the 
relative distress is a priced risk factor. Fama and French (1996, p. 77) provide the 
following explanation: 
“…Consider an investor with specialized human capital tied to a growth 
firm (or industry or technology).…[A] negative shock to a distressed firm 
more likely implies a negative shock to the value of human capital since 
employment to the firm is more likely to contract… If variation in distress 
is correlated across firms, workers in distressed firms have an incentive to 
avoid the stocks of all distressed firms. The result can be a state-variable 
risk premium in the expected returns of distressed stocks”. 
Cochrane (1999) interprets the distress argument as follows: the financial 
distress of individual firms cannot be the priced risk factor, as it can be diversified 
away; the underlying reason for stocks in financial distress to earn high returns is 
                                                                                                                                       
12
 i.e. the difference between the returns on the portfolios of stock with high and low Book-
to-Market ratios. 
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that these stocks perform badly in the bad state of the economy with poor credit 
and poor liquidity, “… precisely when investors least want to hear that their 
portfolio is losing money” (p. 41). 
Several studies cast doubt on the distress explanation of the value 
premium. In order for the value premium to be explained by financial distress, 
value firms should have high financial distress relative to growth firms. However, 
Dichev (1998) finds that the relationship between value firms and the bankruptcy 
risk, measured by the classic z-score and O-score, is not a monotonic one. Firms 
with high bankruptcy risks consist of firms with both high and low Book-to-Market 
ratios13. 
Furthermore, if distress is the priced risk factor, it should be positively 
related to stock returns. Dichev (1998), on the other hand, finds that there is a 
negative relationship between bankruptcy risks and stock returns. Using a different 
measure of distress risks, Campbell et al. (2008) also report that distressed firms 
have low average returns. Furthermore, they find that returns on distressed stocks 
are particularly low during the period of high stock market volatility. This evidence 
is at odd with distressed stocks having low average returns, given that those stocks 
which perform poorly during bad times (i.e. risky stocks) tend to have high average 
returns. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find that the negative relationship between 
bankruptcy risks and stock returns documented in Dichev (1998) is driven by the 
poor stock price performance of firms with low Book-to-Market ratios (or growth 
                                                     
13
 Firms with high bankruptcy risks have high Book-to-Market ratios, but firms with 
highest bankruptcy risks have lower Book-to-Market ratios. 
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firms) in the high bankruptcy risk group. Overall, the evidence on the returns of 
distress stocks cast doubt on the distress explanation for the value premium. 
Overall, there appears to be no consensus about whether the value 
premium is due to the relative financial distress, and whether financial distress is a 
priced risk factor. Hence, although there is evidence that the Fama and French 
three factor model can explain the value premium, it is unclear whether the value 
premium is due to distress risks (Fama and French, 1992, 1993, 1996). There is 
also a question of whether the Fama and French three factor model is a 
specification of the ICAPM (Fama and French, 1993, 1996), although there is some 
evidence that the factors in the Fama and French model are linked to the 
innovations in state variables that describe the investment opportunities14. The risk 
based explanation for the value premium is also enriched as other theoretically 
motivated asset pricing models claim to explain it. 
2.2.3. The Value Premium and the Models with Consumption and Labour 
Incomes 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) advocate the inclusion of labour income 
into the aggregate wealth in addition to the market portfolio. Adopting the 
conditional CAPM in which beta is allowed to be sensitive to the business cycle, 
proxied by the default spread, their model can explain the size effect. Santos and 
                                                     
14
 Liew and Vassalou (2000) and Vassalou (2003) find that the SMB and HML factors are 
related to the future growth in the economy. Petkova (2006) provides further evidence that 
the SMB and HML factors are also related to the innovations in several variables, including 
the aggregate dividend yield, the term spread, the default spread, and the one-month 
Treasury bill yield, that describe investment opportunities. Hahn and Lee (2006) find that 
changes in the default spread and the term spread capture the explanatory power of the 
SMB and HML factors. 
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Veronesi (2006) extend the line of research which accounts for human wealth as 
part of the aggregate wealth. Their results suggest that the value premium could be 
explained by the conditional CAPM containing information about consumption and 
labour income, and the HML factor might reflect the same information that the 
conditioning variables supplement to the original CAPM. 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) report that the value premium can be 
explained when the beta of the CCAPM is conditioned on cay, the consumption to 
wealth ratio, to allow for time varying risk premia. This ratio acts as the state 
variable which describes how consumption might deviate from its relation with 
wealth (human and financial). It summarises investor expectations about future 
returns on the aggregate wealth, and not just on the stock market. The authors find 
that the pricing errors of the conditional CCAPM are comparable to the Fama and 
French model in pricing the 25 size x Book-to-Market portfolios. Furthermore, 
value portfolios have higher consumption betas in bad state than growth portfolios, 
consistent with value stocks being riskier than growth stocks. 
Parker and Julliard (2005) find evidence that the HML and SMB factors in 
Fama and French model predict consumption growth. Furthermore, their 
predictability is highest when the consumption is measured over three year horizon. 
This is also the horizon that makes the CCAPM best prices the cross-section of 
stock returns. This evidence explains why the CCAPM with long run consumption 
measurement can capture the value premium, given the empirical success of the 
Fama and French model. It also suggests that the Fama and French model is linked 
to the fundamentals in the macro environment, and the value premium can be 
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explained by a theoretically motivated model instead of an empirically driven 
model.  
Jagannathan and Wang (2007) report that when the aggregate consumption 
is measured as the year-over-year growth at the fourth quarter, the CCAPM 
performs almost equally well as the Fama and French model in pricing the 25 size 
x Book-to-Market portfolios. Moreover, when combining the CCAPM and the 
Fama and French models, the average alpha value remains unchanged, suggesting 
that the two models may capture the same underlying risks. Similar to Parker and 
Julliard (2005), this evidence suggests that the factors in the Fama and French 
model may be linked to consumptions, good news for a risk based explanation for 
the value premium.  
2.2.4. The Value Premium and the Investment based Models 
Cochrane (1991) develops a production based asset pricing model which is 
comparable to the consumption based model. The production based model 
describes producers and production functions in the place of consumers and utility 
functions, and models the relationship between stock returns and investment 
returns. The findings support that the model has some success in pricing aggregate 
stock returns. However, it cannot explain the forecastability of dividend yields on 
stock returns. Cochrane (1996) reports that several investment based models are 
comparable to the CAPM and the Chen et al. (1986) model and outperform the 
CCAPM in explaining the cross section of the size ranked portfolio returns.  
Recent theoretical development, led by Berk et al. (1999), links the 
expected stock returns with firm characteristics related to their investment 
activities. In the Berk et al. (1999) model, firms possess assets-in-place and 
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growth-options and prefer low risk investments. When doing so, they increase their 
current value and lower their risks in subsequent periods, leading to lower 
subsequent returns. This model uses the Book-to-Market ratio as the state variable 
to summarise the firm’s risk relative to the asset base and explains the lower 
subsequent returns of growth firms relative to value firms. Gomes et al. (2003) 
relax the requirement in the Berk et al. (1999) model that investment opportunities 
are heterogeneous in risks. The Gomes et al. (2003) model is a general equilibrium 
one in which the conditional CAPM holds. Size and the Book-to-Market ratio 
correlate with the true conditional market beta and therefore predict stock returns. 
These two papers are the foundation for the three models by Zhang (2005), Cooper 
(2006) and Carlson et al. (2004) that explain the value premium. 
Zhang (2005) relaxes the assumption in Gomes et al. (2003) that firms 
have equal growth options. The model explains the value premium using the cost 
reversibility and the time varying discount rates. Firms are assumed to adjust their 
capital investments to the optimal level across the business cycle and face higher 
costs in cutting than in expanding. Due to the asymmetry of the cost reversibility, 
the expansion is easier than the reduction of capital stocks. Consequently, value 
firms with more established capital stocks have less flexibility than growth firms in 
surviving the adverse environment during the bad states of the business cycle. 
Furthermore, the Zhang (2005) model assumes that prices of risks are 
countercyclical, i.e. discount rates are assumed to be time varying, low during 
economic upturns and high during downturns. In bad states, as the discount rates 
are higher, more assets will become redundant. Value firms will therefore face 
more pressure to disinvest in bad states, reinforcing their higher investment 
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irreversibility relative to growth firms. With this mechanism, Zhang (2005) 
attributes the difference in the returns of value and growth stocks to the difference 
in their risks.  
The Cooper (2006) model explains the outperformance of value over 
growth stocks based on excess capacity. When a firm has experienced adverse 
shocks to its productivity, if the capital investment is largely irreversible, the book 
value of the firm’s assets remains fairly constant. As the market value of this firm 
falls, its Book-to-Market ratio rises. Those firms with high Book-to-Market ratios, 
i.e. value firms, are more sensitive to aggregate shocks, i.e. shocks to aggregate 
productivity. They can benefit from positive aggregate shocks as their existing 
excess capacity means that they do not need to undertake any costly new 
investments to exploit the economic upturns. On the other hand, firms with low 
Book-to-Market ratios, i.e. growth firms, would need to undertake costly 
investments to fully benefit from the positive aggregate shock. Cooper (2006) 
models that growth firms have lower systematic risks because they do not co-move 
much with the business cycle during economic upturns, which is due to the costs 
these firms would incur when investing to exploit the increasing demand during 
these periods. 
Carlson et al. (2004) offer an explanation for the value premium with a 
model based on operating leverage. A firm’s investments may result in higher 
operating leverage through long term commitments such as the fixed operating 
costs of a larger plant, labour contract commitments and commitments to suppliers. 
Furthermore, when the demand for a firm’s product decreases, the firm’s future 
operating profits are lower, leading to a lower equity value relative to its capital 
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stocks. If the fixed operating costs are proportional to the capital stocks, the decline 
in product demand could result in a higher operating leverage, or higher systematic 
risks. In the Carlson et al. (2004) model, a firm’s beta consists of a component 
derived from operating leverage, i.e. the present value of future commitments 
associated with existing capital stocks scaled by the firm’s value. If the book value 
of equity is considered as a proxy for the firm’s capital stocks, the Book-to-Market 
ratio would describe the operating leverage component of risks and reflect the state 
of product market demand conditions relative to invested capitals. Thus, value 
firms with higher Book-to-Market ratios are riskier and generate higher returns 
than growth firms with lower Book-to-Market ratios. 
The three models of Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006) and Carlson et al. 
(2004) share a common feature - the value premium is rooted in the difference in 
the extent to which firms can flexibly adjust their physical capital investments in 
response to aggregate shocks. Empirical tests on the relationship between a firm’s 
physical investments and the value premium are limited so far. Anderson and 
Garcia Feijo (2006) provide evidence on the difference in the capital expenditure 
levels of value and growth firms and the relationship between firms’ investments 
and stock returns. Their results, although shedding light on the value and growth 
firms’ investments, cannot be considered as direct evidence for any of the three 
models that attribute the success of the value-growth trading strategy to the extent 
to which firms’ investments are inflexible. 
Gulen et al. (2008) report a counter-cyclical pattern of the expected value 
premium. This finding suggests the need to consider the time varying nature of 
risks in explaining the value premium. The authors also find that there is a 
47 
 
systematic difference in the firm level investment and financing inflexibility of 
value and growth stocks, and a positive relationship between firms’ costs of equity 
capital and these measures. However, Gulen et al. (2008) do not provide evidence 
that the value premium can be explained when these inflexibility measures are 
taken into account. 
2.2.5. The Value Premium and the Asset Pricing Models with Time 
Varying Components 
There is a tendency to recognize the time varying nature of the risk-return 
relationship in explaining the value premium. Some of these studies also fall into 
the categories of the asset pricing models already reviewed, e.g. Jagannathan and 
Wang (1996) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) in section 2.2.3 (p. 41). Petkova 
and Zhang (2005) use four state variables15, being dividend yield, default spread, 
term spread and Treasury bill rate, to condition the beta and excess market returns 
in the CAPM model. Their findings show that the betas of the portfolio that goes 
long in value and short in growth stocks co-varies positively with the expected 
market risk premium. This result suggests that value stocks have higher downside 
risks than growth stocks; however the covariance is too small to explain the value 
premium. Together with Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), this paper contributes 
important, although not decisive, evidence against the argument of Lakonishok et 
al. (1994) that value stocks are not riskier than growth stocks16.  
                                                     
15
 Literature suggests a variety of leading macroeconomic indicators in explaining stock 
returns, with these four indicators being most frequently used. 
16
 Lakonishok et al. (1994) search for undesirable state of the world in which the value 
portfolio underperforms the growth portfolio to support for the argument of the value 
portfolio being fundamentally riskier. In periods of low GNP growth or low market returns, 
however, the value portfolio still outperform its growth counterpart consistently. Fama and 
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Avramov and Chordia (2006) first condition betas of several asset pricing 
models17 on both state variables and firm-level characteristics18 that describe the 
risks of growth options and assets in place, motivated in Berk et al. (1999) and 
Gomes et al. (2003). They find that conditioning betas helps improve the 
predictability of most asset pricing models. Of these models, the Fama and French 
three factor model performs the best, capable of capturing the size, the value but 
not the momentum effects. The model specification in Avramov and Chordia 
(2006) could be improved in light of the recent theoretical development using 
firms’ investment characteristics to explain the value premium. 
2.2.6. Other Explanations for the Value Premium 
Error-in-Expectation 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that investors rely too heavily on past 
returns when forecasting future returns. They become overly optimistic in 
forecasting future returns of growth stocks while overly pessimistic in forecasting 
future returns of out-of-favour value stocks. The growth stock prices will then be 
bid up to the level commensurate with the expected growth rates, but too high to 
their fundamentals. The opposite happens to value stocks. Over time, as stock 
                                                                                                                                       
French (1996) argue that industry conditions should have greater influence to the prospects 
of individual firms than the overall GNP of the economy. 
17
 Including the original CAPM, Fama and French 3 factor model and its extended models 
augmented with the Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor and with the momentum 
factor,  the original CCAPM of Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978) and Breenden (1979), 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) model, and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) model (cited in 
Avramov and Chordia, 2006). 
18
 Previous studies either link beta with state variables (e.g. Petkova and Zhang, 2005) or 
with firm characteristics (Ferson and Harvey, 1991, 1998, 1999, cited in Avramov and 
Chordia, 2006, p. 1003). 
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prices converge to the fundamental values, value stocks outperform growth stocks. 
According to Barberis and Shleifer (2003), the extrapolation of past returns into the 
future expected returns is based on the cognitive bias of representative heuristic 
described in Tversky and Kahneman (1984, cited in Barberis and Shleifer, 2003).  
Several studies find supportive evidence for the error-in-expectation 
hypothesis. La Porta (1996) and Chan et al. (2000) find that stocks with higher 
growth expectations underperform those with low growth expectations. According 
to La Porta et al. (1997), the returns around the earnings announcement events of 
value stocks are higher than those of growth stocks. This tendency persists for five 
years following the portfolio formation, consistent with the argument in 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) that the market updates slowly the earnings prospects of 
value stocks. On the other hand, Dechow and Sloan (1997) find no evidence for the 
extrapolation of past trends into the future. Skinner and Sloan (2002) report that 
growth stocks have as many positive earnings surprises as negative ones but 
respond asymmetrically to the negative ones. 
Information Asymmetry 
According to Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992), the degree of information 
asymmetry between management and insiders versus outside investors is greater 
for neglected firms. Hence neglected stocks are expected to generate higher returns 
for investors to compensate for bearing these extra costs and risks19. Growth stocks 
                                                     
19
 Several studies document the association of positive stock returns and the information 
asymmetry to explain the cross section of stock returns in different corporate decision 
contexts. Examples include Krishnaswami et al. (1999) with regards to the placement 
structure of corporate debt, and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) with regards to 
corporate spin-off decision. 
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are often followed more closely by press and analysts given their perceived high 
growth prospects. By contrast, value stocks are often unpopular stocks or stocks 
that face turn-around opportunities (Ibbotson and Riepe, 1997). Information 
asymmetry may therefore explain the higher returns of value stocks compared to 
growth stocks. 
Divergence of Opinions 
Using the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecast as a proxy for the 
divergence of opinions, Diether et al. (2002) report that investors have more 
diverge opinions on value stocks than growth stocks. Furthermore, stocks with 
higher dispersions earn lower future returns than the otherwise similar stocks. The 
authors attribute their results to the Miller (1977) dispersion premium hypothesis. 
On the contrary, Doukas et al. (2004) advocate the divergence discount hypothesis.  
They find that the value (growth) portfolio has positive (negative) and significant 
coefficient on the dispersion factor in the augmented Carhart (1997) model. The 
authors suggest that the dispersion is a proxy for risks. Accordingly, value stocks 
have high dispersions, are priced at a discount and hence generate higher 
subsequent returns than growth stocks. 
Doukas et al. (2006) and Boehme et al. (2006) argue that the Miller (1977) 
model requires the presence of both the divergence of opinions and short sale 
constraints. When controlling for short sale constraints, Doukas et al. (2006) find 
that their evidence is consistent with the dispersion discount hypothesis advocated 
in Doukas et al. (2004). On the contrary, Boehme et al. (2006) find evidence to 
support the divergence premium hypothesis when controlling for a combined 
measure of short sale constraints. Hence it is still disputable whether the evidence 
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in Doukas et al. (2004) suggests that value and growth stocks are mispriced or are 
subject to different levels of the priced dispersion factor. 
Short Sale Constraints and Other Limits to Arbitrage 
Ali et al. (2003) report that the value anomaly is more pronounced for 
stocks that are subject to idiosyncratic return volatility, high transaction costs and 
low institutional ownerships. Of these, idiosyncratic return volatility is the most 
influential. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the value premium exists due to 
the excessive volatility in the returns of the hedge portfolio. Nagel (2005) finds that 
it is more pronounced among firms in the low institutional ownership class. 
Moreover, the documented asymmetry in the variation of value and growth stock 
returns to institutional ownership is consistent with institutional investors being 
able to eliminate the mispricing of overvalued stocks more easily than undervalued 
stocks. The evidence points towards (a) the mispricing explanation for the value 
premium, and (b) its persistence due to the lack of arbitrage activities.   
2.2.7. The Gaps in the Literature 
From the review of the literature, there appears to be a lack of rigorous 
empirical evidence to support the emerging theories that use the inflexibility 
characteristics of the firm level investments to explain the cross section of the 
returns of value and growth stocks. Specifically, Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006) and 
Carlson et al. (2004) identify three aspects, i.e. investment irreversibility, excess 
capacity, and operating leverage respectively, that drive the value premium. These 
studies are complementary rather than substitute as the three aspects are closely 
related. This is because firms with investments that are highly irreversible would 
have excess capacity when facing adverse productivity shocks. In addition, long 
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term commitments from firms’ physical investments make the investments difficult 
to reverse and contribute to firms’ operating leverage. There is no existing study 
that tests whether investment flexibility can explain the value premium. This 
chapter aims to fill in this gap. Section 2.3 (p. 52) forms the research questions and 
develops the hypotheses to empirically test the links between the inflexibility 
characteristics of the firm level investments and the profitability of value-growth 
trading. 
2.3. The Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 Section 2.2.7 (p. 51) identifies a gap, i.e. empirical testing of the 
relationship between the inflexibility characteristics of the firm level investments 
and the value premium. This chapter aims to fill in this gap by providing the 
empirically evidence for the relationship between the three characteristics 
identified in Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006) and Carlson et al. (2004) and the value 
premium. These models share a common feature - the value premium is rooted in 
the difference in the extent to which firms can flexibly adjust their physical capital 
investments in response to aggregate shocks. The research questions that this 
chapter aims to address are therefore as follows: 
(1) Whether the value premium exists in the sample; and  
(2) If it does, whether it is affected by the inflexibility of firms’ physical 
capital investments. 
To address the first research question, this chapter expects to find the 
evidence of the value premium in the sample examined, given the extensive 
evidence on its existence in the literature reviewed in section 2.2 (p. 34). The first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
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H2.1: The strategy of buying value stocks and selling growth stocks 
generates positive returns. 
This chapter addresses the second research question by testing the 
hypotheses on the relationship between firms’ investment inflexibility and the 
value premium. Gulen et al. (2008) find that their proxies for investment 
irreversibility of Zhang (2005) are not significant in the cross section of stock 
returns; whereas operating leverage of Carlson et al. (2004) and the financial 
leverage are. The composite flexibility, measured as the average of these variables, 
is highly statistically significant. This result might be driven by the contribution of 
the financial and operating leverage rather than the investment irreversibility 
proxies, given the statistical insignificance of the latter. This evidence therefore 
lends no direct support to the relevance of investment irreversibility as modeled in 
Zhang (2005). Furthermore, the evidence in Gulen et al. (2008) is on the impact of 
these inflexibility measures on firms’ costs of capital rather on whether real 
flexibility accounts for the value premium. Finally, in testing the relationship 
between the real flexibility measures and the cross section of stock returns, Gulen 
et al. (2008) do not consider the interaction of the macroeconomic environment and 
the real flexibility factors as modeled in both Zhang (2005) and Carlson et al. 
(2004). 
Firms’ investment irreversibility and the value premium: 
In Zhang (2005), value firms’ investment irreversibility makes them riskier 
as they are burdened with investments that are costly to reverse. They become less 
flexible in confronting macroeconomic shocks and adjusting to the optimal 
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investment level. This chapter therefore hypothesises that the bigger the investment 
irreversibility gap between value and growth firms, the higher the value premium.  
Furthermore, according to Zhang (2005), in bad states of the business 
cycle, value firms are burdened with more unproductive capital stocks and will 
face more difficulty in cutting their capital stocks compared to growth firms. On 
the other hand, in good states of the business cycle, growth firms have less capital 
stocks and need to expand. Hence, value firms have less flexibility than growth 
firms in surviving the bad states of the business cycle. Hence, the business cycle 
variation plays an essential role in translating the difference in investment 
irreversibility (if any) into the difference in the systematic risks of value and 
growth stocks. This chapter hypothesizes that the cross sectional difference in the 
returns of value and growth stocks should be reduced or eliminated when taking 
into account firms’ investment irreversibility and its interaction with the business 
cycle.  
The following hypotheses are complementary rather than substitute: 
H2.2a: The bigger the investment irreversibility gap between value and 
growth firms, the higher the value premium; and  
H2.2b: Firms’ investment irreversibility and business cycles together affect 
the value premium. 
Firms’ operating leverage and the value premium: 
According to Carlson et al. (2004), operating leverage is the key to explain 
the value premium. Value stocks are those which suffer a decrease in the demand 
for their products, having the relatively low equity value as compared to the book 
value or the capital stocks. If the fixed operating costs are proportional to the 
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capital stocks, value firms would have higher operating leverage and are therefore 
exposed to higher systematic risks compared to growth firms. This chapter 
therefore hypothesises that the bigger the operating leverage gap between value 
and growth firms, the higher the value premium.  
According to the Carlson et al. (2004) model, if the macroeconomic 
environment continues to be unfavourable, i.e. the product demand declines 
further, value firms (those which have been suffering from deteriorating demands), 
will have higher operating leverage, or even higher systematic risks. Therefore, this 
chapter also hypothesises that the cross sectional difference in the returns of value 
and growth stocks should be reduced or eliminated when taking into account the 
difference in firms’ operating leverage and its interaction with the business cycle.  
The following hypotheses are complementary rather than substitute: 
H2.3a: The bigger the operating leverage gap between value and growth 
firms, the higher the value premium; and 
H2.3b: Firms’ operating leverage and business cycles together affect the 
value premium. 
Firms’ excess capacity and the value premium: 
Cooper (2006) suggests the role of excess capacity to the existence of the 
value premium. Value firms are those that have experienced adverse shocks and 
excess capacity and therefore benefit more from positive shocks and suffer more 
from negative shocks. Hence they are exposed to higher systematic risks compared 
to growth firms. The relevance of excess capacity or efficiency to the value 
premium has not been tested empirically. This chapter hypothesises that the bigger 
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the excess capacity gap between value and growth firms, the higher the value 
premium.  
In the Cooper (2006) model, during the economic upturn, value firms’ 
excess capacity allows them to enjoy the expanding product market demand 
whereas growth firms would need to invest to take advantage of it. Hence, this 
chapter also hypothesises that the difference in value and growth stock returns is 
influenced by both firms’ excess capacity and the state of the business cycle. The 
cross sectional difference in the returns of value and growth stocks should be 
reduced or eliminated when taking into account the difference in firms’ excess 
capacity and its interaction with the business cycle.  
The following hypotheses are complementary rather than substitute: 
H2.4a: The bigger the excess capacity gap between value and growth firms, 
the higher the value premium; and 
H2.4b: Firms’ excess capacity and business cycles together affect the value 
premium. 
Firms’ financial constraints and the value premium: 
 Firms’ investments can be influenced by their financial constraint status. 
Livdan et al. (2009) find that firms with financial constraints are riskier as they are 
prevented from making investments and smoothing the dividend streams in 
confronting aggregate shocks. Gulen et al. (2008) include financial leverage as a 
proxy for financial constraints and reports that value firms with higher Book-to-
Market ratios have higher financial leverage. 
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Along the lines of Livdan et al. (2009) and Gulen et al. (2008), financial 
constraints could play a direct role in the existence of the value premium, i.e. value 
firms are subject to higher financial constraints and earn higher returns to 
compensate for investors’ exposure to a higher level of risks. This chapter 
hypothesises that if this argument holds, the bigger the financial constraint gap 
between value and growth firms, the higher the value premium.  
Furthermore, the business cycle would accentuate the impact of financial 
constraints on stock returns as the constraints tend to be more severe during the bad 
states of the business cycle. Hence this chapter also hypothesizes that the cross 
sectional difference in the returns of value and growth stocks should be reduced or 
eliminated when taking into account firms’ financial constraints and the business 
cycle.  
The following hypotheses are complementary rather than substitute: 
H2.5a: The bigger the financial constraint gap between value and growth 
firms, the higher the value premium; and 
H2.5b: Firms’ financial constraints and business cycles affect the value 
premium.  
Alternatively financial constraints can indirectly affect firms’ investment. 
In the Caggese (2007) model, financial constraints amplify the impact of 
investment irreversibility on firms’ investment in fixed capital and working capital 
stocks. Investment irreversibility induces firms to maintain their working capital 
investments too low during downturns and fixed capital investments too low during 
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economic upturns. Financial constraints reinforce the impact of investment 
irreversibility on the investment of working capital and fixed capital stocks20.   
Moreover, given the theoretical studies on how firms’ investment 
irreversibility could explain the value premium (Zhang, 2005), we can expect that 
financial constraints can help explain the value premium through their influence on 
the relationship between firms’ investment irreversibility and their investments. 
Specifically, the higher the financial constraints are, the stronger the impact of 
investment irreversibility on the value premium. Therefore the alternative 
hypothesis is that the more financially constrained firms are, the higher the value 
premium.  
In addition, according to Caggese (2007), financial constraints and 
investment irreversibility may together affect firms’ ability to invest at the optimal 
level differently during different states of the business cycle. Hence, this chapter 
hypothesises that the cross sectional difference in the returns of value and growth 
stocks should be reduced or eliminated when taking into account both firms’ 
financial constraints and investment irreversibility, and the business cycle.  
The following hypotheses are complementing each other and are 
alternative to the hypotheses H2.5a: and H2.5b:  
                                                     
20
 At the beginning of a downturn, firms might want to downside their fixed assets but are 
prevented from doing so due to the irreversibility constraint. As the downturn continues 
revenues worsen. Some firms may also have binding financing constraints and are forced to 
reduce their investment in working capital. When the downturn ends, firms are more 
cautious about increasing their fixed capital. Consequently, during downturns, firms that 
face investment irreversibility and / or financial constraints would have fixed investment at 
an inefficiently high level and working capital at an inefficiently low level. During 
economic upturns, fixed investment might be inefficiently low. 
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H2.6a: The more financially constrained both the value and growth firms 
are, the higher the value premium; and 
H2.6b: Firms’ financial constraints, their investment irreversibility and 
business cycles together affect the value premium. 
The hypotheses developed and examined in this chapter are summarised in 
Table 2.1. 
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
2.4 The Methodology and Sample 
2.4.1. Measurement of Key Firm Level Variables 
Investment irreversibility: 
To measure the extent to which firms’ assets are irreversible, this chapter 
follows the industrial economics literature. Kessides (1990) recommends a proxy 
for industry level sunk costs, consisting of three components – the portion of 
capital which can be rented (negatively correlated with the level of irreversibility), 
the extent to which fixed assets have depreciated (negatively correlated), and the 
intensity of the second-hand market for the capital employed (negatively 
correlated). Farinas and Ruano (2005) modify the industry-level measure in 
Kessides (1990) to three separate firm-level measures: a dummy of 1 for firms 
renting at least part of their capital and 0 otherwise, the ratio of depreciation 
charged during the year / total fixed assets, and the ratio of proceeds of fixed asset 
sale / total fixed assets.  
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To avoid the effect of fully depreciated assets being included in a firm’s 
balance sheet, this chapter replaces the denominator of total fixed assets in Farinas 
and Ruano (2005) with the beginning of the year net fixed assets. To increase the 
precision in measuring the cross sectional difference in the fixed asset rental 
activities among firms, this chapter uses the rental expense scaled by the modified 
denominator instead of the dummy variables in Farinas and Ruano (2005). Finally, 
using one year’s proceeds from fixed asset sales significantly reduces the sample 
size whereas the underlying economic force that it measures, i.e. the intensity of 
the second hand market for the assets employed by a firm, would not dramatically 
change from one year to the next. Hence this chapter modifies the numerator of this 
measure in Farinas and Ruano (2005) to be the sum of the proceeds from fixed 
asset sales in the last three years.  
The fixed asset ratio used in Gulen et al. (2008) does not directly describe 
the extent to which a firm’s assets are irreversible. Firms may have very high 
percentage of fixed assets in their balance sheets but this mere fact does not make 
the assets highly irreversible if their fixed assets, for example, are quickly 
depreciated. It might explain why the fixed asset ratio is statistically weakest and 
insignificant among the proxies for real flexibility employed in Gulen et al. (2008).  
The other measurement of irreversibility in Gulen et al. (2008) is the 
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm disinvests for at least one year during 
the last three years. Gulen et al. (2008) attribute this measure to the frequency of 
disinvestments and argues that the more frequently the firm needs to disinvest, the 
more prone it is to irreversibility. In this chapter, the measurement of the asset sale 
proceeds ratio captures not only the frequency of disinvestments but also the 
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magnitude of the sale proceeds. More importantly, along the lines of Kessides 
(1990) and Farinas and Ruano (2005), the more frequent a firm sells its assets, the 
more active the second hand market for its assets is, and therefore the lower the 
irreversibility of its assets. Also, if firms can recover non-trivial funds from asset 
sales, they are subject to lower investment irreversibility as the funds can be 
reinvested into new assets. On the other hand, often firms with bulky assets which 
tend to be more difficult to disinvest are likely to achieve non-trivial asset sale 
proceeds. The relationship between firms’ disinvestments and their asset 
irreversibility can therefore be either negative or positive; which of these signs 
prevails is an empirical question. 
The final measurements of the three aspects of investment irreversibility 
are the depreciation charge and the rental expense during the year, and the sum of 
the proceeds from fixed asset sales in the last three years, all scaled by the 
beginning of the year net fixed assets. The higher the depreciation charge ratio, the 
more quickly the assets are depreciated, the more easily the firm can replace them 
with new assets. The more assets are rented, the more easily the firm can replace 
them with new assets at the end of the rental contract, normally no longer than their 
useful life. Therefore, these variables are positively correlated with firms’ 
flexibility and negatively correlated with investment irreversibility. The final 
measure, i.e. fixed asset sale proceeds ratio, hereinafter referred to as the 
disinvestment ratio, can be either negatively or positively related to firms’ 
investment irreversibility. 
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Operating leverage: 
To measure the operating leverage, this chapter uses the standard text-book 
measure of the percentage change in operating profits before tax to the percentage 
change in sales. Firms with high fixed costs relative to variable costs benefit more 
from higher sales volume as they do not need to spend as much on additional units 
produced. The downside of having high fixed costs relative to variable costs is that 
if the sales volume is low, firms do not save as much on additional units not 
produced. Hence, firms with high operating leverage, or high fixed costs relative to 
variable costs, have operating profits more sensitive to changes in sales. The ratio 
of changes in operating profits to changes in sales is therefore positively related to 
the degree of operating leverage. To avoid the negative value of operating leverage 
in case operating profits and sales move in opposite directions in a year, negative 
ratios are replaced with missing values. 
Capacity utilisation: 
To proxy for the capacity utilisation, this chapter measures the efficiency 
of firms relative to their peers in the same industry using the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) technique. DEA is a non-parametric technique used to measure the 
efficiency of decision making units (DMUs) first initiated in Charnes et al. (1978). 
DEA evaluates each DMU, optimises its performance by either minimising inputs 
given the output level or maximising outputs given the input level, and determines 
an efficient frontier on which the efficient DMUs lie. According to Banker and 
Maindiratta (1986, cited in Murthi et al., 1997), DEA offers three advantages over 
its parametric counterparts. Firstly, it does not require any assumption about the 
functional form of the relationship between inputs and outputs. Secondly, the 
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efficient frontier can practically be achieved, whereas the parametric methods 
estimate efficiency relative to the average performance. Thirdly, DEA calculates an 
efficiency index for individual DMUs whereas the parametric methods calculate 
statistical averages. 
In Cooper (2006), value firms suffer negative shocks and have excess 
capacity. The efficiency of value firms is viewed from the input perspective, i.e. 
value firms have more capacity than what is needed to meet the current low 
demands. Therefore this chapter chooses the input minimisation model, i.e. given 
the current level of output, determining the minimum input needed to compare with 
firms’ actual inputs21. To determine its capacity utilisation, each firm is evaluated 
against the other firms in the same industry. Industries are defined as one of the 
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 The settings of the DEA input minimisation option are as follows (Emrouznejad, 2005). 
Given n DMUs denoted as { }njDMU j ...1; = , m inputs denoted as { }mixij ,...1; = xij 
and s outputs denoted as { }sryrj ...1; = , the input oriented DEA model seeks to minimise 
φ subject to: 
∑ =+ +
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ijiijj xSx 0φλ  i∀  
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where 0j is the DMU to be assessed. iS and rS are slack variables. +iS represents an 
additional inefficiency use of input i whereas −rS represents an additional inefficiency in the 
production of output r. *φ is the optimal value of φ . 
0jDMU is Pareto efficient if 
*φ =1 
and the optimal value of +iS and 
−
rS =0. Conversely, 0jDMU is inefficient if 1<φ  and / 
or the slacks are positive. The positive values of jλ construct a composite unit with output 
∑ rjj yλ with r = 1…. and input ∑ iji xλ with I = 1…, that outperforms unit 0jDMU  
and provides targets for 
0jDMU . 
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Fama and French (1997) 4922 industries. The output variable is the inflation 
adjusted sales. Two input variables are the annual cost of fixed capital, i.e. 
depreciation expense, and the annual cost of human capital, i.e. inflation adjusted 
salary related expense. The depreciation expense is not inflation adjusted as it 
reflects the historical costs at the time the fixed capital is acquired. DEA seeks to 
find the optimum level of inputs given the level of output of a firm within an 
industry. To implement DEA, this chapter uses the SAS programme by 
Emrouznejad (2005). The result is an efficiency level from 0 to 1 for each firm 
each year, with 0 corresponding to inefficiency and 1 to efficiency. When the DEA 
analysis fails to give any efficiency level for a firm, i.e. when the optimisation fails, 
this chapter assumes that the corresponding efficiency is zero. 
Financial constraints: 
Almeida and Campello (2007) use the payout ratio together with the credit 
ratings of bonds and commercial papers and total assets to proxy for financial 
constraints. According to Hahn and Lee (2009), these criteria reflect financial 
constraints in terms of external funds available for borrowing rather than the higher 
cost of borrowing, with the former being more relevant than the latter according to 
Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Greenwald et al. (1984) 
(cited in Hahn and Lee, 2009). Compared with the other alternative measures in 
Almeida and Campello (2007), the payout ratio is a more direct and straight 
forward measure of the ability of a firm to mobilise funds. The net payout ratio is 
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 Fama and French (1997) originally provide the categorisation of 48 industries. The recent 
update on Kenneth French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_49_ind
_port.html) increases the number of industries to 49. 
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better than the payout ratio at measuring the constraints in terms of fund 
availability as it takes into account not only firms’ distribution in the form of 
dividends but also repurchases23, and their mobilisation through share issuance. 
Hence, this chapter uses the net payout ratio as the proxy for firms’ financial 
constraints.  
Gulen et al. (2008) use financial leverage as a measure for financial 
inflexibility of firms. There is a subtle difference between the debt overhang and 
the financial constraints. A firm might have high debt overhang but if it can get 
access to bank loans or capital markets, it is not financially constrained. The 
hypotheses to be tested are on firms’ financial constraints. Therefore it is more 
appropriate to use the net payout ratio in testing hypotheses H2.5 and H2.6. 
The construction of the key firm level variables described in this section is 
summarised in Panel A of Table 2.2. 
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
2.4.2. Methodology 
To address the research questions and the hypotheses set out in section 2.3 
(p. 52), this chapter employs two methods of analysis. In the portfolio sorting 
approach, stocks are sorted by the value of Book-to-Market ratios as of 31st 
December (year t-1) in ascending order. Ten portfolios with equal number of 
stocks are composed and positions (long and short) are taken at the beginning of 
July of the following year (year t) and held until the end of June the next year (year 
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 Share repurchases are relevant given that they have become an increasingly important 
form of distribution relative to the traditional dividend payment. 
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t+1). The gap of six months between the account year end and the beginning of the 
portfolio holding period ensures that the information that is necessary to compose 
portfolios (i.e. the Book-to-Market ratio) is available to investors. The raw returns 
of ten equally weighted deciles and of the long-short portfolio that goes long in 
value stocks (i.e. the portfolio with the highest ranking in the Book-to-Market 
ratio) and short in growth stocks (i.e. the portfolio with the lowest ranking in the 
Book-to-Market ratio) are reported. 
Following Fama and French (1992), this chapter measures the book value 
of equity and the Book-to-Market ratio as follows24: 
 Book value of equity equals book value of common equity plus balance 
sheet deferred tax25; 
 Market capitalisation equals stock price multiplied with outstanding 
number of shares; and 
 The Book-to-Market ratio equals book value of equity divided by market 
capitalisation measured as of 31st December26 of each year. 
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 Fama and French (1993, 1995, and 1996) adjust the book value of equity for additional 
variables including investment tax credit and book value. Given that data on these 
additional variables are not available for several stocks, this chapter uses the original 
measure of book value of equity in Fama and French (1992) so that it is more consistently 
measured across stocks. 
25
 Balance sheet deferred tax refers to the liabilities on taxable amounts resulting from the 
temporary differences between the carrying values for the accounting and the tax purposes 
(http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias12.htm, accessed on 16/08/2010). Balance sheet 
deferred tax is added to the book value of common equity in determining the Book-to-
Market ratio due to the remote nature (documented in, for example, Colley et al., 2010) of 
the liabilities. This practice is also employed in Fama and French (1992, 1993, and 1996). 
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The second methodology uses (a) an asset pricing model to adjust stock 
returns for risks and investigates whether the positive relationship between risk 
adjusted stock returns and the Book-to-Market ratio is present after controlling for 
risks, and (b) how this relationship is affected by firms’ investment environment. 
This chapter adapts the asset pricing framework of Avramov and Chordia (2006) to 
examine the relationship between the risk adjusted returns and the Book-to-Market 
ratio. Avramov and Chordia (2006) use firm-level data rather than the traditional 
portfolio approach in order to avoid (a) losing information when stocks are grouped 
into portfolios and (b) data snooping biases. The framework involves a two stage 
procedure. In stage one, stock returns of individual firms are adjusted for risks 
using an asset pricing model. In stage two, the risk adjusted returns are regressed 
against the variables that proxy for the widely documented asset pricing anomalies.  
The asset pricing framework of Avramov and Chordia (2006) offers an 
important advantage as it can flexibly incorporate additional information into the 
main asset pricing model to adjust stock returns for risks. This chapter extends the 
model of Avramov and Chordia (2006) to test the contribution of the inflexibility 
of the firm level investments to the value premium. In Avramov and Chordia 
(2006), size and the Book-to-Market ratio are chosen as the conditioning variables 
as they proxy for asset-in-place and growth options, motivated by the Berk et al. 
(2003) model. In this chapter, the firm level conditioning variables in the original 
Avramov and Chordia (2006) model are replaced with the relevant proxies for 
investment and financing flexibility that are hypothesised to be relevant to the 
                                                                                                                                       
26
 The majority of U.S. listed firms have their fiscal year ended in December (Kamp, 2002), 
hence the Book-to-Market ratio is measured in December each year. This practice is also 
employed in Fama and French (1992, 1993, and 1996). 
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value premium. These proxies are introduced one by one to highlight their 
supplementary roles. The investment irreversibility, operating leverage and excess 
capacity measures are not simultaneously present in a model as they all measure 
different aspects of investment inflexibility in different models of Zhang (2005), 
Carlson et al. (2004) and Cooper (2006) respectively. 
The general model specification is described below. In stage one, the 
following time series regression is run for individual firms: 
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in which jtR  is the return on stock j and FtR is the risk free rate at time t. 
ftF represents the priced risk factors, which include the market factor, the HML 
and SMB factors of the Fama and French model (1993, 1996). Firm characteristic 
1−jtFirm  is the one month lagged firm level measurements of (a) investment 
irreversibility, (b) operating leverage, (c) excess capacity, and (d) financial 
constraints. The construction of these variables at December each year is presented 
in section 2.4.1 (p. 59). The variables, measured at December year t-1, are matched 
with stock returns from July year t to June year t+1, and lagged one month to be 
1−jtFirm  in equation 2.1. 1−tMWF is the one month lagged market wide variable 
describing the factors in the business cycle that induce firms to adjust their 
investments to the optimal level. The market wide variable is included in addition 
to the firm level measurements to test hypotheses H2.2b, H2.3b, H2.4b, H2.5b and H2.6b 
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regarding the interaction of the firm level investment inflexibility and the business 
cycle. 
Avramov and Chorida (2006) argue that the inclusion of the business cycle 
variables is motivated by the literature on the time series predictability of business 
cycle variables, such as Fama and French (1989) and Chen (1991). Following 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Avramov and Chorida (2006) eventually use the 
default spread as the business cycle indicator. Similar to Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996), their choice of a single indicator is also motivated by the desire to have a 
small number of variables to ensure some precision in the estimation procedure. 
The default spread is chosen as (a) according to Jagannathan and Wang (1996), 
interest rate variables are likely to be more helpful in predicting future business 
conditions; and (b) Bernanke (1990) reports that of several interest rate variables, 
the default spread is the best single variable to forecast the business cycle. This 
chapter measures the default spread as the spread between the U.S. corporate bonds 
with Moody’s rating of AAA and BAA.  
In stage two, i.e. the cross sectional regressions, the part of returns that are 
unexplained by the asset pricing model in stage one is regressed against the Book-
to-Market ratio. This regression helps assess the return predictability of the Book-
to-Market ratio after controlling for risks.  
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in which *jtR  is the risk adjusted return of stock j at time t, measured as the sum of 
the constant and the residual terms from equation (2.1). 1, −tjBM is the firm level 
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Book-to-Market ratio. The vector of size, cumulative returns and stock turnover in 
equation (2.2) represent the control factors, being the size, momentum, and 
liquidity that might also predict the cross section of stock returns. 
The statistical null hypothesis is that the coefficient tBMc ,  attached to the 
Book-to-Market ratio is not significantly different from zero. This means the Book-
to-Market ratio no longer predicts stock returns. It suggests that the value premium 
is explained when returns are adjusted for risks in stage one.  
H2.0: tBMc , = 0 
The coefficients and t-statistics are reported. As the independent variables 
in stage two are not estimated, stage two regression is not subject to the error-in-
variable issue discussed in Shanken (1992) (Bauer et al., 2010 and Subrahmanyam, 
2010). The t-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
following the Newey and West (1987) procedure.  
This chapter follows Avramov and Chordia (2006) to measure the 
variables in stage two. Size measures the market capitalisation of a stock at the end 
of each month. The Book-to-Market ratio in equation (2.2) is measured in a similar 
way with the Book-to-Market ratio in the portfolio approach and is winsorised at 
0.5% and 99.5%. Three variables that measure past returns are cumulative returns 
for month 2 to 3, 4 to 6 and 7 to 12 prior to the current month. The turnover of 
NYSE – AMEX stocks equals trading volume divided by outstanding number of 
shares if the stock is listed in NYSE or AMEX. The turnover of NASDAQ stocks 
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is constructed in a similar manner27. The construction of the key firm level 
variables described in this section is summarised in Panel B of Table 2.2. 
Avramov and Chordia (2006) and Brennan et al. (1998) transform the 
variables in equation (2.2) as follows: (1) lagging two months (size and turnover 
variables), (2) taking natural logarithm (size, turnover variables and the Book-to-
Market ratio), and (3) taking deviation from the respective cross sectional mean 
(size, turnover variables, the Book-to-Market ratio and cumulative returns). The 
transformation is formalised below: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑=−= 1 ,2,2, ln1ln_ i
n
titjtj Sizelag
n
SizelagdtransformeSize  (2.3) 
[ ] [ ]∑=−= 1 ,,, ln1ln_ i
n
titjtj BM
n
BMdtransformeBM  (2.4) 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑=−= 1 ,2,2, ln1ln_ i
n
titjtj Turnoverlag
n
TurnoverlagdtransformeTurnover   
 (2.5) 
in which tjSize , , tjBM , , and tjTurnover , are the measurements of size, Book-to-
Market, and turnover in NYSE / AMEX or NASDAQ for firm j at time t as 
described above. ( )txlag 2  refers to the two - month lag of  variable tx . 
[ ]yln refers to the natural log of variable y . n refers to the number of stocks in the 
sample at time t. tjdtransformeSize ,_ , tjdtransformeBM ,_ and 
                                                     
27
 The turnovers of the NYSE/AMEX and of the NASDAQ listed stocks are separated as 
the NASDAQ market is a dealer market and the trading volume for the NASDAQ traded 
stocks could therefore be double counted (Atkins and Dyl, 1997, cited in Avramov and 
Chordia, 2006). Furthermore, a dummy variable for the NASDAQ listed stocks is included 
to control for the tendency that returns on the NASDAQ listed stocks are lower than the 
NYSE/AMEX counterparts (Loughran, 1993, cited in Avramov and Chordia, 2006). 
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tjdtransformeTurnover ,_  are the corresponding variables after the 
transformation and replace tjSize , , tjBM , , and tjTurnover , . These variables are 
lagged one month to become 1, −tjSize , 1, −tjBM , and 1, −tjTurnover in equation 
(2.2). 
The variables are lagged to avoid any biases caused by bid-ask effects and 
thin trading. Due to the considerable skewness, they are transformed using natural 
logarithm. Finally, taking deviation from the cross sectional mean implies that the 
average stock will have the values of each of the firm level characteristic equal to 
zero, and the expected return is determined solely by the risk factors.  
2.4.3. Sample Description 
The sample includes stocks which are not in the financial and utility 
sectors and are listed in the three stock markets – NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.  
Financial stocks are excluded as they have different asset structures compared to 
the non-financial stocks. Utilities stocks are excluded as utilities firms and 
potentially their investments are more strictly regulated than firms in other 
industries. Stocks should have a minimum of 36 months of non-negative book 
value of equity to be included in the sample. The sample covers 414 months from 
July 1972 to December 2006, with 988,050 firm-month observations. The coverage 
period starts in 1972 due to the availability of the data to measure net payout ratio. 
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows some statistics for the key variables. All variables 
except for the efficiency measure show a high degree of skewness given their high 
standard deviations and the considerable difference between means and medians. 
The three variables that describe the extent to which firms’ assets are irreversible, 
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i.e. the depreciation charge ratio, the rental ratio and the disinvestment ratio, have 
their means within a close range but the medians significantly apart.  
The correlation matrix of the key variables shows that the three investment 
irreversibility variables are significantly positively correlated. The correlation 
coefficients (a) between the depreciation charge ratio and the disinvestment ratio, 
and (b) between the rental expense ratio and the disinvestment ratio, are close to 
zero; while that between the rental expense ratio and the depreciation charge ratio  
is higher  (at 0.33) but still well  below 1.00. The remaining correlation coefficients 
between any other two variables are either statistically or economically 
insignificant, suggesting that they describe different economic forces. 
[Insert Table 2.3 about here] 
Panel B of Table 2.3 describes the statistics for the variables in the 
regressions of the Avramov and Chordia’s asset pricing framework. An average 
stock in the sample has the excess return of 0.94% per month with the average 
market capitalisation of $1.30 billion and the average Book-to-Market ratio of 0.98. 
The average cumulative returns of the past 2nd to 3rd month, 4th to 6th month, and 7th 
to 12th month are 2.75%, 4.09% and 8.67% per month respectively. All the 
variables in this panel show a significant level of skewness, with the mean values 
well above the median, which suggests that it is appropriate to transform them in 
accordance with Avramov and Chordia (2006) and Brennan et al. (1998) as 
described in section 2.4.2 (p. 65). 
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2.5. The Results 
2.5.1. Results of the univariate analysis 
2.5.1.1. The Profitability of the Value-Growth Trading Strategy 
Table 2.4 reports the returns to the ten equally weighted portfolios sorted 
by the Book-to-Market ratio and the long-short portfolios. For the full sample, the 
returns to the portfolios follow a monotonic pattern, increasing from the growth 
portfolio to the value portfolio. The return to the long-short portfolio is 1.55% per 
month and is statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
Furthermore, in the subsamples with the available data to calculate the key 
firm level variables, including the depreciation charge ratio, the rental expense 
ratio, the disinvestment ratio, the operating leverage, the efficiency ratio, and the 
net payout ratio, similar patterns are observed. With the exception of the subsample 
with the availability of the efficiency ratio, the returns to the portfolios in the other 
subsamples also follow a monotonic pattern, increasing from the growth portfolios 
to the value portfolios. The returns to the long-short portfolios in these subsamples 
are positive and statistically significant, varying between 1.23% per month (the 
subsample with the available operating leverage) and 1.62% per month (the 
subsample with the available disinvestment ratio).  
In the subsample with the efficiency ratio, the returns to the portfolios do 
not strictly follow a monotonic pattern from the growth to the value portfolio – the 
return declines from decile 2 to 4 before it increases from decile 4 through to decile 
10 (i.e. the value portfolio). The return of 0.94% per month to the long-short 
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portfolio in this subsample is also significant, but well below the returns to the 
long-short portfolios in the other subsamples. Overall, the evidence obtained using 
the portfolio sorting methodology suggests that value stocks outperform growth 
stocks, consistent with the existing literature on the value premium.  
To conclude, there is evidence that the returns to the portfolios based on 
the Book-to-Market ratio increase monotonically from low to high Book-to-Market 
deciles. The returns to the long-short portfolios are positive and significant. The 
evidence suggests that hypothesis H2.1, i.e. whether the value-growth trading 
strategy is profitable, cannot be rejected in the univariate analysis.  
2.5.1.2. Investment Irreversibility and the Value Premium 
This chapter first investigates how investment irreversibility differs 
between value and growth stocks to test the relationship between firms’ investment 
irreversibility and the value premium (hypothesis H2.2a). Columns 1 to 3 in Table 
2.5 present the average measures of investment irreversibility, i.e. the ratio of 
depreciation expenses, rental expenses and the proceeds from fixed asset sale, to 
beginning of the year net fixed assets of the Book-to-Market deciles. The time 
series average of (a) the mean investment irreversibility measures of ten equally 
weighted decile portfolios, and (b) the difference in these means measures of the 
value and growth portfolios, are reported. Table 2.6 presents the evidence on the 
relationship between investment irreversibility and the value premium. 
Investment irreversibility measured by the depreciation charge ratio 
In column 1 in Table 2.5, the depreciation charge ratio decreases 
monotonically across the ten Book-to-Market deciles from the growth portfolio to 
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the value portfolio. The growth portfolio has the average depreciation charge ratio 
of 23.57% whereas that of the value portfolio is 14.26%. The assets of value firms 
appear to be on average longer lived than the assets of growth firms, suggesting 
that it is easier for growth firms to make new investments than value firms. As 
expected, the depreciation charge ratio, being negatively related to firms’ 
investment irreversibility, is higher among growth firms and lower among value 
firms. 
[Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
Table 2.6 investigates hypothesis H2.2a that the higher the gap in investment 
irreversibility between value and growth stocks, the higher the value premium. 
Panel A provides the evidence when investment irreversibility is measured using 
the depreciation charge ratio. Hence, only those firms with the available data to 
construct the depreciation charge ratio are included. The sample is then divided 
into three subsamples. Firms having the depreciation charge ratio in the top 30% 
are included in the subsample with low investment irreversibility. Firms having the 
depreciation charge ratio in the bottom 30% are included in the subsample with 
high investment irreversibility. The remaining firms are included in the subsample 
with medium investment irreversibility. 
[Insert Table 2.6 about here] 
In the overall sample, the return to the long-short portfolio is 1.54% per 
month and is statistically significant (column 2 in Table 2.4). Similarly, the first 
three columns of Panel A in Table 2.6 show that in all the three subsamples by the 
depreciation charge ratio, the average returns to the ten deciles generally increase 
from the growth portfolios to the value portfolios. In the subsample with low 
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investment irreversibility (high depreciation charge ratios), the return to the long-
short portfolio is 2.00% per month and is statistically significant. In the subsamples 
with medium and high investment irreversibility, the returns are lower (1.19% per 
month and 1.38% per month respectively).  
The last three columns of Panel A in Table 2.6 present the average 
depreciation charge ratio of the deciles and the corresponding gaps in this ratio 
between the value and growth portfolios in the three subsamples. The depreciation 
charge ratio exhibits a decreasing pattern across the deciles from the growth to the 
value portfolios in the subsample with low investment irreversibility (high 
depreciation charge ratio). The pattern is not monotonic in the subsamples with 
medium and high investment irreversibility. All the gaps in the depreciation charge 
ratios of the value and growth portfolios are negative in the three subsamples, 
similar to the gap in the overall sample (column 1 in Table 2.5).  
The gap in absolute value is the highest (3.58%) in the subsample with low 
investment irreversibility. It is lower in the subsamples with medium and high 
investment irreversibility (1.31% and 0.70% respectively). The results show that 
the subsample with the highest investment irreversibility gap (3.58%) generates the 
highest value premium (2.00% per month). The magnitude of the gap and of the 
value premium in this subsample is well above that in the other two subsamples. 
However, the positive relationship between the depreciation gap and the value 
premium does not hold between these two subsamples28. The evidence weakly 
                                                     
28
 The subsample with a lower gap (0.56%) generates a higher value premium (1.38% per 
month), whereas in the subsample with a higher gap (1.31%), the premium is lower (1.19% 
per month). 
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supports the hypothesis that the higher the investment irreversibility gap, the higher 
the value premium (H2.2a). 
Investment irreversibility measured by the rental expense ratio 
In column 2 in Table 2.5, the rental expense ratio follows a declining 
pattern across the ten Book-to-Market deciles from the growth to the value 
portfolio. The growth portfolio has the average rental expense ratio of 17.13% 
whereas that of the value portfolio is 8.04%. Growth firms appears to use more 
rented assets than value firms, suggesting that it is easier for growth firms to shift 
between fixed assets than value firms. As expected, the rental expense ratio, being 
negatively related to the investment irreversibility of firms’ assets, is higher among 
growth firms and lower among value firms. 
Panel B in Table 2.6 provides the evidence to test hypothesis H2.2a (i.e. the 
higher the gap in investment irreversibility between value and growth stocks, the 
higher the value premium) when investment irreversibility is measured using the 
rental expense ratio. Hence, only those firms with the available data to construct 
the rental expense ratio are included. The sample is then divided into three 
subsamples. Firms having the rental expense ratio in the top 30% are included in 
the subsample with low investment irreversibility. Firms having the rental expense 
ratio in the bottom 30% are included in the subsample with high investment 
irreversibility. The remaining firms are included in the subsample with medium 
investment irreversibility.  
Column 3 in Table 2.4 reports that the return to the long-short portfolio is 
1.53% per month and is statistically significant in the overall sample with the 
available rental expense ratio. Similarly, the first three columns of Panel B in Table 
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2.6 show that in all the three subsamples by the rental expense ratio, the average 
returns to the ten deciles generally increase from the growth portfolios to the value 
portfolios. The return to the long-short portfolio in the subsample with low 
investment irreversibility (high rental expense ratios) is 1.68% per month and is 
statistically significant. In the subsamples with medium and high investment 
irreversibility, the returns are lower (1.19% per month and 1.38% per month 
respectively). 
The last three columns of Panel B in Table 2.6 present the average rental 
expense ratio of the deciles and the corresponding gaps in this ratio between the 
value and growth portfolios in the three subsamples. The rental expense ratio 
exhibits a decreasing pattern across the deciles from the growth to the value 
portfolios in all the three subsamples. All the gaps in the rental expense ratio of the 
value and growth portfolios are negative in the three subsamples, similar to the gap 
in the overall sample (column 2 in Table 2.5).  
The gap in absolute value is the highest (5.71%) in the subsample with low 
investment irreversibility. It is lower in the subsamples with medium and high 
investment irreversibility (1.65% and 0.35% respectively). The results show that 
the subsample with the highest investment irreversibility gap (5.71%) generates the 
highest value premium (1.68% per month). The magnitude of the gap and of the 
value premium in this subsample is higher than that in the other two subsamples. 
However, the positive relationship between the rental gap and the value premium 
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does not hold in these two subsamples29. Similar to the evidence on the relationship 
between the depreciation gap and the value premium discussed in the previous 
section, the results in this section only weakly support the hypothesis that the 
higher the investment irreversibility gap, the higher the value premium (H2.2a). 
Investment irreversibility measured by the disinvestment ratio 
In column 3 in Table 2.5, the disinvestment ratio follows an increasing 
pattern across the ten Book-to-Market deciles from the growth to the value 
portfolio. The average disinvestment ratio of the growth portfolio is 1.57% whereas 
that of the value portfolio is 3.23%. The disinvestment ratio appears to be 
positively related to the Book-to-Market ratio. The evidence is consistent with the 
disinvestment ratio being positively related to firms’ investment irreversibility. 
While being scaled by the same deflator, i.e. the beginning of the year net fixed 
assets, the magnitude of the disinvestment ratio is much lower than that of the 
depreciation charge ratio and the rental expense ratio, relative to the net fixed 
assets. The evidence suggests that reversing investments through the disinvestment 
of existing assets is less important a channel compared to the option to rent or to 
depreciate the existing assets, and invest in new ones. 
Panel C in Table 2.6 provides the evidence to test hypothesis H2.2a (i.e. the 
higher the gap in investment irreversibility between value and growth stocks, the 
higher the value premium) when investment irreversibility is measured using the 
disinvestment ratio. Hence, only those firms with the available data to construct the 
                                                     
29
 The subsample with a lower gap (0.35%) generates a higher value premium (1.49% per 
month), whereas in the subsample with a higher gap (1.65%), the premium is lower (1.30% 
per month). 
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disinvestment ratio are included. The sample is then divided into three subsamples. 
Firms having the disinvestment ratio in the top 30% are included in the subsample 
with high investment irreversibility. Firms having the disinvestment ratio in the 
bottom 30% are included in the subsample with low investment irreversibility. The 
remaining firms are included in the subsample with medium investment 
irreversibility. 
Column 4 in Table 2.4 reports that the return to the long-short portfolio in 
the overall sample with the available disinvestment ratio is 1.62% per month and is 
statistically significant. Similarly, the first three columns of Panel C in Table 2.6 
show that in all the three subsamples by the disinvestment ratio, the average returns 
to the ten deciles generally increase from the growth portfolios to the value 
portfolios. The returns to the long-short portfolios in the subsamples with low, 
medium and high investment irreversibility (low, medium and high disinvestment 
ratios respectively) are  1.56% per month, 1.42% per month, and 1.66% per month 
respectively and are all statistically significant.  
The last three columns of Panel C in Table 2.6 present the average 
disinvestment ratio of the deciles and the corresponding gaps in this ratio between 
the value and growth portfolios in the three subsamples. The disinvestment ratio 
does not follow any specific pattern across the deciles from the growth to the value 
portfolios in all the three subsamples. Furthermore, there appears to be no 
relationship between the disinvestment gap and the value premium in the three 
subsamples.  
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Conclusions 
Of the three measures for investment irreversibility, the disinvestment ratio 
appears to contribute the least economic magnitude. Furthermore, the results reject 
the hypothesis that the higher the investment irreversibility gap, the higher the 
value premium (H2.2a) when investment irreversibility is measured by the 
disinvestment ratio. 
2.5.1.3. Operating Leverage and the Value Premium 
This chapter first investigates how operating leverage differs between 
value and growth stocks to test the relationship between firms’ operating leverage 
and the value premium (hypothesis H2.3a). Column 4 in Table 2.5 reports the time 
series average of (a) the mean operating leverage of ten equally weighted deciles, 
and (b) the difference in these means of the value and growth portfolios. Operating 
leverage increases monotonically across the ten Book-to-Market deciles from the 
growth to the value portfolio. The growth portfolio has the average operating 
leverage of 1.28 times whereas that of the value portfolio is 3.30 times. The 
profitability of value firms appears to be more sensitive to changes in their sales, 
suggesting that value firms rely more heavily on fixed costs in their cost structure 
as compared to growth firms. As expected, operating leverage is on average higher 
among value firms than among growth firms. 
Table 2.7 investigates hypothesis H2.3a that the higher the gap in operating 
leverage between value and growth stocks, the higher the value premium. Only 
those firms with the available data to construct operating leverage are included. 
The sample is then divided into three subsamples. Firms having operating leverage 
in the top 30% are included in the subsample with high operating leverage. Firms 
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having operating leverage in the bottom 30% are included in the subsample with 
low operating leverage. The remaining firms are included in the subsample with 
medium operating leverage. 
[Insert Table 2.7 about here] 
As reported in column 5 in Table 2.4, the return to the long-short portfolio 
in the overall sample is 1.23% per month and is statistically significant. Similarly, 
the first three columns in Table 2.7 show that in all the three subsamples by 
operating leverage, the average returns to the ten deciles generally increase from 
the growth portfolios to the value portfolios. The returns to the long-short 
portfolios in the subsamples with high, medium and low operating leverage are 
1.05% per month, 1.15% per month and 1.12% per month respectively and are all 
statistically significant. 
The last three columns in Table 2.7 present the average operating leverage 
of the deciles and the corresponding gaps in this measure between the value and 
growth portfolios in the three subsamples. Operating leverage follows an 
increasing pattern from the growth to the value portfolio in the subsample with 
medium operating leverage. However, in the other subsamples, it does not appear 
to follow any pattern across the Book-to-Market deciles. Furthermore, there 
appears to be no relationship between the operating leverage gap and the value 
premium in the three subsamples. Hence, the results reject the hypothesis that the 
higher the operating leverage gap, the higher the value premium (H2.3a). 
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2.5.1.4. Excess capacity and the Value Premium  
This chapter first investigates how excess capacity differs between value 
and growth stocks to test the relationship between firms’ excess capacity and the 
value premium (hypothesis H2.4a). Column (5) of Table 2.5 reports the time series 
average of (a) the mean excess capacity of ten equally weighted deciles, and (b) the 
difference in this measure between the value and growth portfolios. The efficiency 
ratio follows a declining pattern, although not strictly monotonic, from the growth 
to the value portfolio. The growth portfolio has the average efficiency ratio of 
76.24% whereas that of the value portfolio is 57.94%. Growth firms appear to be 
more efficient than value firms, consistent with the expectation that generally value 
firms have more excess capacity than growth firms. 
Table 2.8 investigates hypothesis H2.4a that the higher the gap in excess 
capacity between value and growth stocks, the higher the value premium. Only 
firms with the available data to construct the efficiency ratio are included. The 
sample is then divided into three subsamples. Firms having the efficiency ratio in 
the top 30% are included in the subsample with low excess capacity. Firms having 
the efficiency ratio in the bottom 30% are included in the subsample with high 
excess capacity. The remaining firms are included in the subsample with medium 
excess capacity. 
[Insert Table 2.8 about here] 
Column 6 in Table 2.4 shows that in the overall sample, the return to the 
long-short portfolio is 0.94% per month. While statistically significant, it is 40% 
lower than the corresponding figure in the original sample. In the first three 
columns in Table 2.8, the returns to the long-short portfolios are positive and 
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significant in two out of the three subsamples (0.89% per month and 0.91% per 
month). However, the returns to the Book-to-Market deciles from the growth to the 
value portfolios in these subsamples do not follow any monotonic pattern. 
The last three columns in Table 2.8 present the average efficiency ratio of 
the deciles and the corresponding gaps in this ratio between the value and growth 
portfolios in the three subsamples. The efficiency ratio does not follow any pattern 
from the growth to the value portfolio in any subsample. Furthermore, there 
appears to be no relationship between the efficiency gap and the value premium in 
the three subsamples. Hence, the findings reject the hypothesis that the higher the 
efficiency gap, the higher the value premium (H2.4a). 
2.5.1.5. Financial Constraints and the Value Premium 
To test the relationship between firms’ financial constraints and the value 
premium (hypotheses H2.5 and H2.6), this chapter first investigates how financial 
constraints differ between value and growth stocks. Column 6 in Table 2.5 reports 
the time series average of (a) the mean net payout ratios of ten equally weighted 
deciles, and (b) the difference in this ratio between the value and growth portfolios. 
The net payout ratio does not follow any monotonic pattern across the Book-to-
Market deciles from the growth to the value portfolios. The net payout ratio of the 
deciles varies within the range of 10% to 15%. 
Table 2.9 presents the evidence on the relationship between financial 
constraints and the value premium. If financial constraints play the primary role to 
the value premium, i.e. it is driven by the difference between the financial 
constraints of value and growth firms, the higher the gap in financial constraints 
between value and growth firms, the higher the value premium (H2.5a). 
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Alternatively, financial constraints could play a secondary role to the value 
premium through reinforcing the impact of firms’ investment irreversibility on 
firms’ investments in working capitals and fixed capitals. Furthermore, section 
2.5.1.2 (p. 75) supports the contribution of firms’ investment irreversibility to the 
value premium. Therefore, alternatively the more financially constrained firms are, 
the higher the value premium among these firms (H2.6a). 
[Insert Table 2.9 about here] 
The sample in Table 2.9 includes firms with the available data to construct 
the net payout ratio. The sample is then divided into three subsamples. Firms 
having the net payout ratio in the top 30% are included in the subsample with low 
financial constraints. Firms having the net payout ratio in the bottom 30% are 
included in the subsample with high financial constraints. The remaining firms are 
included in the subsample with medium financial constraints.  
Column 7 in Table 2.4 reports that the return to the long-short portfolio in 
the overall sample with the available net payout ratios is 1.61% per month and is 
statistically significant. The first three columns in Table 2.9 show that in all the 
three subsamples by net payout ratios, the average returns to the ten deciles 
generally increase from the growth portfolios to the value portfolios. The returns to 
the long-short portfolios in the subsamples with low, medium and high financial 
constraints (i.e. high, medium and low net payout ratios) are 1.50% per month, 
1.48% per month and 1.44% per month respectively. The differences approximate 
each other and do not support the hypothesis that the value premium is higher 
among firms with higher financial constraints (hypothesis H2.6a). 
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The last three columns in Table 2.9 present the average net payout ratio of 
the deciles and the corresponding gaps in this ratio of the value and growth 
portfolios in the three subsamples. Similar to the overall sample, in the three 
subsamples, the net payout ratio does not appear to follow any pattern across the 
deciles from the growth to the value portfolios. Furthermore, there appears to be no 
relationship between the financial constraint gap and the value premium in the 
three subsamples. Hence, the findings reject the hypothesis that the higher the 
financial constraint gap, the higher the value premium (H2.5a). 
Overall, the evidence does not support either hypothesis H5a (the higher the 
financial constraint gap, the higher the value premium), or hypothesis H2.6a (the 
value premium is higher among firms with higher financial constraints) in the 
univariate analysis. It is possible that the relationship between financial constraints 
and the value premium exists but not in the linear direction hypothesised in H2.5a 
and H2.6a.  
2.5.2. Results of the multivariate analysis 
2.5.2.1. The Profitability of the Value-Growth Trading Strategy 
Scenarios 1 and 2 in Table 2.10 provide the evidence for the value 
premium using the Avramov and Chordia (2006) regression approach. In scenario 
1, returns are not adjusted for risks in the stage one regression. The raw returns are 
regressed against the firm level variables as described in equation 2.2 (p. 69) in the 
stage two regression. The Book-to-Market coefficient is positive and significant. It 
suggests that there is a positive and significant relationship between the cross 
section of stock returns and the Book-to-Market ratio. This result confirms the 
evidence so far that the value premium exists in the sample. The coefficients of the 
88 
 
control variables also show the expected signs. The size coefficient is negative and 
significant (i.e. the return predictability of size), while the cumulative return 
coefficients are positive and significant (i.e. the return predictability of cumulative 
returns). 
[Insert Table 2.10 about here] 
In scenario 2, the unconditional Fama and French three factor model is 
used to adjust returns for risks in stage one. The time series regression in stage one 
is described in equation 2.1 (p. 68) with the following 
constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . The risk adjusted returns are regressed 
against the firm level variables as described in equation 2.2. The adjusted R2 drops 
from 4.43% in scenario 1 to 2.18% in scenario 2, suggesting that the Fama and 
French model in stage one helps better explain the return predictability of the 
variables in equation 2.2. However, the Book-to-Market coefficient is positive and 
significant. The evidence suggests that the Book-to-Market ratio predicts stock 
returns, or the value premium exists, even when stock returns are adjusted for risks 
using the unconditional Fama and French model. 
To conclude, the Book-to-Market ratio is positively related to the returns, 
including both raw returns and the risk adjusted returns using the Fama and French 
three factor model, at the firm level. Consistent with the evidence in the univariate 
analysis in section 2.5.1.1 (p. 74), the evidence in this section suggests that 
hypothesis H2.1, i.e. whether the value-growth trading strategy is profitable, cannot 
be rejected. The answer to the first research question, i.e. whether the value 
premium exists in the sample, is therefore affirmative.  
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2.5.2.2. Investment Irreversibility and the Value Premium 
The univariate evidence in section 2.5.1.2 (p. 75) suggests that the 
investment irreversibility gap between value and growth firms is related to the 
magnitude of the value premium (hypothesis H2.2a) when investment irreversibility 
is proxied by the depreciation charge ratio and the rental expense ratio. The 
evidence does not support this conjecture when investment irreversibility is proxied 
by the disinvestment ratio. This section investigates hypothesis H2.2b, i.e. firms’ 
investment irreversibility and the business cycle together affect the value premium. 
To provide evidence for this hypothesis, this chapter uses the asset pricing 
framework of Avramov and Chordia (2006) as detailed in section 2.4.2 (p. 65). The 
three proxies for investment irreversibility reflect the three independent aspects of 
investment irreversibility. Therefore this chapter uses all the three measures to 
investigate whether investment irreversibility and the business cycle can explain 
the value premium. Only firms with available information to calculate the three 
measures of investment irreversibility are included in Panel B in Table 2.10.  
Scenario 3 in Panel B in Table 2.10 replicates scenario 230 and uses the 
unconditional Fama and French model to adjust returns for risks in stage one. 
Similar to the result in scenario 2, scenario 3 shows that the value premium is 
present in this subsample, with the Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc ,  (0.21) in the 
cross sectional regression (equation 2.2, p. 80) being statistically significant. In 
scenario 4, the unconditional Fama and French model in stage one is replaced by 
the conditional version in which the betas are conditioned on the three measures of 
                                                     
30
 Scenario 2 investigates the original sample with no requirement that any investment 
irreversibility, operating leverage, efficiency, or financial constraints measure is available. 
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investment irreversibility. The time series regression in stage one is described in 
equation 2.1 (p. 68) with the constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . As the Book-to-Market 
coefficient  tBMc , (0.13) in the cross sectional regression (equation 2.2) remains 
statistically significant, introducing information about investment irreversibility 
does not help the Fama and French model to explain the value premium. The 
coefficient tBMc , is smaller in scenario 4 than in scenario 3, suggesting that 
introducing the information on firms’ investment irreversibility into the asset 
pricing model helps reduce the economic significance of the value premium in the 
sample. 
Central to the mechanism that gives rise to the value premium in Zhang 
(2005) is the difference in the value and growth firms’ response to the business 
cycle due to the difference in their investment irreversibility. Furthermore, Petkova 
and Zhang (2005) and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) find that value stocks 
outperform growth stocks in good states and under-perform in bad states of the 
economy. The evidence presented so far suggests that introducing solely 
investment irreversibility is insufficient for the Fama and French model to explain 
the value premium. This chapter next supplements the conditional Fama and 
French model with the information about the business cycle.  
In scenario 5 (panel B in Table 2.10), stock returns are adjusted for risks 
using the Fama and French model which is conditioned on the business cycle 
variable. Equation 2.1 (p. 68) describes the time series regression in stage one with 
the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . The Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc , is 0.18 
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and is statistically significant, meaning that introducing the business cycle variable 
only does not help the Fama and French model to explain the value premium.  
Finally, in scenario 6 (panel B in Table 2.10), stock returns are adjusted for 
risks using the Fama and French model which is conditioned on both investment 
irreversibility and the default spread as described in the full version of equation 
2.1. The Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc , of 0.08 is statistically insignificant. 
However, the p-value is actually 10.15%, only marginally above the threshold of 
10% for the purpose of determining the conventional statistical significance. 
Compared with the Book-to-Market coefficients reported in scenarios 3 to 5, the 
Book-to-Market coefficient in scenario 6 is also least economically significant with 
the smallest coefficient.  
The results support hypothesis H2.2b that the value premium can be 
explained when taking into account firms’ investment irreversibility. While the 
Fama and French model includes a value factor, it is incapable of explaining the 
value premium. The sole information about firms’ investment irreversibility is 
insufficient to improve the power of the Fama and French model in explaining the 
value premium. The Fama and French model can explain the value premium only 
when both firms’ investment irreversibility and the business cycle are used as the 
conditioning variables. 
2.5.2.3. Operating Leverage and the Value Premium 
This section investigates hypothesis H2.3b, i.e. firms’ operating leverage and 
the business cycle together affect the value premium using the asset pricing 
framework of Avramov and Chordia (2006). Only firms with the available 
information to calculate operating leverage are included in Panel C of Table 2.10. 
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Scenario 7 in Panel C of Table 2.10 replicates scenario 2 and uses the 
unconditional Fama and French model to adjust returns for risks in stage one. 
Similar to the result in scenario 2, scenario 7 shows that the value premium is 
present in this subsample, with the Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc ,  in the cross 
sectional regression (equation 2.2, p. 80) being positive and statistically significant. 
In scenarios 8 to 10, the unconditional Fama and French model in stage 
one is replaced by the conditional versions in which the betas are conditioned on 
(a) firms’ operating leverage31, (b) the business cycle variable32, and (c) both firms’ 
operating leverage and the business cycle variables33. In the cross sectional 
regression (equation 2.2), the Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc , remains positive 
(from 0.13 to 0.16) and significant (t-statistic varying from 2.57 to 2.86). The result 
rejects hypothesis H2.3b that firms’ operating leverage and the business cycle 
together help explain the value premium. Furthermore, the univariate results in 
section 2.5.1.3 (p. 82) reject hypothesis H2.3a that the higher the operating leverage 
gap, the higher the value premium. Taken together, the findings do not support the 
relevance of firms’ operating leverage to the value premium. 
2.5.2.4. Excess Capacity and the Value Premium 
This section investigates hypothesis H2.4b, i.e. firms’ excess capacity and 
the business cycle together affect the value premium using the asset pricing 
framework of Avramov and Chordia (2006). Only firms with the available 
                                                     
31
 The constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ is imposed on equation 2.1. 
32
 The constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ is imposed on equation 2.1. 
33
 No constraint is imposed on equation 2.1. 
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information to calculate the efficiency ratio are included in Panel D of Table 2.10. 
Scenario 11 in Panel D of Table 2.10 replicates scenario 2 and uses the 
unconditional Fama and French model to adjust returns for risks in stage one. 
Similar to the result in scenario 2, scenario 11 shows that the value premium is 
present in this subsample, with the Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc , in the cross 
sectional regression (equation 2.2, p. 80) being positive and statistically significant.  
In the scenarios 12 to 14, the unconditional Fama and French model in 
stage one is replaced by the conditional versions in which the betas are conditioned 
on (a) firms’ efficiency ratio34, (b) the business cycle variable35, and (c) both firms’ 
efficiency ratios and the business cycle variable36. In the cross sectional regression 
(equation 2.2), the Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc , remains positive (from 0.14 to 
0.18) and significant (t-statistic varying from 2.62 to 3.13). The results reject 
hypothesis H2.4b that firms’ efficiency or excess capacity and the business cycle 
together help explain the value premium. Furthermore, the univariate results in 
section 2.5.1.4 (p. 84) reject hypothesis H2.4a that the higher the efficiency gap, the 
higher the value premium. Taken together, the findings do not support the 
relevance of firms’ excess capacity to the value premium. 
2.5.2.5. Financial Constraints and the Value Premium 
This section investigates hypotheses H2.5b and H2.6b using the asset pricing 
framework of Avramov and Chordia (2006). If financial constraints play the 
                                                     
34
 The constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ is imposed on equation 2.1. 
35
 The constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ is imposed on equation 2.1. 
36
 No constraint is imposed on equation 2.1. 
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primary role, financial constraints and the business cycle together are expected to 
affect the value premium (H2.5b). Alternatively, if financial constraints play the 
secondary role, then financial constraints, investment irreversibility and the 
business cycle together are expected to affect the value premium (H2.6b).  
Financial constraints and the value premium: 
Only firms with the available information to calculate net payout ratios are 
included in Panel E in Table 2.10. Scenario 15 in Panel E in Table 2.10 replicates 
scenario 2 and uses the unconditional Fama and French model to adjust returns for 
risks in stage one. Similar to the result in scenario 2, scenario 15 shows that the 
value premium is present in this subsample, with the Book-to-Market 
coefficient tBMc , in the cross sectional regression (equation 2.2, p. 80) being 
positive and statistically significant.  
In the scenarios 16 to 18, the unconditional Fama and French model in 
stage one is replaced by the conditional versions in which the betas are conditioned 
on (a) firms’ financial constraints37, (b) the business cycle variable38, and (c) both 
firms’ financial constraints and the business cycle variable39. The Book-to-Market 
coefficient tBMc , in the cross sectional regression (equation 2.2) remains positive 
(varying from 0.10 to 0.17) and significant (t-statistic varying from 1.97 to 3.11). 
The results reject hypothesis H2.5b that firms’ financial constraints and the business 
cycle affect the value premium. 
                                                     
37
 The constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ is imposed on equation 2.1. 
38
 The constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ is imposed on equation 2.1. 
39
 No constraint is imposed on equation 2.1. 
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Financial constraints, investment irreversibility and the value premium: 
Only firms with the available information to calculate both net payout 
ratios and the three measures of investment irreversibility are included in Panel F 
in Table 2.10. Scenario 19 (Panel F in Table 2.10) replicates scenario 2 and uses 
the unconditional Fama and French model to adjust returns for risks in stage one. 
Similar to the result in scenario 2, scenario 15 shows that the value premium is 
present in this subsample, with the Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc , in the cross 
sectional regression (equation 2.2) being positive and statistically significant. 
In scenario 20, the unconditional Fama and French model in stage one is 
replaced by the conditional version in which the betas are conditioned on both 
financial constraints and investment irreversibility. The time series regression in 
stage one is described in equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . As 
the Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc , in the cross sectional regression (equation 2.2) 
remains positive and significant, introducing financial constraints and investment 
irreversibility does not help the Fama and French model to explain the value 
premium.  
As section 2.5.2.2 (p. 89) supports  hypothesis H2.2b that investment 
irreversibility and the business cycle together affect the value premium, it is 
possible that the indirect role of financial constraints to the value premium through 
investment irreversibility, if exists, would be also dependent on the business cycle 
state. Scenarios 21 and 22 (Panel F in Table 2.10) account for this possibility. In 
scenario 21, stock returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French model 
which is conditioned on the business cycle variable. Equation 2.1 describes the 
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time series regression in stage one with the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . The 
Book-to-Market coefficient tBMc , is positive and significant.  
Finally, in scenario 22 (panel F in Table 2.10), stock returns are adjusted 
for risks using the conditional Fama and French model with betas being 
conditioned on both firms’ financial constraints and investment irreversibility, and 
the business cycle variable. Stock returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and 
French model which is conditioned on both investment irreversibility and the 
default spread as described in the full version of equation 2.1. The Book-to-Market 
coefficient tBMc , of 0.07 is statistically insignificant with the t-statistic of 1.60. 
Compared with the coefficient tBMc , reported in scenarios 19 to 21, the 
corresponding coefficient in scenario 22 is also least economically significant with 
the smallest coefficient. Both the coefficient and the t-statistic (0.07 and 1.60 
respectively) of the Book-to-Market variable in scenario 22 are lower than in those 
in scenario 6 (0.08 and 1.64 respectively) in which financial constraints are not 
present. 
The results in this section support hypothesis H2.6b that financial 
constraints, investment irreversibility and the business cycle together affect the 
value premium. The value premium is better explained than when only (a) firms’ 
investment irreversibility and (b) the default spread are considered. Section 2.5.2.2 
(p. 89) supports hypothesis H2.2b that investment irreversibility and the business 
cycle together affect the value premium. The findings in this section supplement 
that adding financial constraints to this relationship better explains the value 
premium. 
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2.6. Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the effects of firms’ physical investment 
inflexibility on the value premium. Consistent with the literature, this chapter finds 
strong evidence of the value premium in the sample examined. This chapter reports 
the raw value premium of 1.55% per month. The value premium is also evident 
given the positive and significant relationship between stock returns and the Book-
to-Market ratio. When stock returns are adjusted for risks using the unconditional 
Fama and French three factor model, the relationship remains positive and 
significant. The evidence suggests that the value premium exists even when returns 
are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French three factor model. 
This chapter finds that consistent with Zhang (2005), firms’ investment 
irreversibility is relevant to the value premium. There is a monotonic upward trend 
in investment irreversibility across the Book-to-Market portfolios from the growth 
to the value portfolio. Furthermore, when using two out of the three dimensions of 
investment irreversibility, this chapter finds that the higher the gap in investment 
irreversibility between value and growth firms, the higher the value premium. 
When the Fama and French three factor model is conditioned on both investment 
irreversibility and the business cycle, the relationship between stock returns and the 
Book-to-Market ratio becomes marginally insignificant. 
The above finding suggests that the value-growth trading strategy is no 
longer profitable once risks are controlled for using the conditional Fama and 
French model with the model specification described above. The evidence supports 
the theory in Zhang (2005) and highlights the important role of both the business 
cycle and the firm level investment irreversibility in explaining the value premium. 
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It is also broadly consistent with the conjecture in Cooper (2006) and Carlson et al. 
(2004) that investment inflexibility helps explain the value premium. When 
measuring investment inflexibility using operating leverage and excess capacity as 
in Carlson et al. (2004) and Cooper (2006) respectively, the findings reject the 
claim that these measures explain the value premium. 
Livdan et al. (2009) and Caggese (2007) suggest that firms’ financial 
constraints may affect firms’ overall risk profiles and the relationship between 
investment irreversibility and firms’ investment activities respectively. Therefore 
financial constraints may directly contribute to the value premium or indirectly, 
through its influence on investment irreversibility and firms’ investment activities. 
This chapter finds no evidence that financial constraints play the primary role that 
drives the value premium. The net payout ratio, which proxies for firms’ financial 
constraints, does not follow any pattern across the ten Book-to-Market deciles from 
the growth to the value portfolio. Also, there is no clear relationship between the 
gap in net payout ratios between value and growth firms and the value premium.  
Moreover, when returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French 
model conditioned on financial constraints, the relationship between risk adjusted 
returns and the Book-to-Market ratio remains positive and significant. This 
evidence suggests that the value-growth trading strategy is profitable even when 
returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French model conditioned on 
firms’ financial constraints. 
This chapter finds some evidence for the indirect role of financial 
constraints to the value premium. The univariate evidence rejects the hypothesis 
that the value premium is higher among firms with higher financial constraints. 
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However, when the Fama and French model is conditioned on (a) financial 
constraints and investment irreversibility, and (b) the business cycle variable, the 
relationship between stock returns and the Book-to-Market ratio becomes 
statistically insignificant, rendering the value-growth strategy to be no longer 
profitable.  
Implications 
The findings in this chapter have several implications. This chapter reports 
that a risk-return relationship can explain the value premium. Hence, future stock 
returns cannot be predicted based on the Book-to-Market ratio after controlling for 
risks. In the language of the market efficiency literature, the market is efficient 
with regards to the Book-to-Market ratio. Furthermore, the risk-return relationship 
can only explain the value premium when accounting for the inflexibility in the 
investment and financing environment at the firm level. Hence, the findings 
suggest that the understanding of corporate finance can help extend the 
understanding of the securities markets. 
Finally, the findings have practical implications to investors who attempt 
to profit from the value-growth trading strategy. The profit from the value-growth 
trading strategy can be improved if investors use the value and growth firms with 
bigger investment irreversibility gaps. The value premium can be completely 
explained when returns are adjusted for risks using the asset pricing model 
conditioned on these characteristics. Therefore investors should bear in mind that 
the improved performance might just be a compensation for higher risks. Investors 
could benefit from future work on how to utilise the information about financial 
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constraints to further improve the profitability of the value-growth trading strategy 
among value and growth firms with big investment irreversibility gaps. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses examined in chapter 2 are summarised below: 
 
 IIR OPL EC FC IIR x FC 
H2.1 Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
H2.2 Accept     
H2.3  Accept    
H2.4   Accept   
H2.5    Accept  
H2.6     Accept 
 
 IIR represents the explanation that the value premium is driven by the difference 
in investment irreversibility between value and growth firms, motivated by Zhang (2005). 
OPL represents the explanation that the value premium is driven by the difference in the 
operating leverage between value and growth firms, motivated by Carlson et al. (2004). EC 
represents the explanation that the value premium is driven by the difference in the excess 
capacity between value and growth firms, motivated by Cooper (2006). FC represents the 
explanation that the value premium is driven by the difference in risks due to the financial 
constraints between value and growth firms, motivated by Livdan et al. (2009) and Gulen et 
al. (2008). Finally, IIRxFC represents the explanation that financial constraints indirectly 
affect the value premium. Along the lines of Caggese (2007) financial constraints may 
influence the impact of investment irreversibility on the value premium. 
 102 
Table 2.2: Construction of Key Variables 
The key variables used in chapter 2 are constructed as follows: 
A. Key variables in portfolio sorting 
 
Key variables Construction 
Depreciation charge 
ratio 
The depreciation expense for the year, scaled by the beginning of 
the year net fixed assets. 
Rental expense ratio The rental expense for the year, scaled by the beginning of the 
year net fixed assets. 
Disinvestment ratio The sum of the proceeds from fixed asset sales in the last three 
years, scaled by the beginning of the year net fixed assets. 
Operating leverage The percentage change in operating profits before tax to the 
percentage change in sales. To avoid the negative value of 
operating leverage in case operating profits and sales move in 
opposite directions in a year, negative ratios are replaced with 
missing values. 
Efficiency The efficiency of firms relative to their peers in the same industry 
is measured using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique. 
The input minimisation model, i.e. given the current level of 
output, determining the minimum input needed to compare with 
firms’ actual inputs, is chosen. Each firm is evaluated against the 
other firms in the same industry, defined as one of 49 industries 
classified by Fama and French (1997) and updated on French’s 
website. The output variable is the inflation adjusted sales.  
Two input variables are the annual cost of fixed capital, i.e. the 
depreciation expense, and the annual cost of human capital, i.e. 
the inflation adjusted salary related expense. The former is not 
adjusted for inflation as it reflects the historical costs at the time 
the fixed capital is acquired. The SAS programme for DEA by 
Emrouznejad (2005) generates an efficiency level from 0 to 1 for 
each firm-year, with 0 corresponding to inefficiency and 1 to 
efficiency. When the analysis fails to give any efficiency level, 
this chapter assumes that the corresponding efficiency is zero. 
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Key variables (cont.) Construction (cont.) 
Net payout ratio Dividends plus repurchases minus share issuance, scaled by the 
net incomes. 
 
B. Key variables in the regression of the Avramov and Chordia (2006) framework 
Key variables Construction 
Size (Market 
capitalization) 
The product of the outstanding number of shares and the share 
price at the end of each month, in billion $. 
Book-to-Market ratio The sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet 
deferred tax, scaled by the market capitalisation, measured in 
December each year, and is winsorised at 0.5% and 99.5%. 
Cumulative returns, 
month 2-3, 4-6, 7-12 
The buy-and-hold cumulative returns for month 2 to 3, 4 to 6 and 
7 to 12 prior to the current month.   
Turnover, NYSE/ 
AMEX 
The trading volume of the NYSE/AMEX listed stocks divided by 
the outstanding number of shares. This variable has the value of 
zero for the NASDAQ listed stocks. 
Turnover, NASDAQ The trading volume of the NASDAQ listed stocks divided by the 
outstanding number of shares. This variable has the value of zero 
for the NYSE/AMEX listed stocks. 
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Table 2.3: Sample Description 
Table 2.3 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample of non-financial, non-
utilities firms listed in the three main exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the 
U.S. market. Stocks should have a minimum of 36 months of non-negative book value of 
equity to be included in the sample. The coverage period is from 1972 to 2006.  
A. Key variables in portfolio sorting 
 
A - Key variables in portfolio sorting Mean Median Standard deviation 
Depreciation charge ratio (1) 0.35 0.18 2.86 
Rental expense ratio (2) 0.30 0.11 1.76 
Disinvestment ratio (3) 0.26 0.02 6.13 
Operating leverage (4) 20.84 1.73 362.39 
Efficiency (5) 0.06 0.00 0.20 
Net payout ratio (6) -0.28 0.07 23.86 
Non-zero efficiency (7) 0.65 0.65 0.28 
 
Correlation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
(1) 1.00 0.33 0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
   0.00 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.96 
  106,893 92,504 96,950 74,476 105,483 98,219  
         
(2) 0.33 1.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
  0.00  0.00 0.93 0.00 0.86 
  92,504 92,591 84,003 64,078 91,304 84,649 
         
(3) 0.11 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00  0.92 0.92 0.86 
  96,950 84,003 97,871 67,078 96,565 89,215 
         
(4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
  0.94 0.93 0.92  0.57 0.93 
  74,476 64,078 67,078 74,621 73,721 68,994 
         
(5) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 
  0.00 0.00 0.92 0.57  0.06 
  105,483 91,304 96,565 73,721 116,221 105,745 
         
(6) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 
  0.96 0.86 0.86 0.93 0.06   
  98,219 84,649 89,215 68,994 105,745 107,589 
         
         
(7) -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 1.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00 0.08 0.41  1.00 
  8,588 6,899 7,490 6,610 8,591 8,136 
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Panel A reports the statistics for the key variables used in the portfolio sorting 
methodology. The construction of these variables is described in Table 2.2. The correlation 
matrix reports the correlations among the above mentioned variables. The lines in bold 
report the correlation coefficients between any two variables. The lines underneath report 
the two tailed p-values to test whether these coefficients are different from zero, The second 
lines underneath report the number of firm-year observations with available data to 
construct a variable. 
B. Key variables in the regression of the Avramov and Chordia (2006) framework 
B - Key variables in regressions Mean Median Standard deviation 
Excess returns (%) 0.94 -0.22 14.98 
Market capitalisation ($ billion) 1.30 0.09 6.50 
Book-to-Market 0.98 0.78 0.90 
Cumulative returns, months 2 to 3 (%) 2.75 0.90 20.80 
Cumulative returns, months 4 to 6 (%) 4.09 1.50 25.71 
Cumulative returns, month 7 to 12 (%) 8.67 3.57 39.04 
Turnover, NYSE and AMEX (%) 6.25 4.54 6.78 
Turnover, NASDAQ (%) 11.80 6.61 20.86 
 
Panel B describes the statistics for the variables used in the regression of the 
Avramov and Chordia (2006) asset pricing framework. The construction of the key 
variables is described in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.4: Returns to the Value-Growth Trading Strategy 
Table 2.4 presents the returns to the equally weighted portfolios of stocks sorted 
by the value of the Book-to-Market ratio as of 31st December of year t-1 in ascending order. 
Ten portfolios with equal number of stocks are composed and positions (long and short) are 
taken at the beginning of July year t and held until June year t+1. V-G represents the return 
to the portfolio that goes long in value stocks (i.e. the portfolio with the highest ranking in 
the Book-to-Market ratio) and short in growth stocks (i.e. the portfolio with the lowest 
ranking in the Book-to-Market ratio). The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms 
listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) from 1972 to 
2006. Stocks are required to have a minimum of 36 months of non-negative book value of 
equity. The table also presents the respective returns in the subsamples with data to 
calculate the depreciation charge ratio, the rental expense ratio, the disinvestment ratio, 
operating leverage, the efficiency ratio and the net payout ratio (refer to Table 2.2 for 
details). The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, and the lines that are not in bold are the 
two tailed t-statistics to test whether a portfolio’s return is different from zero. *, ** and 
*** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
BM 
decile 
Overall 
sample 
Sample with 
Depreciation 
charge ratio 
Sample with 
Rental 
expense ratio 
Sample with 
Dis-
investment 
ratio 
Sample 
with 
Operating 
Leverage 
Sample 
with 
Efficiency 
ratio 
Sample 
with Net 
payout 
ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Growth 0.65 0.65 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.85 0.71 
 
1.81 1.81 1.89 1.95 2.28 2.88 2.00 
2 1.08 1.08 1.10 1.20 0.99 1.17 1.18 
 
3.22 3.24 3.21 3.49 3.17 4.25 3.56 
3 1.09 1.09 1.12 1.21 1.02 1.08 1.26 
 
3.59 3.59 3.53 3.79 3.58 4.09 4.14 
4 1.25 1.25 1.27 1.38 1.25 1.01 1.36 
 
4.18 4.15 4.15 4.48 4.28 3.79 4.57 
5 1.41 1.41 1.45 1.59 1.36 1.24 1.55 
 
4.85 4.86 4.82 5.34 4.79 4.52 5.30 
6 1.48 1.47 1.45 1.58 1.43 1.48 1.62 
 
5.13 5.09 4.86 5.35 5.09 5.50 5.60 
7 1.54 1.55 1.60 1.69 1.43 1.44 1.62 
 
5.36 5.39 5.48 5.70 5.13 5.28 5.62 
8 1.66 1.67 1.70 1.84 1.55 1.57 1.81 
 
5.62 5.64 5.57 6.09 5.41 5.74 6.10 
9 1.79 1.79 1.85 1.91 1.76 1.66 1.89 
 
5.79 5.80 5.84 6.02 5.98 5.61 6.06 
Value 2.20 2.19 2.24 2.34 1.98 1.79 2.32 
 
6.46 6.45 6.51 6.79 5.96 5.10 6.72 
V-G 1.55 1.54 1.53 1.62 1.23 0.94 1.61 
 
6.13 6.11 5.96 6.21 4.70 2.82 6.46 
 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
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Table 2.5: The Investment and Financing Flexibility of the Book-to-Market 
deciles 
Table 2.5 presents the average measures of the key firm level variables, including 
the depreciation charge ratio, the rental expense ratio, and the disinvestment ratio, operating 
leverage, the efficiency ratio, and the net payout ratio, of the equally weighted portfolios of 
stocks sorted by the value of the Book-to-Market ratio as of 31st December of year t-1 in 
ascending order. Ten portfolios with equal number of stocks are composed and positions 
(long and short) are taken at the beginning of July year t and held until June year t+1. V-G 
represents the difference in the mean measures of the value stocks (i.e. the portfolio with 
the highest ranking in the Book-to-Market ratio) and growth stocks (i.e. the portfolio with 
the lowest ranking in the Book-to-Market ratio). The sample includes non-financial, non-
utilities firms listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) from 
1972 to 2006. Stocks are required to have a minimum of 36 months of non-negative book 
value of equity. For the construction of these variables, refer to Table 2.2. 
 
BM 
decile 
Depreciation 
charge ratio 
(%) 
Rental 
expense 
ratio (%) 
Disinvestment 
ratio (%) 
Operating 
leverage 
Efficiency 
ratio (%) 
Net 
payout 
ratio (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growth 23.57 17.13 1.57 1.28 76.24 14.03 
2 20.30 13.11 1.69 1.30 74.10 10.54 
3 18.25 10.55 2.03 1.33 71.11 13.36 
4 17.27 9.14 2.38 1.43 74.08 14.01 
5 16.52 8.77 2.40 1.54 66.88 15.34 
6 15.98 8.68 2.77 1.65 70.81 15.32 
7 15.80 8.64 2.71 1.76 68.98 15.13 
8 15.61 8.73 2.85 1.90 67.77 13.25 
9 15.13 8.75 3.13 2.29 62.59 10.22 
Value 14.26 8.04 3.23 3.30 57.94 3.40 
V-G -9.31 -9.08 1.66 2.02 -18.29 -10.63 
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Table 2.6: Investment Irreversibility and the Value-Growth Trading Strategy 
Table 2.6 presents the return to the value-growth trading strategy in the 
subsamples by investment irreversibility. The portfolio formation is described in Table 2.4. 
The three proxies for investment irreversibility, i.e. the depreciation charge ratio, the rental 
expense ratio, and the disinvestment ratio, are described in Table 2.2. The averages of these 
measures of investment irreversibility for the Book-to-Market portfolios and the difference 
in these measures of the value and growth portfolios are also presented. The sample 
includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ) from 1972 to 2006. Stocks are required to have a minimum of 36 
months of non-negative book value of equity.  
 
A. Investment irreversibility measured by depreciation charge ratio 
Panel A Returns (%) Depreciation charge ratio (%) 
BM decile High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Growth 0.58 0.88 0.75 38.88 18.20 9.69 
 1.29 2.59 2.73    
2 0.97 1.01 0.95 37.24 17.66 10.12 
 2.35 3.25 3.38    
3 1.17 1.25 1.07 37.22 17.30 10.16 
 2.87 4.20 4.09    
4 1.28 1.24 1.27 37.32 17.18 10.01 
 3.34 4.25 4.81    
5 1.51 1.31 1.29 36.51 16.89 9.98 
 3.97 4.66 4.97    
6 1.63 1.38 1.45 36.51 16.86 9.83 
 4.11 4.95 5.41    
7 1.72 1.55 1.42 36.01 16.89 9.82 
 4.55 5.36 5.45    
8 1.75 1.72 1.51 35.22 16.90 9.75 
 4.65 5.82 5.21    
9 1.96 1.90 1.69 35.73 17.02 9.56 
 5.14 6.09 5.82    
Value 2.57 2.08 2.13 35.30 16.90 9.12 
 6.48 5.95 6.07    
V-G 2.00 1.19 1.38 -3.58 -1.31 -0.56 
 6.82 4.17 5.42    
 *** *** ***    
 
 
In Panel A, the stocks are required to have available data to calculate the depreciation 
charge ratio. The first three columns present the returns to the Book-to-Market deciles and 
to the long-short portfolio, while the last three columns present the corresponding average 
depreciation charge ratios, for each subsample of high (top 30%), medium (middle 40%) 
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and low (bottom 30%) depreciation charge ratios. Panels B and C repeat Panel A with the 
depreciation charge ratio being replaced with the rental expense ratio and the disinvestment 
ratio respectively. The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not 
in bold are the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether a portfolio’s return is 
different from zero. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
 
B.  Investment irreversibility measured by rental expense ratio 
 Returns (%) Rental expense ratio (%) 
BM decile High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Growth 0.75 0.76 0.77 45.33 11.11 2.72 
 1.68 2.05 2.59 
   
2 0.96 1.17 1.09 41.03 10.48 2.80 
 2.39 3.27 3.78 
   
3 1.06 1.28 1.17 41.52 9.70 2.79 
 2.68 3.89 4.28 
   
4 1.26 1.30 1.30 40.14 9.74 2.73 
 3.41 4.05 4.83 
   
5 1.55 1.59 1.22 40.96 9.87 2.62 
 4.02 5.16 4.59 
   
6 1.51 1.56 1.33 40.01 9.86 2.52 
 4.05 4.89 5.10 
   
7 1.66 1.55 1.60 40.96 9.80 2.48 
 4.72 5.15 5.89 
   
8 1.73 1.67 1.65 40.01 9.91 2.47 
 4.73 5.21 5.98 
   
9 1.98 1.79 1.89 40.61 9.62 2.45 
 5.30 5.52 6.32 
   
Value 2.44 2.06 2.26 39.62 9.46 2.37 
 6.11 5.83 6.62 
   
V-G 1.68 1.30 1.49 -5.71 -1.65 -0.35 
 5.24 4.50 5.53    
 *** *** ***    
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C. Investment irreversibility measured by proceeds from fixed asset sale 
 Returns (%) Disinvestment ratio (%) 
BM decile High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Growth 0.98 0.71 0.66 16.83 1.92 0.00 
 2.63 1.90 1.59    
2 1.21 1.11 1.28 16.00 2.07 0.00 
 3.61 3.30 3.27    
3 1.32 1.32 1.30 15.80 2.17 0.00 
 4.15 4.09 3.71    
4 1.52 1.37 1.43 14.94 2.18 0.00 
 4.83 4.38 4.33    
5 1.54 1.44 1.71 15.50 2.18 0.00 
 5.03 4.78 5.32    
6 1.56 1.60 1.65 15.36 2.30 0.00 
 4.86 5.30 5.06    
7 1.71 1.76 1.70 16.07 2.25 0.00 
 5.28 5.88 5.62    
8 1.72 1.86 1.70 15.89 2.18 0.02 
 5.14 6.33 5.22    
9 2.09 1.96 2.10 15.64 2.22 0.02 
 6.08 6.43 6.09    
Value 2.53 2.13 2.32 17.26 2.11 0.02 
 6.73 6.31 5.93    
V-G 1.56 1.42 1.66 0.43 0.19 0.02 
 5.34 5.14 5.34    
 *** *** ***    
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Table 2.7: Operating Leverage and the Value-Growth Trading Strategy 
Table 2.7 presents the return to the value-growth trading strategy in the 
subsamples by operating leverage. The portfolio formation is described in Table 2.4. The 
measurement of operating leverage is described in Table 2.2. The average operating 
leverage for the Book-to-Market portfolios and the difference in this measure of the value 
and growth portfolios are also presented. The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities 
firms listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) from 1972 to 
2006. Stocks are required to have a minimum of 36 months of non-negative book value of 
equity.  
 Returns (%) Operating leverage 
BM decile High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Growth 0.99 0.69 0.74 7.04 1.50 0.79 
 2.50 2.13 2.11    
2 1.25 0.94 0.94 6.15 1.55 0.79 
 3.37 3.07 2.88    
3 1.49 1.06 0.83 6.97 1.59 0.79 
 4.32 3.62 2.85    
4 1.45 1.24 1.09 6.40 1.61 0.71 
 4.57 4.25 3.92    
5 1.49 1.27 1.19 6.84 1.68 0.71 
 4.53 4.38 4.18    
6 1.44 1.36 1.31 7.32 1.76 0.70 
 4.28 4.50 4.55    
7 1.65 1.52 1.24 7.08 1.75 0.66 
 5.15 5.30 4.32    
8 1.92 1.45 1.46 7.69 1.75 0.65 
 5.69 5.28 5.21    
9 2.15 1.55 1.44 8.48 1.81 0.61 
 6.26 5.45 5.15    
Value 2.04 1.83 1.86 9.76 1.89 0.62 
 5.32 5.75 5.70    
V-G 1.05 1.15 1.12 2.71 0.38 -0.17 
 3.48 4.48 3.77    
 *** *** ***    
The stocks are required to have available data to calculate operating leverage. The 
first three columns present the returns to the Book-to-Market deciles and to the long-short 
portfolio, while the last three columns present the corresponding average operating leverage 
ratios, for each subsample of high (top 30%), medium (middle 40%) and low (bottom 30%) 
operating leverage. The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not 
in bold are the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether a portfolio’s return is 
different from zero. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
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Table 2.8: Excess Capacity and the Value-Growth Trading Strategy 
Table 2.8 presents the return to the value-growth trading strategy in the 
subsamples by excess capacity. The portfolio formation is described in Table 2.4. The 
measurement of excess capacity is described in Table 2.2. The average efficiency ratio for 
the Book-to-Market portfolios and the difference in this measure of the value and growth 
portfolios are also presented. The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in 
the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) from 1972 to 2006. Stocks 
are required to have a minimum of 36 months of non-negative book value of equity.  
The stocks are required to have available data to calculate the efficiency ratio. The 
first three columns present the returns to the Book-to-Market deciles and to the long-short 
portfolio, while the last three columns present the corresponding average efficiency ratio, 
for each subsample of high (top 30%), medium (middle 40%), and low (bottom 30%) 
efficiency ratios. The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not in 
bold are the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether a portfolio’s return is different 
from zero. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
 Returns (%) Efficiency ratio (%) 
BM decile High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Growth 0.95 0.85 1.36 98.35 65.64 34.07 
 2.54 2.68 1.87    
2 1.06 1.25 0.86 98.61 64.45 34.05 
 3.37 3.75 1.80    
3 1.03 1.32 1.24 99.56 67.52 33.45 
 3.55 4.45 2.63    
4 0.69 0.76 1.57 99.76 67.32 34.60 
 2.28 2.48 4.70    
5 1.27 1.10 1.49 98.60 65.91 32.19 
 4.41 3.48 4.34    
6 1.47 1.38 1.52 98.61 66.83 31.93 
 4.70 4.34 3.30    
7 1.54 1.25 1.39 98.50 67.28 31.58 
 4.46 3.98 3.77    
8 1.60 1.40 1.99 98.73 68.71 29.43 
 5.20 4.59 4.47    
9 1.64 1.70 1.68 99.18 66.89 31.06 
 4.57 4.80 3.49    
Value 1.84 1.77 1.77 99.07 65.58 30.06 
 4.92 4.08 3.26    
V-G 0.89 0.91 0.41 0.71 -0.06 -4.01 
 2.08 1.97 0.48    
 ** **     
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Table 2.9: Financial Constraints and the Value-Growth Trading Strategy 
Table 2.9 presents the return to the value-growth trading strategy in the 
subsamples by financial constraints. The portfolio formation is described in Table 2.4. The 
measurement of the net payout ratio, which is proxied for financial constraints, is described 
in Table 2.2. The average net payout ratio for the Book-to-Market portfolios and the 
difference in this measure of the value and growth portfolios are also presented. The sample 
includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ) from 1972 to 2006. Stocks are required to have a minimum of 36 
months of non-negative book value of equity.  
The stocks are required to have available data to calculate the net payout ratio. The 
first three columns present the returns to the Book-to-Market deciles and to the long-short 
portfolio, while the last three columns present the corresponding average net payout ratio, 
for each subsample of high (top 30%), medium (middle 40%), and low (bottom 30%) net 
payout ratios. The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not in 
bold are the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether a portfolio’s return is different 
from zero. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 Returns (%) Net payout ratio (%) 
BM decile High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Growth 0.54 0.91 0.84 77.93 10.78 -23.61 
 1.64 2.43 2.10    
2 1.29 1.21 1.09 67.37 12.15 -28.63 
 4.24 3.71 2.86    
3 1.29 1.31 1.19 65.31 12.81 -23.54 
 4.66 4.23 3.23    
4 1.32 1.59 1.43 65.79 12.59 -25.23 
 5.08 5.21 3.97    
5 1.47 1.73 1.42 66.25 12.57 -28.15 
 5.50 5.74 3.96    
6 1.52 1.77 1.57 64.64 11.51 -23.57 
 5.92 5.94 4.38    
7 1.56 1.65 1.58 67.28 10.26 -22.16 
 5.98 5.53 4.36    
8 1.57 1.99 1.66 67.08 9.59 -19.76 
 5.80 6.40 4.76    
9 1.66 2.13 1.96 77.33 8.05 -21.67 
 5.97 6.82 5.36    
Value 2.04 2.39 2.27 80.56 6.36 -19.03 
 6.64 6.72 5.79    
V-G 1.50 1.48 1.44 2.63 -4.42 4.57 
 6.12 5.82 4.43    
 *** *** ***    
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Table 2.10: The Value Premium and Firms’ Investment Characteristics 
Table 2.10 presents the results of the regressions of risk adjusted returns on the 
Book-to-Market ratio and other firm level variables using the framework of Avramov and 
Chordia (2006). The sample covers non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main 
exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the U.S. market during the period from 1972 
to 2006. Stocks are required to have a minimum of 36 months of non-negative book value 
of equity. 
This table uses the Fama and French model as the base model in the general model 
specification described in equation 2.1 (p. 68). The part of returns unexplained by the asset 
pricing model in equation 2.1 is regressed against the Book-to-Market ratio in a cross 
sectional regression to assess the explanatory power of the model with regards to the value 
premium, i.e. the positive relationship between current stock returns and the Book-to-
Market ratio. Size, cumulative returns, and stock turnovers are included in the cross 
sectional regression to control for the predictability of stock returns with regards to these 
variables. The regression is described in equation 2.2 (p. 69). The construction of the key 
variables in stage two is described in Table 2.2. Their transformation is described in section 
2.4.2 (p. 65). 
The coefficients and the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity corrected two 
tailed t-statistics following the Newey and West (1987) method to test whether a coefficient 
is different from zero. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. The coefficients are multiplied by 100. 
The settings of the regressions in different scenarios are as follows: 
A. Overall sample 
 Scenario 1: Returns are not adjusted for risks; hence no stage one regression is 
run. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 2: Returns are adjusted for risks using the unconditional Fama and 
French model. The regression is described in equation 2.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . In stage two, the regression is 
described in equation 2.2. 
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 Panel A - Overall sample Panel B – Sample with investment irreversibility measures 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 
Book-to-Market 0.31 *** 0.19 *** 0.21 *** 0.13 ** 0.18 *** 0.08  
 4.04  3.19  3.37  2.44  2.99  1.64  
Control variables             
Size -0.15 *** -0.09 *** -0.10 *** -0.07 ** -0.09 ** -0.05  
 -2.73  -2.68  -2.66  -2.15  -2.40  -1.46  
Return 2_3 0.78 *** 0.93 *** 1.02 *** 0.91 *** 1.00 *** 0.88 *** 
 3.05  4.08  4.31  3.72  4.41  3.42  
Return 4_6 0.71 *** 0.62 *** 0.69 *** 0.58 *** 0.64 *** 0.63 *** 
 3.07  3.19  3.49  2.96  3.23  3.26  
Return 7_12 0.51 *** 0.47 *** 0.47 *** 0.48 *** 0.50 *** 0.57 *** 
 3.07  3.26  3.34  3.49  3.53  4.63  
Turnover_NASDAQ -0.08  -0.09  -0.08  -0.08  -0.10 * -0.10 ** 
 -0.97  -1.60  -1.23  -1.37  -1.81  -2.06  
Turnover_NYSE 
AMEX -0.08  -0.13 *** -0.13 *** -0.12 *** -0.12 ** -0.11 *** 
 -1.16  -2.68  -2.58  -2.60  -2.36  -2.66  
NASDAQ 0.10  0.19  0.23 * 0.23 ** 0.18  0.18 * 
 0.75  1.47  1.89  1.98  1.47  1.90  
Intercept 0.89 *** 0.04  0.07  0.13 * 0.04  0.10  
 2.80  0.50  0.83  1.82  0.53  1.50  
Adjusted R2 4.43%  2.18%  2.19%  2.19%  2.15%  2.34%  
Average monthly 
observations 
         
2,360   
         
2,360   
         
1,845  
 
         
1,845  
 
         
1,845  
 
         
1,845  
 
 
B. The sample with available data to calculate the investment irreversibility measures  
The investment irreversibility measures include the depreciation charge ratio, the 
rental expense ratio, and the disinvestment ratio, of investment irreversibility. For the 
construction of these variables, refer to Table 2.1.   
 Scenario 3: Repeating Scenario 2 for the subsample with available data to 
construct investment irreversibility measures. Returns are adjusted for risks 
using the unconditional Fama and French model. The regression is described 
in equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . In stage 
two, the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 4: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model. The regression is described in equation 2.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to the 
investment irreversibility measures. In stage two, the regression is described 
in equation 2.2. 
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  Scenario 5: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model on the business cycle variable. The regression is described in 
equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . In stage two, the 
regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 6: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model as described in equation 2.1. The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to 
the investment irreversibility measures. In stage two, the regression is 
described in equation 2.2. 
 
Panel C – Sample with operating leverage measure 
 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 
Book-to-Market 0.19 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 *** 0.13 *** 
 3.11  2.73  2.86  2.57  
Control variables         
Size -0.06 ** -0.06 ** -0.04  -0.02  
 -2.15  -1.97  -1.57  -0.80  
Return 2_3 1.23 *** 1.25 *** 1.24 *** 1.27 *** 
 5.03  5.13  5.17  5.15  
Return 4_6 0.61 *** 0.64 *** 0.62 *** 0.72 *** 
 3.00  3.28  3.18  3.82  
Return 7_12 0.51 *** 0.53 *** 0.53 *** 0.57 *** 
 3.20  3.42  3.49  3.82  
Turnover_NASDAQ -0.08  -0.07  -0.11 ** -0.11 *** 
 -1.53  -1.37  -2.20  -2.58  
Turnover_NYSE AMEX -0.15 *** -0.15 *** -0.14 *** -0.14 *** 
 -3.11  -3.22  -3.11  -3.15  
NASDAQ 0.30 * 0.27  0.26  0.27 * 
 1.64  1.60  1.54  1.78  
Intercept 0.04  0.06  0.00  -0.01  
 0.49  0.81  0.03  -0.11  
Adjusted R2 2.34%  2.34%  2.29%  2.36%  
Average monthly 
observations 
         
1,672   
         
1,672   
         
1,672   
         
1,672   
 
C. The sample with available data to calculate operating leverage  
For the construction of this variable, refer to Table 2.1. 
 Scenario 7: Repeating Scenario 2 for the subsample with available data to 
construct operating leverage. Returns are adjusted for risks using the 
unconditional Fama and French model. The regression is described in 
equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . In stage two, 
the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
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 Scenario 8: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model. The regression is described in equation 2.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to operating 
leverage. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
  Scenario 9: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model on the business cycle variable. The regression is described in 
equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . In stage two, the 
regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 10: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model as described in equation 2.1. The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to 
operating leverage. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 
Panel D – Sample with efficiency measure 
 Scenario 11 Scenario 12 Scenario 13 Scenario 14 
Book-to-Market 0.19 *** 0.18 *** 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 
 3.16  3.13  2.69  2.62  
Control variables         
Size -0.09 *** -0.09 *** -0.08 ** -0.08 ** 
 -2.70  -2.60  -2.42  -2.33  
Return 2_3 0.95 *** 0.96 *** 0.90 *** 0.89 *** 
 4.17  4.19  4.13  4.12  
Return 4_6 0.62 *** 0.61 *** 0.58 *** 0.56 *** 
 3.20  3.15  3.12  3.00  
Return 7_12 0.46 *** 0.47 *** 0.48 *** 0.47 *** 
 3.23  3.25  3.46  3.46  
Turnover_NASDAQ -0.09 * -0.10 * -0.12 *** -0.12 *** 
 -1.64  -1.64  -2.46  -2.44  
Turnover_NYSE AMEX -0.13 *** -0.14 *** -0.13 *** -0.13 *** 
 -2.68  -2.73  -2.57  -2.62  
NASDAQ 0.18  0.19  0.14  0.15  
 1.46  1.51  1.17  1.21  
Intercept 0.04  0.05  0.02  0.02  
 0.52  0.55  0.23  0.29  
Adjusted R2 2.18%  2.16%  2.14%  2.12%  
Average monthly 
observations 
         
2,348   
         
2,348   
          
2,348   
         
2,348   
 
D. The sample with available data to calculate the efficiency ratio  
For the construction of this variable, refer to Table 2.1. 
 Scenario 11: Repeating Scenario 2 for the subsample with available data to 
construct the efficiency ratio. Returns are adjusted for risks using the 
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unconditional Fama and French model. The regression is described in 
equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . In stage two, 
the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 12: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model. The regression is described in equation 2.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to the 
efficiency ratio. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
  Scenario 13: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model on the business cycle variable. The regression is described in 
equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . In stage two, the 
regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 14: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model as described in equation 2.1. The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to 
the efficiency ratio. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 
Panel E – Sample with financial constraint measure 
 Scenario 15 Scenario 16 Scenario 17 Scenario 18 
Book-to-Market 0.19 *** 0.17 *** 0.15 *** 0.10 ** 
 3.21  3.11  2.69  1.97  
Control variables         
Size -0.09 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 ** -0.07 ** 
 -2.54  -2.52  -2.19  -2.16  
Return 2_3 0.88 *** 0.82 *** 0.82 *** 0.78 *** 
 3.92  3.62  3.79  3.53  
Return 4_6 0.64 *** 0.67 *** 0.64 *** 0.68 *** 
 3.22  3.45  3.33  3.64  
Return 7_12 0.51 *** 0.53 *** 0.55 *** 0.61 *** 
 3.56  3.72  3.97  4.55  
Turnover_NASDAQ -0.09  -0.10 ** -0.13 *** -0.11 *** 
 -1.59  -2.02  -2.64  -2.63  
Turnover_NYSE AMEX -0.14 *** -0.13 *** -0.13 *** -0.12 *** 
 -2.70  -2.63  -2.65  -2.67  
NASDAQ 0.18  0.17  0.15  0.20 * 
 1.44  1.39  1.21  1.77  
Intercept 0.04  0.07  0.01  0.05  
 0.45  0.84  0.14  0.62  
Adjusted R2 2.15%  2.09%  2.13%  2.09%  
Average monthly 
observations 
         
2,173   
         
2,173   
         
2,172   
         
2,172   
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E. The sample with available data to calculate the financial constraint measure. 
The net payout ratio is used to proxy for firms’ financial constraints. For the 
construction of this variable, refer to Table 2.1. 
 Scenario 15: Repeating Scenario 2 for the subsample with available data to 
construct the net payout ratio. Returns are adjusted for risks using the 
unconditional Fama and French model. The regression is described in 
equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . In stage two, 
the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 16: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model. The regression is described in equation 2.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to the net 
payout ratio. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
  Scenario 17: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model on the business cycle variable. The regression is described in 
equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . In stage two, the 
regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 18: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model as described in equation 2.1. The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to 
the net payout ratio. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 
F. The sample with available data to calculate the financial constraint and investment 
irreversibility measures 
For the construction of these variables, refer to Table 2.1. 
 Scenario 19: Repeating Scenario 2 for the subsample with available data to 
construct the net payout ratio and the three investment irreversibility 
measures. Returns are adjusted for risks using the unconditional Fama and 
French model. The regression is described in equation 2.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . In stage two, the regression is 
described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 20: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model. The regression is described in equation 2.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to the net 
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payout ratio and the three investment irreversibility measures. In stage two, 
the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 21: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model on the business cycle variable. The regression is described in 
equation 2.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . In stage two, the 
regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 Scenario 22: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model as described in equation 2.1. The variable 1, −tjFirm refers to 
the net payout ratio and the three investment irreversibility measures. In stage 
two, the regression is described in equation 2.2. 
 
Panel F – Sample with investment irreversibility and financial constraint measures 
 Scenario 19 Scenario 20 Scenario 21 Scenario 22 
Book-to-Market 0.21 *** 0.19 *** 0.19 *** 0.07  
 3.29  3.30  3.15  1.60  
Control variables         
Size -0.10 *** -0.09 *** -0.08 ** -0.02  
 -2.61  -2.53  -2.13  -0.80  
Return 2_3 1.00 *** 0.91 *** 0.98 *** 0.84 *** 
 4.26  3.90  4.35  3.09  
Return 4_6 0.71 *** 0.71 *** 0.71 *** 0.80 *** 
 3.52  3.63  3.54  3.97  
Return 7_12 0.51 *** 0.55 *** 0.55 *** 0.61 *** 
 3.67  3.91  3.93  5.13  
Turnover_NASDAQ -0.09  -0.09  -0.11 * -0.09 ** 
 -1.33  -1.54  -1.93  -2.09  
Turnover_NYSE AMEX -0.14 *** -0.14 *** -0.13 *** -0.12 *** 
 -2.77  -2.64  -2.56  -2.97  
NASDAQ 0.22 * 0.20 * 0.18  0.19 ** 
 1.86  1.74  1.51  2.16  
Intercept 0.05  0.08  0.02  0.08  
 0.65  0.98  0.26  1.30  
Adjusted R2 2.15%  2.11%  2.11%  2.57%  
Average monthly 
observations 
         
1,689   
         
1,689   
         
1,689   
         
1,689   
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Chapter 3 – Firms’ Investment, Financing, and the 
Momentum Trading Strategy
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3.1. Introduction 
A technique widely used in technical analysis is price channel based on the 
idea that successive price changes are dependent (Brock et al., 1992). The 
profitability of a trading strategy that buys past winners and sells past losers over a 
horizon of six months was documented in the academic literature as early as in 
Levy (1967). Later on, Jensen and Bennington (1970) conceded that this trading 
rule was not better than a simple buy-and-hold strategy. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) revisit this phenomenon and report that the trading strategy does generate 
statistically and economically significant returns. The success of this strategy 
(which is referred to as the momentum trading strategy) implies that the 
information about past stock returns can be used to generate excess returns, a 
violation of the weak form market efficiency, hence also known as “momentum 
anomaly”.  
There is abundant evidence confirming the profitability of the momentum 
trading strategy (or the momentum profit) in the literature. Rouwenhorst (1998, 
1999) reports that the momentum profit can be found in several international 
markets. In the U.S. market, Grundy and Martin (2001, p.1) report the momentum 
profit to be “remarkably stable across subperiods of the entire post-1926 era” after 
controlling for the time-varying and cross-sectional time variation in risks. In 
explaining the momentum profit, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), argue that the 
momentum trading strategy does not appear to involve a high level of risks. The 
momentum profit exists even when returns are adjusted for risks using the CAPM. 
Fama and French (1996) concede that momentum is the only anomaly that cannot 
be explained by their otherwise successful three factor model.  
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Several authors, including Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et al. (1998), and 
Hong and Stein (1999), attempt to explain the momentum profit using 
psychological biases. Daniel et al. (1998) attribute the momentum profit to investor 
over-reaction to prior private signals whereas Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and 
Stein (1999) attribute it to investor under-reaction to news. So far the evidence in 
support of these models is limited and mixed. Hong et al. (2000) find the 
supportive evidence for Hong and Stein (1999) model. Kausar and Taffler (2005) 
support the Daniel et al. (1998) model but not the Barberis et al. (1998) and the 
Hong and Stein (1999) models. Chan et al. (2004) partially support the Barberis et 
al. (1998) model. 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) report that the momentum profit is 
positive in the U.S. market only during the expansionary period, a necessary but 
not the sufficient condition for a risk based explanation for the momentum profit. 
Cooper et al. (2004) report that the momentum profit in the U.S. market is positive 
and significant only during the periods of stock market upturns. They argue that 
this result is consistent with the prediction of several behavioural models as the 
stock market upturns and downturns measure the investor sentiment cycle. 
However, it is arguable that the stock market upturns and downturns can be a 
measure of different macroeconomic states as in Griffin et al. (2003)40. On the 
other hand, Griffin et al. (2003) find that the momentum profit is positive and 
significant in several international markets in both economic upturns and 
downturns. 
                                                     
40
 Cochrane (1991) finds some evidence that some variables used to describe the business 
cycle can forecast the aggregate stock market return, and the aggregate stock market return 
can forecast future economic activities.  
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Some studies examine whether the momentum profit can be explained by 
firms’ investments. In the Berk et al. (1999) model, firms possess assets-in-place 
and growth options. They also prefer low risk projects than high risk projects. In 
the Johnson (2002) model, the momentum profit arises due to the risk attached to 
expected growth. When calibrated, these models generate the momentum profits 
that persist longer than the profit documented in the existing empirical studies. 
Empirically, Liu and Zhang (2008) document that half of the momentum profit can 
be explained by the growth rate risk proxied by the growth rate of industrial 
production. 
There is also a growing literature on the relationship between stock prices 
and subsequent investments. Morck et al. (1990) provide a comprehensive analysis 
on different channels through which stock prices could affect firms’ investments. 
Recent studies extend the evidence in Morck et al. (1990). In Baker et al. (2003), 
equity dependent firms, i.e. firms that need to rely on external equities to finance 
their investments, would under-invest when their stocks are undervalued. Such 
firms would have to issue equities at a price below the fundamental value to 
finance for all the profitable investments in the pipeline. In Polk and Sapienza 
(2009), if stocks are overpriced according to their existing level of investments, 
managers who hold a short term view might invest further to cater investors’ 
sentiment and maintain the recent stock price trend. Bakke and Whited (2010) 
support the proposition that stock prices contain private information that managers 
use when making investment decisions, particularly among less financially 
constrained firms. Finally, Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) concede that 
increasing stock prices reflects the better quality of growth opportunities. 
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In short, the literature suggests that firms’ investments are related to their 
risks, which might predict future stock returns. On the other hand, stock prices are 
likely to influence firms’ investments. Hence, it is possible that past stock prices 
are related to future stock prices through firms’ current investments. There is a gap 
to extend the research on firms’ investments and the momentum profit in light of 
the recent studies on stock prices and firms’ investments. This chapter aims to fill 
in this gap by examining whether the momentum profit can be explained by the 
investment patterns of past winners and past losers.  
This chapter argues that there are three processes that can contribute to the 
profitability of the momentum trading strategy based on the deviation in the 
investment patterns of past winners and past losers. First, according to 
Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009), stock prices reflect investment opportunities; 
and the positive association between stock prices and investments is a by-product 
of their positive relationship with investment opportunities41. Accordingly, past 
winners would invest more than past losers because they have better investment 
opportunities. According to Hahn and Lee (2009), among financially constrained 
firms, those with higher debt capacity are more exposed to the credit multiplier 
effect of Kiyotaki and Moor (1997), and this exposure is priced. Therefore, among 
financially constrained firms, as past winners invest more, they are more exposed 
to the credit multiplier effect, hence are riskier and generate higher returns. 
On the other hand, along the lines of the equity issuance channel in Baker 
et al. (2003), past winners would invest more than past losers as they can issue 
                                                     
41
 This is consistent with the pricing of growth opportunities and why the firms with higher 
(lower) growth opportunities trade at higher (lower) price. 
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more overpriced shares to finance their investments that would not otherwise be 
undertaken. As investors welcome the new efficient investments, past winners 
might be further mispriced, and the return continuation might be maintained. 
Alternatively, along the lines of Polk and Sapienza (2009), if past winners and past 
losers are mispriced due to investors misjudging their investments, past winners 
might continue to invest to maintain their upward price movement, hence the return 
continuation. 
This chapter contributes in enhancing the understanding of the relationship 
between corporate policy decisions and the stock price momentum and supports the 
investing community in making investment decisions. This is the first study, to the 
author’s knowledge, to suggest an explanation for the momentum profit using the 
concept of the credit multiplier effect of Kiyotaki and Moor (1997). It also extends 
the literature on the mispricing of past winners and losers by attributing it to 
investors’ interpretation of their investments. Along this line, the chapter suggests 
two explanations using the share issuance channel based on Baker et al. (2003) and 
the catering theory based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
The propositions in this chapter can be reconciled with several findings 
documented in the literature. For example, the reported momentum profit among 
firms that do not pay dividends (Asem, 2009), have low credit ratings (Avramov et 
al., 2007), are exposed to a high financial distress risk (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008) 
could be reconciled with the evidence of the momentum profit in the financially 
constrained firms. This pattern is consistent with an explanation using the credit 
multiplier effect based on Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) / Hahn and Lee 
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(2009). It is also consistent with an explanation using the share issuance channel 
based on Baker et al. (2003). 
 Furthermore, often during economic upturns, the discount rate is lower 
(see, e.g. Zhang, 2005), making more investment projects worthwhile. One can 
expect a more pronounced deviation in the investment patterns of past winners and 
past losers during economic upturns than during downturns. External funds also 
tend to be available more readily during economic upturns. Hence both the above 
mentioned processes suggest a more pronounced momentum profit during 
economic upturns and among financially constrained firms, resolving the so called 
“puzzle” in Avramov et al. (2007). 
Consistent with the literature, this chapter finds evidence of the momentum 
profit in non-financial, non-utilities firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
from 1972 to 2006. It also finds that past winners invest more than past losers and 
the investment gap is higher during economic upturns than during downturns. The 
investment gap is also higher, with a positive speed of change among firms with 
high financial constraints42. It is lower with a close to zero speed of change among 
firms with low financial constraints. The momentum profit is positive and 
significant among firms with high financial constraints and insignificant among 
firms with low financial constraints. These observations are consistent with an 
explanation using the credit multiplier effect based on Ovtchinnikov and 
                                                     
42
 Firms at the bottom 30% of the overall sample in terms of the net payout ratio are 
classified as those with high financial constraints. Firms at the top 30% are classified as 
those with low financial constraints. The remaining firms are classified as those with 
medium financial constraints. 
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McConnell (2009) and Hahn and Lee (2009), and an explanation based on the 
share issuance channel in Baker et al. (2003).  
The subsample with medium financial constraints generates a positive and 
significant momentum profit and has the investment gap with a positive speed of 
change. This evidence is consistent with an explanation based on the catering 
theory in Polk and Sapienza (2009). Different from the other two explanations, the 
catering theory does not require financial constraints as the sufficient condition, 
provided that firms are not too financially constrained to invest. 
Finally, this chapter finds that cumulative returns can predict future returns 
even when controlling for risks using the unconditional Fama and French three 
factor model, evident for the momentum profit. The return predictability is weak 
when the betas are conditioned on firms’ financial constraints and the business 
cycle variable. Cumulative returns remain their predictability when the Fama and 
French model conditioned on firms’ investments is used to adjust returns for risks. 
It suggests that at least part of the information on firms’ investments is not relevant 
to the momentum profit through a risk-return channel. The momentum profit is 
explained when (a) controlling for risks using the Fama and French model 
conditioned on firms’ financial constraints and the business cycle variables, and (b) 
accounting for the interaction between the momentum profit and firms’ 
investments as suggested in the mispricing explanations based on Polk and 
Sapienza (2009) and Baker et al. (2003). 
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3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Literature Review on the Profitability of the Momentum Trading 
Strategy 
In the literature, the success of the momentum trading strategy was first 
documented by Levy (1967). It was later questioned in Jensen and Bennington 
(1970). Motivated by the popularity of this trading strategy in the modern 
investment practice, and in light of the academic research on the strategies that 
employ the opposite courses of action at a longer time horizon43, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) revisit this strategy. They document the profitability of a hedging 
strategy that goes long in NYSE and AMEX stocks that have performed well in the 
last three to twelve months (i.e. past winners) and short in stocks that have 
performed badly (past losers). During the period from 1965 to 1989, this strategy 
delivers significant positive returns in the following three to twelve months. Since 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) revisit the profitability of the momentum trading 
strategy, they have inspired a significant amount of subsequent research.  
The success of the momentum trading strategy has been considered as a 
challenge in the literature given that it does not appear to be riskier and is robust in 
numerous international markets outside the US. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) do 
not find evidence that the momentum profit is due to a positive market beta of the 
hedge portfolio or a positive serial correlation of the factor mimicking portfolio. 
Fama and French (1996) report that their three factor model cannot explain the 
momentum profit.  
                                                     
43
 I.e. the contrarian investment strategy, documented in De Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
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Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999) finds that the price momentum exists in several 
markets outside the US. This is important evidence against the possibility that the 
result in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is due to U.S.-specific reasons. Rouwenhorst 
(1998) reports the momentum profit in twelve European markets during the period 
from 1978 to 1995. The momentum profit exists even when returns are adjusted for 
risks using (a) the international market factor, and (b) the international version of 
the SMB factor in the Fama and French three factor model (1993, 1996). 
Rouwenhorst (1999) also reports evidence of the momentum profit in emerging 
markets in different continents.  
Aside from its documented robustness across markets, the momentum 
profit is evidently persistent over time. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) update the 
evidence they first reported in their 1993 article on the U.S. market. The 
momentum profit is positive and significant during the nine years following the 
period originally examined in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). More importantly, the 
economic significance of the momentum profit during the extended period is 
comparable to that during the period in the original study. According to Fama and 
French (2008), the momentum anomaly is the most robust anomaly among several 
anomalies examined. Grundy and Martin (2001) report that the momentum profit 
exists in several sub-periods back to 1926. These studies suggest that the success of 
the momentum trading strategy is not likely to be a product of data mining, given 
its robustness across the markets and over time.  
The persistence of the momentum profit motivates several studies to 
investigate how investors can exploit it. The evidence on whether transaction costs 
can fully account for the persistence of the momentum profit is mixed. Lesmond et 
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al. (2004) find that transaction costs can completely eliminate the momentum profit 
in the U.S. market as the strategy requires extensive trading, particularly among 
stocks that are prone to high transaction costs. Lesmond et al. (2004) suggest that 
the transaction cost estimates in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) does not include the 
important components such as bid-ask spread, short sale costs, and taxes.  
In another study, Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) report that although the 
transaction costs reduce the magnitude of the momentum profit, it is positive and 
significant even after accounting for these costs. Furthermore, their estimates show 
that from nearly 3% to over 30% of different types of hedge funds can make 
transaction cost adjusted profits from the momentum trading strategy. The 
transaction costs estimated in Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) are lower than in 
Lesmond et al. (2004), which explains for their higher momentum profits net of 
transaction costs.  
Although the momentum profit is documented across different markets, 
studies on the impact of transaction costs on the momentum profit are concentrated 
on the U.S. market only. Given the size and the depth of the U.S. equity market 
compared to the international markets, the trading costs in other international 
markets should be higher than or equal to those in the U.S. market. Therefore, it is 
likely that transaction costs would considerably reduce the momentum profit, 
possibly to non-existence as Lesmond et al. (2004) suggest. 
While it is important to acknowledge the role of transaction costs in 
explaining the robustness of the momentum profit, it is crucial to address the 
question of the sources of the momentum profit in the first place. According to 
Rouwenhorst (1998), the international evidence of the momentum profit suggests 
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either (a) even a more serious problem of model misspecification, or (b) a 
systematic mispricing due to investors’ irrationality. These two possibilities point 
towards different directions. The momentum profit could either be explained when 
returns are adjusted for risks appropriately, or when accounting for investors’ 
psychological biases. The following sections provide a review on each of these 
sides. 
Explanations for the Momentum Profit based on the Risk-Return 
Relationship 
Fama and French (1996) concede that their three factor model cannot 
explain the momentum profit. Schwert (2003) reports that the momentum profit is 
even higher when returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French three 
factor model than using the CAPM. Ang et al. (2001) develop a downside risk 
factor that reflects the correlation of stock returns with the market return during 
downturns. They find that the momentum profit loads positively on this factor in a 
two factor model consisting of a market factor and a downside risk factor. 
However, the alpha estimated in their two factor model is still statistically 
significant, suggesting that their model cannot fully explain the momentum profit. 
 While Ang et al. (2001) focus on the impact of market downturns, several 
other studies examine the impact of the overall business cycle on the momentum 
profit. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) document that the momentum profit varies 
across the business cycle, remains positive and significant during expansions and 
turns insignificant during contractions. Furthermore, they find that the momentum 
profit is driven by the strategy which ranks stocks on the basis of the returns 
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predicted from the lagged macroeconomic variables. The authors conclude that the 
momentum profit is linked to common factors in the macro economy.  
 Griffin et al. (2003) extend the work of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) to 
16 international markets. Contrary to the evidence in Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002), they find that the predicted returns from the lagged macroeconomic 
variables do not exhibit the momentum pattern, although the raw returns exhibit a 
strong momentum pattern. Furthermore, while using the unconditional 
macroeconomic model of Chen et al. (1986) to fit the momentum profit, Griffin et 
al. (2003) find that the fitted momentum profit is significantly different from the 
actual momentum profit. Also, the model fitness is well below that of the Fama and 
French three factor model reported in Fama and French (1996).  
Finally, different from the evidence in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) on 
the U.S. market’s, Griffin et al. (2003) find that the momentum profit in the 
international markets is positive and significant in both economic upturns and 
downturns, a challenge to a risk based explanation for the momentum profit. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994), Petkova and Zhang (2005), and Lettau and Ludvigson 
(2001) argue that the necessary condition for the value premium to be driven by 
risks is that value stocks outperform growth stocks in good states, and under-
perform in bad states of the business cycle. By the same token, Griffin et al. (2003) 
argue that the necessary condition for the momentum profit to be driven by risks is 
that it is positive during economic upturns and negative during economic 
downturns. Hence, they concede that the momentum profit is not driven by 
macroeconomic risks, given the evidence of the momentum profit in both states of 
the business cycle. 
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 Some studies incorporate the macroeconomic information into the factor 
models to account for the riskiness of the momentum profit. Wu (2002) uses a 
conditional version of the Fama and French model in which the betas are 
conditioned on the macroeconomic variables. When adjusting the momentum profit 
for risks using this model, the alpha remains positive and significant, suggesting 
that the tested conditional Fama and French model cannot explain the momentum 
anomaly. However, Wu (2002) argues that using the asset pricing tests of Dumas 
and Solnik (1995) leads to a different conclusion, i.e. the Fama and French model 
conditioned on the macroeconomic variables can explain the momentum profit. 
 Similar to Wu (2002), Avramov and Chordia (2006) also examine the 
explanatory power of conditional asset pricing models. They also find that the 
unconditional Fama and French model cannot explain the momentum profit. 
Furthermore, several other factor models and their conditional versions cannot 
explain the momentum profit. It is explained only when returns are adjusted for 
risks using the Fama and French model with alpha conditioned on the 
macroeconomic variable and betas on size, Book-to-Market, and the 
macroeconomic variable. Hence, both Wu (2002) and Avramov and Chordia 
(2006) confirm the result in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) that the momentum 
profit is related to the business cycle. Also, to explain the momentum profit, it is 
important to adjust returns for risks using asset pricing models that contain 
conditional information on the macro economy. 
 Motivated by the existing empirical evidence on its relationship with the 
business cycle, Avramov et al. (2007) investigate whether the momentum profit is 
related to credit risks, on the basis that credit risks vary across the business cycle. 
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They find that the momentum profit is positive and significant only among firms 
with low credit ratings, and does not exist among firms with high credit ratings. 
The momentum profit in the high credit risk firms survives the adjustment for risks 
using the CAPM and the Fama and French three factor model. Their findings 
suggest that there might be a process by which credit risks are linked to the 
momentum profit. Avramov et al. (2007) leave an interesting puzzle, i.e. the 
momentum profit exists only among firms with high credit risks but is significant 
only during economic expansions when the default rate is lower. 
In searching for a risk based explanation for the momentum profit, several 
studies examine its relationship with firms’ investments. As discussed in section 
2.2.4 (p. 43), the Berk et al. (1999) theoretical model explains stock returns based 
on changes in firms’ portfolios of investment projects. When calibrating the model 
with realistic project life and depreciation parameters, the model generates positive 
momentum profits for a period of five years. The magnitude of the calibrated 
momentum profit is comparable to that of the momentum profit observed in the 
U.S. market documented in existing empirical studies. However, the calibrated 
momentum profit is more persistent. For example Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
report that the momentum profit disappears beyond about two years following the 
portfolio formation date. Although the calibrated momentum profit does not match 
with the observed profit, Berk et al. (1999) embark a promising direction into the 
relationship between firms’ investment activities and the momentum profit. 
 In the Johnson (2002) model, past winners (losers) are likely to have 
experienced positive (negative) growth shocks. The author assumes that firms with 
positive (negative) growth rate shocks are more likely to have high (low) growth 
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rate levels. Firms with high growth rate are exposed to higher growth risks, and if 
this risk is priced, one would expect past winners to outperform past losers in the 
holding period. The model offers a straight-forward connection between firms’ 
cash flows and the momentum profit. However, similar to the Berk et al. (1999) 
model, the Johnson (2002) model when calibrated generates the momentum profit 
that is persistent beyond the time horizon observed in the existing empirical 
studies. 
 Sagi and Seasholes (2007) study the interaction of the various firm level 
attributes with the momentum profit. They report that the momentum profit can be 
improved by up to 14% if the trading strategy is restricted to firms with more 
growth options, higher revenue volatility, and lower costs. Sagi and Seasholes 
(2007) concede that their work links the momentum profit with firms’ 
microeconomics and does not necessarily support the rational or behavioural line 
of research. However, the relationship between firms’ growth options and the 
momentum profit established in Sagi and Seasholes (2007) is closely related to the 
feature in Johnson’s model (2002) that past winners are riskier than past losers 
because the former are exposed to the risk derived from higher growth. 
 Motivated by the Johnson (2002) model, the Sagi and Seasholes (2007) 
empirical evidence, and several studies that document the relationship between the 
momentum profit and the business cycle, Liu and Zhang (2008) investigate 
whether the momentum profit is due to past winners and past losers having 
different exposures to the growth related risk. This risk is proxied by the growth 
rate of industrial production (MP) from the Chen et al. (1986) macroeconomic 
model. Griffin et al. (2003) find that the Chen et al. (1986) model does not explain 
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the momentum profit. Different from Griffin et al. (2003), Liu and Zhang (2008) 
arrive at a different conclusion using different test portfolios and regression 
windows to estimate risk premiums. 
Liu and Zhang (2008) report that past winners have higher loadings on the 
MP factor than past losers. Also, the loadings and risk premiums of the MP factor 
can account for more than half of the momentum profit. Furthermore, the higher 
loading of past winners on the MP factor lasts for about six months following the 
portfolio formation period, corresponding to the persistence of the momentum 
profit observed in several existing empirical studies. Although the momentum 
profit is not completely explained, the work of Liu and Zhang (2008) contributes to 
the literature on the risk based explanations for the momentum profit. 
Similar to the Liu and Zhang (2008) model, several other asset pricing 
models can only partially explain the momentum profit. The Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) liquidity factor can explain half of the momentum profit over the period 
from 1966 to 1999. The cash flow beta estimated from aggregate consumptions and 
firms’ dividends in Bansal et al. (2005) is higher for past winners and lower for 
past losers. Finally, Chen et al. (2010) report that their investment based factor 
model is better than the CAPM and the Fama and French three factor model in 
explaining the momentum profit. Although none of these models can explain it 
completely, their partial success to date is promising to the search for a risk based 
explanation for the momentum profit. 
Several studies, including Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Griffin et al. 
(2003), find that the momentum profit reverses beyond the holding period. 
According to Liu and Zhang (2008), this evidence is hard to reconcile with a risk 
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based explanation. If past winners outperform past losers in the post formation 
period because the former is riskier than the latter, there is no built-in mechanism 
to explain why such a pattern only last for about one year following the formation 
period, as observed in the data. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) also argue that the 
subsequent return reversal is against the explanation in Conrad and Kaul (1998) 
that the momentum profit is due to the cross sectional variation in mean returns. 
Liu and Zhang (2008) concede that the reversal can be explained by the persistence 
of the difference in the loadings on the industrial growth factor of past winners and 
past losers. The difference in the factor loadings lasts for about one year beyond 
the formation period, coinciding with the period of time between the portfolio 
formation and the return reversal.  
The lack of a satisfactory risk based explanation for the momentum profit 
that can accommodate the subsequent return reversal motivates researchers to turn 
to the explanations based on investors’ psychological biases. The following section 
reviews the proliferation of the research on the momentum profit in this direction. 
Explanations for the Momentum Profit based on Investors’ Biases 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) attribute the momentum profit to investors’ 
under-reaction to firm specific information rather than the under-reaction to 
common factors. The theoretical building blocks of the research in the momentum 
profit using investors’ psychological biases consist of Daniel et al (1998), Barberis 
et al (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999). 
Daniel et al. (1998) develop a model in which investors are overconfident 
and are subject to the self-attribution bias, i.e. attributing success to their own 
competence and failure to bad luck. Due to overconfidence, investors would be 
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overconfident about their own skills to extract information. Hence they would 
overreact to private information and under-react to public information. As more 
public information is released, the self-attribution bias causes investors to continue 
to be overconfident. Hence investors continue overreacting to prior private signals, 
leading to the stock price momentum. When stock prices eventually return to the 
fundamental values as more public information is released, stock returns reverse in 
the long term.  
The Barberis et al. (1998) model uses different psychological biases, i.e. 
representativeness and conservatism, to explain the momentum profit Due to 
conservatism, investors update their information slowly, and classify firms’ 
earnings to follow either a trend or a mean-reverting process. News can have 
different strengths and statistical weights. When they place more weights on the 
mean-reverting model and less weights on the trend model, investors under-react to 
earnings announcements. On the other hand, when they place more weights on the 
trend model following a string of shocks in the same direction, they over-react to 
earnings announcements. The model generates both under-reaction / return 
momentum in the short term and over-reaction / return reversal in the long term. 
 In the Hong and Stein (1999) model, there are two classes of investors, i.e. 
the “news watcher” and the “momentum trader”. The news watcher trades based on 
his or her private information while the momentum trader simply chases the trend. 
If the information diffuses slowly, initially stock prices will under-react to news. 
As momentum traders chase the trend, eventually stock prices will over-react at 
longer horizon. Similar to the Daniel et al. (1998) and the Barberis et al. (1998) 
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models, the Hong and Stein (1999) model unifies both under-reaction and over-
reaction to explain both stock return momentum and reversal.  
Based on these models, several studies develop and test the predictions on 
how the momentum trading strategy behaves among different groups of stocks or 
during a period of time. Cooper et al. (2004) argue that the Daniel et al. (1998) 
model can be extended to predict the momentum profit following stock market 
gains or losses. On the basis that investors in general should be more overconfident 
following market gains, the Daniel et al. (1998) model would predict a higher 
momentum profit during this time. Cooper et al. (2004) also argue that (a) to the 
extent that the delayed over-reaction is greater when the risk aversion is lower in 
the Hong and Stein (1999) model, and (b) wealth increases leads to lower risk 
aversion according to e.g. Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the Hong and Stein 
(1999) model also suggests a higher momentum profit following stock market 
gains. Cooper et al. (2004) find supportive evidence for this prediction extended 
from Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999). 
Huang (2006) provides the confirming evidence for the finding in Cooper 
et al. (2004). The momentum profit is higher during market upturns in 17 
international markets. Market upturns and downturns are determined based on the 
past 12 and 24 months’ cumulative returns. When the lagged world industrial 
production growth is used to determine up markets and down markets, the 
momentum profit behaves as expected. This evidence casts doubt on whether the 
cumulative past market returns proxy for the period of high investor confidence as 
interpreted in Cooper et al. (2004).  
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On the basis that the momentum profit might be due to investors’ under-
reaction to fundamental news (Barberis et al., 1998 and Hong and Stein, 1999), 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) concede that investors under-react to the distress risk. 
They argue that this view is consistent with their evidence that the momentum 
profit is pronounced among firms with high exposure to the financial distress risk. 
The under-reaction argument in Agarwal and Taffler (2008) is motivated by the 
negative risk premium for the distress risk (e.g. Dichev, 1998). However, a recent 
study by George and Hwang (2010) argues that the so-called negative distress risk 
premium might be due to firms optimising their distress costs in a rational manner. 
This study therefore casts doubt on the argument in Agarwal and Taffler (2008) 
that the momentum profit is driven by investors’ under-reaction to the distress risk. 
In Asem (2009), the momentum profit is lower among firms that pay out 
dividends. The author attributes this result to investors’ under-reaction to the 
dividend announcements and reductions. Given that firms in distress (Agarwal and 
Taffler, 2008) or having low credit ratings (Avramov et al., 2007) are more likely 
to omit dividends, the evidence in Asem (2009) in a way is consistent with the 
evidence in Agarwal and Taffler (2008) and Avramov et al. (2007). Liu et al. 
(2008) find that investors do not under-react to dividends omission or reduction. 
Hence, it is possible that the relationship between the momentum profit and firms’ 
dividend paying status identified in Asem (2009) is not driven by investors’ under-
reaction to the dividend related events.  
3.2.2. Literature on Stock Prices and Firms’ Investments 
This section reviews the literature on how firms’ investments are 
influenced by firms’ stock price movements. This line of research started as early 
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as in Bosworth (1975, cited in Morck et al., 1990). Morck et al. (1990) provide a 
comprehensive analysis on different channels through which stock prices might 
affect firms’ investments. First, stock prices only passively reflect future activities 
and therefore do not affect firms’ investments. Second, managers rely on the stock 
prices as a source of information in making investment decisions. Third, managers 
time the equity financing so that new shares are issued at the time they are 
overvalued, making the cost of capital low and allowing investments that would 
not otherwise be undertaken. Finally, managers cater investors’ mispricing to 
protect themselves. Morck et al. (1990) find little evidence that managers learn new 
information from stock prices (the second channel). They also report that after 
controlling for the company fundamentals, stock prices do not influence 
investments, inconsistent with the last two channels. Blanchard et al. (1993) also 
find evidence supporting this view. 
 More recent studies extend the evidence in Morck et al. (1990) in all four 
channels. Among the most prominent studies in stock mispricing and corporate 
investments are Baker et al. (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009). Baker et al. 
(2003) find that equity dependent firms, i.e. firms that need to rely on external 
equities to finance their investments, would under-invest when their stocks are 
undervalued. This is because these firms would have to issue equities at a price 
below the fundamental value to finance such investments. By the same token, these 
firms would issue equities to invest when their stocks are overpriced. Hence, firms 
subject to financial constraints in the sense that they need to rely on external 
equities to finance investments would invest more efficiently when their stocks are 
overpriced. Baker et al. (2003) support the third channel in Morck et al. (1990). 
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 Polk and Sapienza (2009), on the other hand, complement the stock 
mispricing – investments channel by the catering theory. This channel is 
independent of the equity issuance channel of Baker et al. (2003), as mispricing 
can affect firms’ investments even when firms do not rely on seasoned equity 
offerings for financing. If stocks are overpriced according to their level of 
investments, managers who hold a short term view may want to maintain the recent 
upward trend of the stock price by investing further to cater investors’ sentiment. 
Firms with abundant financial resources (e.g. cash and debt capacity) would also 
invest more when their stocks are overpriced. Different from Baker et al. (2003), 
firms may invest in negative NPV projects to cater for investor sentiment. Polk and 
Sapienza (2009) support the fourth channel in Morck et al. (1990). 
 The debate on whether stock prices are related to firms’ investments 
continues with the works of Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) and Bakke and 
Whited (2010). Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) report that there is no 
systematic difference in the relationship between stock prices and firms’ 
investments among undervalued firms as compared to that among overvalued 
firms. Bakke and Whited (2010) only find some limited evidence that such a 
difference exists. The literature is therefore inconclusive on the relationship 
between stock mispricing and firms’ investments. 
 In line with the second channel in Morck et al. (1990), several studies 
examine whether the information contained in stock prices affect firms’ 
investments. Chen et al. (2007) suggests that stock prices contain private 
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information44 not known to managers and relevant to the investment decision 
making. Furthermore, managers use the private information in stock prices in their 
investment decisions. Bakke and Whited (2010) strongly support this proposition, 
particularly among less financially constrained firms. The evidence is consistent 
with the second channel but is inconsistent with the finding in Morck et al. (1990). 
 On the other hand, Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) argue that the 
relevant information in stock prices is the growth opportunities, and increasing 
stock prices reflects the better quality of growth opportunities. They find the 
supportive evidence when the growth opportunities are both stock price based (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) and non-stock price based (e.g. asset growth and sales growth) 
measures. Furthermore, this relationship is more pronounced among firms with 
more debt overhang and information asymmetries, and facing higher distress costs, 
or generally more financially constrained firms. In light of Morck et al. (1990), the 
evidence in Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) supports the first channel and is 
also consistent with the finding in Morck et al. (1990). 
In summary, there is existing empirical evidence on the influence of 
current stock prices on firms’ investments in the presence of financial constraints. 
However, the explanations for this influence remain disputable. Recent literature 
also suggests that firms’ investments and their financial constraints are related to 
their risks, and hence to their stock returns. Kiyotaki and Moor (1997) describe the 
credit multiplier effect, i.e. how the dual role of fixed assets as a factor of 
production and as collaterals for debts can help amplify a small technological 
                                                     
44
 For example, information about the product market demand or the relevant strategic 
issues. 
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shock to affect the stock market returns. Firms facing credit limits and having more 
fixed assets can use these assets as collaterals to obtain more funds and invest more 
in fixed assets, which in turn can be used as collaterals for further borrowings. 
Based on the concept of the credit multiplier effect, Almeida and Campello (2007) 
test a model in which asset tangibility affects the sensitivity of corporate 
investments to cash-flow in firms with financial constraints.  
 Hahn and Lee (2009) test the asset pricing implication of the credit 
multiplier effect. Because stock prices reflect the net present value of investments, 
the stock returns of firms facing financial constraints and having high debt capacity 
are more sensitive to the availability of funds. If the exposure to the availability of 
funds is priced by the market, firms with high debt capacity would earn higher 
returns than firms with low debt capacity. Hahn and Lee (2009) find that among 
financially constrained firms, debt capacity significantly affects the cross section of 
stock returns. This relationship exists only among financially constrained firms. 
3.2.3. The Gaps in the Literature 
Given the overwhelming evidence on the existence of the momentum 
profit across the markets and over time, the most prominent question is what 
explains the phenomenon. The literature suggests that firms’ investments are 
related to their risks, which might predict future stock returns. On the other hand, 
stock prices are likely to influence firms’ investments. Hence, it is possible that 
past stock prices are related to future stock prices through firms’ current 
investments. The research into the relationship between stock price momentum and 
firms’ investments is limited mainly to the theoretical works of Berk et al. (1999) 
and Johnson (2002), and the empirical work of Liu and Zhang (2008). None of 
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these studies fully explains the momentum profit pattern observed in the existing 
literature.  
There is a gap to extend the abovementioned research direction in light of 
the recent studies on stock prices and firms’ investments. This chapter aims to fill 
in this gap by extending the understanding on whether the momentum profit can be 
explained by the investment patterns of past winners and past losers. The literature 
on the momentum trading strategy is also characterised with several scattered 
findings on the pattern of the momentum profit. Hence it is useful if a new 
explanation for the momentum profit can accommodate some of these findings. 
The following section forms the research questions and develops the hypotheses to 
empirically test the relationship between firms’ investments and the profitability of 
the momentum trading strategy. 
3.3. The Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This chapter aims to investigate whether the profitability of the momentum 
trading strategy observed in the stock market can be explained by the firm level 
investment activities. The questions that this chapter aims to address are as follows: 
(1) Whether the momentum trading strategy is profitable in the sample; 
and 
(2) If it is, whether firms’ investment patterns can explain it.  
Given the extensive evidence on the existence of the momentum profit 
reviewed in section 3.2 (p. 129), this chapter expects to find evidence of the 
momentum profit in the U.S. markets. The first hypothesis is as follows: 
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H3.1: The strategy of buying past winners and selling past losers generates 
positive returns.  
To answer the second research question, this chapter examines whether the 
momentum profit is related to the investment gap between past winners and past 
losers. The literature in the relationship between stock prices and firms’ 
investments reviewed in section 3.2.2 (p. 141) suggests that increasing stock prices 
can be associated with firms’ investments, which could be due to one or more of 
the followings:  
 Model 1 - higher growth opportunities are reflected in the price (Ovtchinnikov 
and McConnell, 2009),  
 Model 2 - more private information is embedded in the price (Bakke and 
Whited, 2010),  
 Model 3 - firms issue overpriced stocks to finance investments that could not 
have been undertaken otherwise (Baker et al., 2003), and 
 Model 4 - managers invest to cater for investor sentiment that make stocks 
mispriced (Polk and Sapienza, 2009).  
The second hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
H3.2: Past winner firms invest more than past loser firms. 
 Firms’ accessibility to sufficient funds also directly affects their investment 
activities. Hence the next hypothesis examines how the investment gap between 
past winners and past losers differs across different groups of firms with different 
financial constraints. According to Bakke and Whited (2010), managers react more 
strongly to the private information embedded in the stock price when firms are less 
financially constrained. This is because with more financial resources, it is easier 
 148 
for managers to respond to the private information. Polk and Sapienza (2009) also 
argue that the catering process works better among firms with abundant financial 
resources as they give firms the freedom to undertake investments to cater for 
investor sentiment.  
On the other hand, Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) suggest that the 
investments of more financially constrained firms are more responsive to changes 
in their investment opportunity set than those of less financially constrained firms. 
By definition, equity dependent firms are financially constrained; hence the equity 
issuance channel of Baker et al. (2003) should work better among financially 
constrained firms than among those with abundant financial resources. Taking the 
prediction based on the arguments in Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) and 
Baker et al. (2003) as the basis, the next hypothesis is formed as follows: 
H3.3: The investment gap between past winner firms and past loser firms is 
higher among firms with higher financial constraints than among firms 
with lower financial constraints. 
 If firms’ investments respond to the private information in the stock price 
as suggested by Bakke and Whited (2010), hypothesis H3.3 would be rejected. 
However, it is difficult to establish how this relationship evolves into further price 
appreciation of past winners versus past losers to explain the momentum profit.  
If the sensitivity of firms’ investments to stock price is due to the stock 
prices reflecting the quality of growth opportunities (Ovtchinnikov and McConnell, 
2009), hypothesis H3.3 would be supported. Furthermore, financially constrained 
firms might have a richer portfolio of projects in the pipeline than financially 
unconstrained firms. This is because without financing frictions, firms would have 
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exercised the best growth options already. Hence, financially constrained firms 
would invest more and benefit from the rectification of the financing frictions. 
Kiyotaki and Moor (1997) describe the credit multiplier effect by which 
financing frictions can be rectified as firms invest. Among firms with financial 
constraints, when past winners invest more than past losers, the new investments 
can be used as collaterals. Hence, past winners would increase their debt capacity 
at a faster rate than past losers do. Along the lines of Almeida and Campello 
(2007), past winners are more exposed to the credit multiplier effect than past 
losers. Furthermore, Hahn and Lee (2009) concede that the exposure to the credit 
multiplier effect is priced only among firms with financial constraints. Hence, past 
winners would generate higher returns than past losers when their stocks are not 
mispriced and reflect fundamental information about the investment opportunity 
set (Ovtchinnikov and McConnell, 2009). 
If firms’ investments respond to stock prices through the equity issuance 
channel of Baker et al. (2003), financially constrained firms can have the sufficient 
resources to invest more efficiently. More efficient investments in turn might help 
maintain the upward movement of the overpriced stocks until the mispricing is 
eventually corrected. This process could give rise to a more pronounced 
momentum profit among financially constrained firms, and no profit among 
financially unconstrained firms. 
Finally, in the case of the explanation based on the catering theory (Polk 
and Sapienza, 2009), hypothesis H3.2 would be accepted and hypothesis H3.3 would 
be rejected. Furthermore, if the catering achieves its objective, one would expect 
the price trend to continue as investor sentiment is maintained, until the mispricing 
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is corrected. Polk and Sapienza (2009) argue that this catering behaviour is more 
likely to happen when firms have access to abundant resources. Therefore the 
momentum profit would be stronger among financially unconstrained firms.  
Similar to the formation of hypothesis H3.3, the following hypothesis on the 
momentum profit is formed on the basis of the prediction based on the arguments 
in Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) and Baker et al. (2003): 
H3.4: The momentum profit is pronounced among firms with higher 
financial constraints and non-existent among firms with lower financial 
constraints. 
Firms’ investment activities tend to vary across different business cycle 
stages. Hence, if the momentum profit is driven by investments, it should also be 
influenced by the business cycle. The existing evidence on the performance of the 
momentum trading strategy during the economic expansion versus contraction is 
contradicting. In Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), the momentum profit is positive 
only during the expansionary period. On the other hand, Griffin et al. (2003) report 
that the momentum profit in several international markets is positive and 
significant in both good and bad business cycle stages.  
Cooper et al. (2004) study the momentum profit in the stock market 
upturns and downturns, and find that the profit is positive and significant only 
during the market upturns. One may argue that the result in Cooper et al. (2004) is 
consistent with that in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), as the aggregate stock 
market returns are related to the business cycle. For example, Cochrane (1991) 
finds some evidence that some variables used to describe the business cycle can 
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forecast the aggregate stock market return, and vice versa, the aggregate stock 
market return can forecast future economic activities.  
If the momentum profit is driven by the investment activities of past 
winners and past losers, there is an alternative possibility. The stages of business 
cycle might affect firms’ investment activities, through which it would influence 
the momentum profit. If managers attempt to invest efficiently, and stock prices 
reflect the growth opportunities (Ovtchinnikov and McConnell, 2009), one would 
expect the investment gap between past winners and past losers to be higher during 
economic upturns than during downturns. This is because often during economic 
upturns, the discount rate is lower, making the value of growth opportunities higher 
and more projects worth investing. For the same reason, in the case of the share 
issuance channel (Baker et al., 2003), if the new investments are efficient, the 
investment gap between past winners and past losers would also be higher during 
economic upturns than during downturns.  
Alternatively, managers may attempt to invest to cater for investor 
sentiment (Polk and Sapienza, 2009). The catering activity is likely to be stronger 
during the period of high investor sentiment. Several studies45 suggest that the 
investor sentiment cycle and the business cycle are closely related. This chapter 
therefore hypothesises that during economic upturns, which could coincide with 
sentiment upturns, the investment gap between past winners and past losers is 
higher.  
If the momentum profit is driven by the investment gap between past 
winners and past losers as conjectured in the previous hypotheses, one could expect 
                                                     
45
 E.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2006 and Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006. 
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the momentum profit to be stronger during economic upturns than during 
downturns. The final hypothesis can therefore be formed as follows: 
H3.5a: The investment gap of past winners and past losers is bigger during 
economic upturns than during downturns. 
H3.5b: The momentum profit is more pronounced during economic upturns 
than during downturns. 
Of the explanations examined in this chapter, those based on the arguments 
in Polk and Sapienza (2009) and Baker et al. (2003) attribute the momentum profit 
to the mispricing of past winners and past losers. As a result, the return 
predictability of cumulative returns would remain even when controlling for risks. 
Alternatively, the explanation based on the arguments in Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell (2009), Kiyotaki and Moor (1997) and Hahn and Lee (2009) attributes 
the profit to the difference in the risks of winners and losers. In this case, the return 
predictability of cumulative returns would disappear when controlling for risks. 
The null hypothesis using the risk-based explanation is as follows: 
H3.6: The momentum profit can be explained by an asset pricing model 
that incorporates relevant fundamental factors. 
Any explanation to the momentum profit should be able to accommodate 
the long term return reversal. The explanations based on the catering theory of Polk 
and Sapienza (2009) and the share issuance channel of Baker et al. (2003) can 
accommodate the return reversal as the mispricing would eventually be corrected. 
The explanation based on the growth opportunities model of Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell (2009) could accommodate the return reversal in the longer term due to 
the diminishing marginal return on investments. Since the better investment 
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opportunities would be prioritised, as firms invest, the quality of the growth 
opportunities will deteriorate. Hence, the return continuation of past losers and past 
winners would not persist forever. 
The hypotheses developed and examined in this chapter are summarised in 
Table 3.1.  
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
The following section discusses the methodologies employed to test the hypotheses 
set out in the current section, and describes the data to be tested. 
3.4. The Methodology and Sample 
3.4.1. Measurement of Key Firm Level Variables 
Firms’ investment activities are measured by the CAPEX ratio, i.e. the 
ratio of capital expenditures incurred during the year divided by net fixed assets at 
the beginning of the year. The firm month observations with missing data on 
current year’s capital expenditures or previous year’s net fixed assets are excluded. 
Since this chapter examines the investment activities of past winners and past 
losers as the stock price evolves, it reports monthly contemporaneous CAPEX. For 
example, if the current month is March 2005, the CAPEX ratio for each stock is 
measured for the financial year ended in December 2005.  
The portfolio CAPEX is determined as follows: (1) calculate the mean 
contemporaneous CAPEX of the portfolio in each calendar month; and (2) 
calculate the average of this mean contemporaneous CAPEX across the calendar 
month for each portfolio. To calculate the CAPEX gap between the past winners 
and past losers, this chapter (a) first takes the difference in the mean 
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contemporaneous CAPEX ratio of the winner and the loser portfolios in each 
calendar month; and (b) calculates the average of this CAPEX gap across the 
calendar months. 
To test the impact of financial constraints on the momentum profit, this 
chapter uses the net payout ratio, similar to the choice in chapter 2 (section 2.4, p. 
70). For each firm in each financial year, the net payout ratio is calculated as 
dividends plus repurchases minus share issuance, scaled by the net incomes. Since 
this chapter investigates the momentum trading strategy in the financially 
constrained versus unconstrained subsamples, and the financial constraint status in 
general does not tend to fluctuate frequently from month to month, the net payout 
ratio is measured at a lag with stock returns. It is measured in December year t-1 
and is used to classify firms into the groups with high, medium and low financial 
constraints from July year t to June year t+1. Firms in the bottom 30% of the 
overall sample are included in the subsample with high financial constraints. Firms 
in the top 30% are included in the subsample with low financial constraints. The 
remaining firms are included in the subsample with medium financial constraints. 
The construction of the key firm level variables described in this section is 
summarised in Panel A of Table 3.2. 
[Insert Table 3.2 about here] 
This chapter uses the cumulative market returns to classify the period 
under examination into upturns and downturns. These states would coincide with 
both the economic and the sentiment upturns and downturns. Following Cooper et 
al. (2004), when the three year cumulative market return is positive, the dummy 
variable UP is assigned the value of 1, and zero otherwise. On the other hand, when 
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the cumulative market return is negative, the dummy variable DOWN is assigned 
the value of 1, and zero otherwise. 
3.4.2. Methodology 
To address the research questions and the hypotheses set out in section 3.3 
(p. 146), this chapter employs two methods of analysis. The first methodology is 
the portfolio sorting approach based on past stock return performance to form the 
momentum trading strategy. A 6 x 6 momentum strategy that skips one month 
between the formation and the holding periods is formed as follows. In each 
month, stocks are sorted in ascending order into deciles by the cumulative returns 
from month t-6 to month t-1 (i.e. the formation period) using the sample decile 
breakpoints. The resulting ten portfolios are held for six months from month t+1 to 
month t+6 (i.e. the holding period). The portfolio construction procedure results in 
the overlapping portfolios with stocks entering and exiting the portfolios each 
month. The raw returns of the ten equally weighted deciles and of the long-short 
portfolio that goes long in past winners (i.e. the portfolio with top ranking in the 
formation period’s cumulative return) and short in past losers (i.e. the portfolio 
with bottom ranking in the formation period’s cumulative return) are reported. 
To address the first research question of whether the momentum profit 
exists in the sample, this chapter first employs a variety of the momentum trading 
strategies with the formation period of either 3, 6, 9, or 12 months, the holding 
period of either 3, 6, 9, or 12 months, with and without one month in between the 
formation and the holding period. With four choices for the formation period and 
four choices for the holding period, without skipping a month in between, there are 
16 momentum strategies. Similarly, when the momentum strategies skip a month 
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between the formation and the holding period, there are another 16 strategies. In 
total, there are 32 strategies. The original Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) paper does 
not skip a month between the formation and holding period. Several subsequent 
studies, such as Cooper et al. (2004), skip a month between these periods when 
constructing the portfolio to avoid the bid-ask bounce effects. 
 To examine the second research question on the sources of the momentum 
profit, among the above 32 strategies, this chapter identifies a strategy that satisfies 
the following conditions: 
 Skip a month between the formation and holding period to avoid the bid-
ask bounce and the very short term reversal (Jegadeesh, 1990); and 
 Does not require regular rebalancing to avoid the possibility that the results 
could be eliminated by transaction costs46.  
 This chapter measures the momentum profit during economic upturns and 
downturns using the UP and DOWN dummy variables described in section 3.4.1 
(p. 153). When the profit is regressed against the UP and DOWN dummy variables, 
the coefficient attached to the UP (DOWN) variable gives the average momentum 
profit during economic upturns (downturns). When the profit is regressed against 
the UP dummy variable and a constant, the coefficient attached to the UP dummy 
variable measures the difference between the momentum profit during economic 
upturns versus downturns. All the t statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity with the Newey and West (1987) method. Cooper et al. (2004) 
suggest that this approach preserves the time series of returns and reliably corrects 
any serial correlation. 
                                                     
46
 For a review on the momentum profit and transaction costs, refer to Swinkels (2004).  
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To test whether the momentum profit can be explained by risks, similar to 
chapter 2, this chapter uses the asset pricing framework of Avramov and Chordia 
(2006) to control individual stock returns for risks. This approach has an advantage 
that it uses all the information at the firm level rather than the aggregate 
information at portfolio level. For a detailed discussion on the framework of 
Avramov and Chordia (2006), refer to section 2.4 (p. 59). 
The hypotheses formed in section 3.3 (p. 146) relate firms’ investments 
and financing to the momentum profit. Hence the firm level investments and 
financial constraints variables are used as the conditioning variables in the 
Avramov and Chordia (2006) framework. These variables are measured using the 
CAPEX ratio and the net payout ratio as described in section 3.4.1 (p. 153). A 
business cycle variable is also used as the conditioning variable, as hypothesis H3.5 
conjectures that the investment gap and the momentum profit potentially vary 
across the economic upturns and downturns. Similar to chapter 2, this chapter uses 
the default spread to describe the business cycle, on the basis that as a single 
indicator, it performs better than other popular alternatives. 
The Fama and French model is used as the base model in the following 
general model specification:  
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in which jtR  is the return on stock j and FtR is the risk free rate at time t. 
ftF represents the priced risk factors, which include the market factor, the HML 
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and SMB factors of the Fama and French model (1993, 1996). Firm characteristic 
1−jtFirm  is the one month lagged firm level measurement of investments and / or 
financial constraints. 1−tMWF is the one month lagged market wide factor 
describing the business cycle variable, proxied by the default spread, i.e. the spread 
between the U.S. corporate bonds with Moody’s ratings of AAA and BAA. 
The part of returns unexplained by the asset pricing model in equation 
(3.1) is regressed against the cumulative returns in a cross sectional regression. The 
following regression helps assess the return predictability of cumulative returns 
after controlling for risks:  
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in which *jtR  is the risk adjusted return of stock j at time t, measured as the sum of 
the constant and the residual terms from equation (3.1). 1,, −tjmPR are the firm level 
cumulative returns for the periods of 1-3 month, 4-6 month, and 7-12 month prior 
to the current month. The vector of size, the Book-to-Market ratio, and stock 
turnovers in equation (3.2) represents the control factors, being the size, value and 
liquidity that might also predict the cross section of stock returns.  
Size measures the market capitalisation at the end of each month. The 
Book-to-Market ratio is measured as the sum of the book value of common equity 
and balance sheet deferred tax, scaled by the market capitalisation. The ratio is 
measured in December of the previous year for the firm-month observations from 
July of the current year to June of the following year. There is a six month gap 
between (a) the time at which this ratio is measured and (b) the time at which stock 
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returns are measured. This gap ensures that the required accounting data to 
calculate the ratio is available to investors when they consider their investment 
decisions. The turnover of the stocks listed on NYSE /AMEX stock exchanges is 
calculated as the trading volume divided by the outstanding number of shares. The 
turnover of the stocks listed on NASDAQ stock exchange is constructed in a 
similar manner. The construction of the key firm level variables described in this 
section is summarised in Panel B of Table 3.2. 
Similar to chapter 2, following Avramov and Chordia (2006) and Brennan 
et al. (1998), this chapter transforms the firm level variables in equation (3.2) by 
(1) lagging two months (size and turnovers), (2) taking natural logarithm (size, 
turnovers and the Book-to-Market ratio), and (3) taking deviation from the cross 
sectional mean (size, turnovers, the Book-to-Market ratio, the accrual ratio and past 
cumulative returns).  The transformation is described below: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑=−= 1 ,2,2, ln1ln_ i
n
titjtj Sizelag
n
SizelagdtransformeSize  (3.3) 
[ ] [ ]∑=−= 1 ,,, ln1ln_ i
n
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n
BMdtransformeBM  (3.4) 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑=−= 1 ,2,2, ln1ln_ i
n
titjtj Turnoverlag
n
TurnoverlagdtransformeTurnover   
 (3.5) 
in which tjSize , , tjBM , , and tjTurnover , are the measurements of size, Book-to-
Market, and turnover in NYSE / AMEX or NASDAQ for firm j at time t as 
described above. ( )txlag 2 refers to the two month lag of  variable tx . [ ]yln refers 
to the natural log of variable y . n refers to the number of stocks in the sample at 
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time t. tjdtransformeSize ,_ , tjdtransformeBM ,_ and 
tjdtransformeTurnover ,_  are the corresponding variables after the 
transformation and replace the role of  tjSize , , tjBM , , and tjTurnover , . These 
variables are lagged by one month to become 1, −tjSize , 1, −tjBM , and 
1, −tjTurnover in equation (3.2). 
The variables are lagged to avoid any biases by bid-ask effects and thin 
trading and are taken as natural logarithms to avoid skewness. Taking the deviation 
from the cross sectional mean implies that the average stock will have the firm 
level characteristics at the average level (i.e. the deviation from the cross sectional 
mean is zero), and its expected return is driven solely by risks.  
The statistical null hypothesis is that the coefficients mtc attached to the 
cumulative returns are not significantly different from zero. This means the 
cumulative returns no longer predict subsequent stock returns. It suggests that the 
momentum profit is explained when returns are adjusted for risks in stage one.  
H3.0: mtc = 0 
The coefficients and t-statistics are reported. As argued in chapter 2, the procedure 
employed in this chapter does not involve regressions with estimated independent 
variables. Therefore it is not subject to the error-in-variable problem (Bauer et al., 
2010 and Subrahmanyam, 2010). The t-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West (1987) method. 
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3.4.3. Sample Description 
The sample includes all non-financial and non-utilities stocks listed in the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges. The sample period is between 
1972 and 2006. Similar to chapter 2, financial stocks are excluded as they have 
different asset structures compared to the non-financial stocks. Utilities stocks are 
excluded as utilities firms and potentially their investments are more strictly 
regulated than firms in other industries. The coverage period starts in 1972 due to 
the availability of the data to measure the net payout ratio. 
Only stocks with available information to calculate the CAPEX ratio for 
the year and the proxy for financial constraints in December of the previous year 
are considered. Following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), this chapter excludes the 
firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling 
within the smallest NYSE size decile. According to Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), 
the purpose is to avoid the results to be driven by small and illiquid stocks or bid-
ask bounce. The sample has 557,730 firm-month observations, stretching across 
414 months from July 1972 to December 2006. The descriptive statistics of the 
sample are reported in Table 3.3. 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports the statistics of the key variables used in the 
portfolio sorting methodology. All the variables, including the monthly returns, the 
holding period cumulative returns, the CAPEX ratio, and the net payout ratio are 
highly skewed. The correlation coefficient of the two firm level variables, i.e. the 
CAPEX ratio and the net payout ratio, is close to zero and is statistically 
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insignificant. The low correlation suggests that these variables describe different 
economic forces. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 describes the statistics of the variables in the 
regressions of the Avramov and Chordia’s asset pricing framework. The sample is 
further constrained in that there should be data on stock returns, market 
capitalisation, and the Book-to-Market ratio in the current year and in the 36 
months prior to the current month. According to Avramov and Chordia (2006), this 
condition ensures that the estimation at the firm level is not noisy. An average 
stock has the average market capitalisation of $2.33 billion and the average Book-
to-Market ratio of 0.76. The average cumulative returns of the past 2nd to 3rd month, 
4th to 6th month, and 7th to 12th month are 3.36%, 5.13% and 10.87% respectively.  
All the variables in this panel show a significant level of skewness, with the mean 
values well above the median. The skewness suggests that it is appropriate to 
transform the variables in accordance with Avramov and Chordia (2006) and 
Brennan et al. (1998) as described in section 3.4.2 (p. 155). 
3.5. The Results 
3.5.1. The Profitability of the Momentum Trading Strategy 
Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Table 3.4 presents the 
momentum trading strategy with the formation and holding periods varying 
between 3 months to 12 months. The variety of the formation and holding periods 
helps ensure that the evidence on the momentum profit is robust. Taking the 6 x 6 
strategy as an example, in each month, stocks are sorted in ascending order by the 
cumulative returns from month t-6 to month t-1. Ten portfolios with equal number 
of stocks are composed and positions (long and short) are taken from month t to 
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month t+5. W-L represents the momentum profit, or the return to the portfolio that 
goes long in past winners (i.e. the portfolio with the highest ranking in the 
cumulative returns) and short in past losers (i.e. the portfolio with the lowest 
ranking in the cumulative returns). The portfolio construction procedure results in 
overlapping portfolios with stocks entering and exiting at different points in time.  
[Insert Table 3.4 about here] 
Panel A reports the returns to the portfolios and to the long-short portfolios 
when the momentum trading strategies do not skip between the formation and the 
holding periods. Panel B reports the returns when the momentum trading strategies 
skip one month between the formation and the holding periods. Consistent with the 
literature, this chapter finds strong evidence for the momentum profit in the 
sample. The returns to the portfolios follow an increasing pattern from past losers 
to past winners. All the momentum trading strategies in both Panel A and Panel B 
generate positive and statistically significant momentum profits. Their magnitudes 
vary from 0.51% to 1.29% per month. Skipping a month between the formation 
and the holding periods tends to improve the profitability of the trading strategy. 
Also, the strategies that rely on longer formation or holding periods tend to 
generate lower returns.  
Scenarios 1 and 2 in Table 3.9 provide evidence for the momentum profit 
using the Avramov and Chordia (2006) regression approach. In scenario 1, returns 
are not adjusted for risks in the stage one regression. The raw returns are regressed 
against the firm level variables in the stage two regression as described in equation 
3.2 (p. 158). The three cumulative return coefficients are positive and significant. 
They suggest that there is a positive and significant relationship between the cross 
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section of stock returns and the cumulative returns. This result confirms the 
evidence so far that the momentum profit exists in the sample. The coefficients of 
the control variables also show the expected signs. The size coefficient is negative 
and significant (i.e. the return predictability of size), while the Book-to-Market 
coefficient is positive and significant (i.e. the return predictability of the Book-to-
Market ratio). 
In scenario 2, returns are adjusted for risks using the unconditional Fama 
and French three factor model in stage one. The time series regression in stage one 
is described in equation 3.1 (p. 157) with the following 
constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . The risk adjusted returns are regressed 
against the firm level variables as described in equation 3.2. The adjusted R2 drops 
from 6.20% in scenario 1 to 2.74% in scenario 2, suggesting that the Fama and 
French model in stage one helps better explain the return predictability of the firm 
level variables in equation 3.2. Although the cumulative return coefficient at the 
longest lag becomes statistically insignificant, the other two cumulative return 
coefficients are still positive and significant. The evidence suggests that cumulative 
returns exhibit predictability, (thus suggesting that the momentum profit exists), 
even when accounting for risks using the unconditional Fama and French model. 
To summarise, there is evidence that the returns to the portfolios based on 
cumulative returns increase from past losers to past winners. The returns to the 
long-short portfolios are positive and significant. The cumulative returns are 
positively related to the current returns, even when they are adjusted for risks using 
the Fama and French three factor model at the firm level. The evidence suggests 
that hypothesis H3.1, i.e. whether the momentum trading strategy is profitable in the 
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sample, is accepted. The answer to the first research question, whether the 
momentum profit exists in the sample, is therefore affirmative. The following 
sections report evidence in testing hypotheses H3.2 to H3.6 in order to address the 
second research question of whether the momentum profit is affected by firms’ 
investment patterns. 
3.5.2. The Investment Patterns of Past Winners’ and Past Losers 
To address the second research question of whether the momentum profit 
is related to firms’ investments, this chapter uses a momentum trading strategy that 
satisfies the conditions set out in section 3.4 (p. 153). The strategy would skip a 
month between the formation and holding periods and requires few regular 
rebalancing. In Panel B of Table 3.4 which reports the performance of the 
momentum strategies that skip a month, the highest momentum profits concentrate 
in the strategies with 6 to 9 month formation periods and 3 to 6 month holding 
periods. The 6 month holding period is preferred to the 3 month holding period as 
it reduces the need to balance the portfolios by a half.  
The 6x6 strategy turns out to be the one with the highest momentum profit 
(1.21% per month) given the selection criteria. It is also known to be the most 
successful one in the literature. Skipping a month helps avoid the bid-ask bounce 
and the short term reversal described in Jegadeesh (1990). Hence this chapter 
employs the 6x1x6 strategy, i.e. 6 month formation period, skipping 1 month, and 6 
month holding period, to test hypotheses H3.2 to H3.5. 
Table 3.5 reports the investment activities, measured by the 
contemporaneous CAPEX ratio, of past winners and past losers during the holding 
period. Column (1) of Table 3.5 shows that in the overall sample, past winners 
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invest more than past losers by about 15% of a firm’s net fixed assets per year. 
This difference translates into 40% of the average investments past losers 
undertake each year. The investment gap is also statistically significant. However, 
there is no monotonic pattern in the average investments from past losers to past 
winners during the holding period. The average investments of the portfolios in 
between the winner and the loser portfolios approximate each other, and are lower 
than those of the winner and the loser portfolios. 
[Insert Table 3.5 about here] 
Columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table 3.5 show the relationship between capital 
market accessibility described by financial constraints and the investments of past 
winners and past losers during the holding period. The overall sample is divided 
into three subsamples. Firms having the net payout ratio in the bottom 30% are 
included in the subsample with high financial constraints. Firms having the net 
payout ratio in the top 30% are included in the subsample with low financial 
constraints. The remaining firms are included in the subsample with medium 
financial constraints.  
In the subsample with high financial constraints, the investment gap 
between past winners and past losers is about 21%, statistically significant and 
economically highest among the winner-loser investment gaps in the three 
subsamples. The investment gap in the subsample with low financial constraints is 
about ¾ that in the subsample with high financial constraints and is also 
statistically significant. The gap in the subsample with medium financial 
constraints, at nearly 9%, is lower than those in the other two subgroups. 
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Columns (2) and (3) show that the investment gap is smaller among less 
financially constrained firms. The evidence suggests that when firms have 
reasonable access to the capital market, the past stock return performance plays a 
less important role to managements’ investment decisions. However, this tendency 
is not present in columns (3) and (4). In fact, the gap in the subsample with 
medium financial constraints is smaller than that in the subsample with low 
financial constraints. Furthermore, the CAPEX ratio patterns across the deciles 
from past losers to past winners in all the three subsamples by firms’ financial 
constraints do not follow any monotonic pattern. The investments follow a U-
shape, higher in past losers, lower in the middle deciles, and well higher in past 
winners. The patterns are closer to a monotonic increase from past losers to past 
winners in the subsamples with high and medium financial constraints. 
To shed further light into the investment activities of past winners and past 
losers, the chapter next studies the investment activities of past winners and past 
losers during both the formation and the holding periods. An event window 
consisting of the formation period (month -6 to month -1), the skipping month 
(month 0), and the holding period (month 1 to month 6) is considered. For each of 
the thirteen event months within this window, the average contemporaneous 
CAPEX ratios of the ten deciles and the CAPEX gaps are calculated. The average 
contemporaneous CAPEX ratios of each portfolio in each calendar month are first 
calculated. Then the gap in these mean CAPEX ratios between past winners and 
past losers in each calendar month is calculated. Finally, the average of these 
CAPEX gaps is taken across the calendar months for each event month. 
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Figure 3.1 shows that the investment gaps between past winners and past 
losers exhibit very different patterns among the subsamples with different financial 
constraints. In terms of the magnitude, during the holding period, the investment 
gap in the subsample with high financial constraints dominates, followed by the 
investment gaps in the subsample with low and medium constraints respectively. 
The magnitudes of the investment gap lines can explain the observation 
documented earlier in Table 3.5. 
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
In terms of the speed of change over time, in the overall sample, the 
investment gap increases with a relatively constant slope across the formation and 
holding period. The investment gaps in the subsamples with high and medium 
financial constraints exhibit an upward pattern. On the contrary, the investment gap 
in the subsample with low financial constraints changes from an upward movement 
towards a horizontal one during the holding period. Panel B focuses on the 
behaviour of the investment gaps during the holding period. A trend line is added 
to each of the investment gap lines in the overall sample and in each subsample. In 
the subsample with high financial constraints, the investment gap line has a slope 
of 0.74. The slopes are 0.87 and -0.05 respectively in the subsamples with medium 
and low financial constraints. 
The evidence suggests that in general, past winners invest more than past 
losers during the holding period, and the gap is increasing over time. Hypothesis 
H3.2 is therefore supported. Furthermore, during the holding period, the investment 
gap in the subsample with high financial constraints has a higher magnitude and a 
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higher speed of change over time than in the subsample with low financial 
constraints, supporting hypothesis H3.3.  
The higher magnitude of the investment gap in the subsample with high 
financial constraints is consistent with the argument in Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell (2009). The authors argue that (a) the investment of more financially 
constrained firms is more responsive to changes in their investment opportunity set 
than that of less financially constrained firms, and (b) stock prices reflect the 
investment opportunities. It is also consistent with the share issuance argument in 
Baker et al. (2003) in which overpriced firms issue shares to finance investments 
and underpriced firms forgo positive NPV investments when they are financially 
constrained. 
The evidence is inconsistent with the catering theory of Polk and Sapienza 
(2009) in which (a) firms invest to cater for investor sentiment, and (b) they would 
be more likely to do so when having abundant financial resources. The evidence is 
also against an argument that managers invest more in firms with rising stock 
prices in response to more positive private information embedded in the price 
(Bakke and Whited, 2010). According to this argument, managers would react 
more strongly to the private information embedded in the stock price if firms are 
less financially constrained, making the investment gap more pronounced among 
firms with low financial constraints. 
Furthermore, the positive speed of change of the investment gap in the 
subsample with high financial constraints and the zero speed of change in the 
subsample with low financial constraints can be explained by the corresponding 
theories that explain their magnitudes. If stock prices reflect the investment 
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opportunities as argued by Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009), and the higher 
investment gap in the subsample with high constraints compared to that in the 
subsample with low constraints is driven by the higher sensitivity of investments to 
changes in the investment opportunity set, the positive speed of change of the 
investment gap in the subsample with high financial constraints should be driven 
by fundamental forces. This chapter argues that the credit multiplier effect of 
Kiyotaki and Moor (1997) might represent these forces. 
According to the credit multiplier effect, starting with a small investment 
gap between past winners and past losers, firms that invest more have additional 
collateral for further borrowings. By contrast, firms that cut back investments have 
less collateral for further borrowings. Hence the credit multiplier effect can widen 
the investment gap and make its slope positive over time. In fact, Almeida and 
Campello (2007) report that only among firms with financial constraints does asset 
tangibility affect the extent to which firms’ investments respond to cash flows. 
Consistent with Kiyotaki and Moor (1997) and Almeida and Campello (2007), in 
this chapter, the slope of the investment gap is positive in the subsample with high 
financial constraints but not in the subsample with low financial constraints. 
From the perspective of the share issuance channel (Baker et al., 2003), 
among the financially constrained firms, the more stocks are mispriced, the more 
likely it is that new shares are issued at a higher price. This translates into the more 
fund is available at a lower cost of capital, and hence the more the firm would be 
able to invest. Conditional on more efficient investments helping to maintain the 
upward movement of overpriced stocks, financially constrained firms would 
continue issuing shares and investing sensibly. This tendency might also lead to the 
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positive speed of change of the investment gap in the subsample with high 
financial constraints. 
The relationships between the investment gap in the subsample with 
medium financial constraints and the gaps in the other two subsamples do not show 
any clean support towards any hypothesis. The investment gap in the subsample 
with medium constraints is smaller than the gap in the subsample with high 
constraints, consistent with hypothesis H3.3. However, it is smaller than the gap in 
the subsample with low constraints, inconsistent with hypothesis H3.3. Furthermore, 
firms having sufficient financial resources is not the sufficient condition of the 
catering theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009). As long as firms are not highly 
constrained, the catering theory would predict that the investment gap is higher 
among firms with more financial resources. Given that the subsample with medium 
financial constraints is in the grey area of the two opposite forces, its investment 
pattern might be the results of the influences by both sides. 
3.5.3. Firms’ Investments and the Momentum Profit 
Hypothesis H3.4 extends hypotheses H3.2 and H3.3 to examine the 
subsequent stock price behaviour. The explanation based on Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell (2009) suggests that past winners are being more exposed to the credit 
multiplier effect among firms with high financial constraints. According to Hahn 
and Lee (2009), this exposure is priced. Hence this explanation would suggest 
higher returns to past winners than past losers (H3.4). The explanation based on the 
share issuance channel of Baker et al. (2003) would also suggests the return 
continuation among financially constrained firms (H3.4) if the consequent 
investments can make investors even more optimistic about the prospect of the 
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overpriced firm. The explanation based on the catering theory in Polk and Sapienza 
(2009) would also suggest return continuation, as mispricing would lead to 
investments with the purpose of reinforcing further mispricing. However, the return 
continuation is expected to be stronger among the subsample with low financial 
constraints, rejecting hypothesis H3.4. 
Table 3.7 presents the returns to the ten equally sorted portfolios sorted by 
cumulative returns, and the long-short portfolios in the overall sample and in the 
subsamples by firms’ financial constraints. In the overall sample and in each 
subsample, the returns to the deciles monotonically increase from past losers to 
past winners. The momentum profit in the overall sample is statistically significant 
at 1.21% per month, similar to the result reported in Table 3.4 for J=K=6 in Panel 
B. Among the three subsamples, the subsample with high financial constraints 
generates the highest momentum profit (0.65% per month). By contrast, the 
subsample with low financial constraints generates the lowest profit (0.20% per 
month). While the momentum profits in the subsamples with high and medium 
financial constraints are statistically significant, that in the subsample with low 
financial constraints is not.  
[Insert Table 3.7 about here] 
The evidence in the three subsamples supports hypothesis H3.4, consistent 
with the explanation based on Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009). It is also 
consistent with the mispricing explanation based on Baker et al. (2003). On the 
other hand, the catering theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009), which would predict a 
rejection of hypothesis H3.4, is not supported. Finally, it is unclear that the positive 
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and significant momentum profit in the subsample with medium financial 
constraints is consistent with which of these three explanations. 
To conclude, the evidence in sections 3.5.2 (p. 165) and 3.5.3 (p. 171) 
supports hypothesis H3.2 that past winners invest more than past losers. The 
investment gap is higher in the subsample with high financial constraints than in 
the subsample with low financial constraints (H3.3). The speed of change of the 
investment gap in the subsample with high financial constraints is positive. It is 
close to zero in the subsample with low financial constraints. Furthermore, there is 
supportive evidence on the positive and significant momentum profit in the 
subsample with high financial constraints, while small and insignificant in the 
subsample with low financial constraints (H3.4).  
These patterns are consistent with an explanation in which stock prices 
reflect investment opportunities, and the sensitivity of investments to growth 
opportunities is higher for firms with high financial constraints (Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell, 2009). Also, the financially constrained firms which invest more are 
more exposed to the credit multiplier effect (Kiyotaki and Moor, 1997, Almeida 
and Campello, 2007), and generate higher returns as the exposure is priced (Hahn 
and Lee, 2009). They are also consistent with an explanation in which financially 
constrained firms issue shares and invest efficiently when overpriced, and forgo 
valuable investment projects when underpriced (Baker et al., 2003).  
The evidence does not support the prediction based on the Polk and 
Sapienza (2009) catering theory on the investment patterns of past winners and past 
losers in the subsamples with high versus low financial constraints. It is also 
inconsistent with the prediction based on the Bakke and Whited (2010) conjecture 
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that stock prices reflect private information. Furthermore, it is difficult to extend 
the Bakke and Whited (2010) conjecture to predict the return continuation. The 
prediction by the catering theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009) (i.e. rejecting H3.4) is 
not supported in the subsamples with high and low financial constraints. Finally, 
the pattern of the investment gap and the significant momentum profit in the 
subsample with medium financial constraints do not lend clear support to any 
explanation. 
3.5.4. Firms’ Investments and the Momentum Profit across the Business 
Cycle 
This section provides evidence for hypothesis H3.5a, i.e. whether the 
investment gap is higher during economic upturns, and hypothesis H3.5b, i.e. 
whether the momentum profit is more pronounced during economic upturns, than 
during downturns. If the investment gap between past winners and past losers is 
driven by the difference in the growth opportunities, along the lines of 
Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009), the investment gap would be higher during 
economic upturns than during economic downturns. This is because there would be 
more growth opportunities during economic upturns. More growth opportunities 
would also encourage managers of financially constrained firms to issue shares to 
invest when the share is overpriced. Hence, the share issuance channel of Baker et 
al. (2003) would also suggest a higher investment gap during economic upturns. 
Alternatively, if the investment gap is driven by managers catering for 
investor sentiment, along the lines of Polk and Sapienza (2009), the investment gap 
would be higher during sentiment upturns and lower during sentiment downturns. 
This is because the catering activity is more likely to achieve its objective when the 
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general investor sentiment in the market is high. Furthermore, investors tend to be 
optimistic during economic upturns. Hence economic upturns (downturns) and 
sentiment upturns (downturns) are likely to coincide. This chapter uses the positive 
cumulative market returns to capture both the economic and sentiment upturns. 
Table 3.6 presents the investments of firms in the ten equally weighted 
portfolios sorted by cumulative returns during economic upturns and downturns. 
The corresponding investment gaps between past losers and past winners are also 
presented. In the overall sample, the investment gap between past winners and past 
losers is statistically significant during both economic upturns and downturns. 
However, the gap of 14.75% during economic upturns is more than twice that 
during downturns (6.55%). The difference in the investment gaps during economic 
upturns versus downturns is statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 3.6 about here] 
Figure 3.2 shows that across the formation and the holding period, the 
investment gap during economic upturns is higher than that during downturns. 
Furthermore, in Table 3.8, consistent with Cooper et al. (2004), the momentum 
profit in the overall sample is positive and significant during economic upturns, 
while it is insignificant during downturns. The evidence supports hypothesis H3.5 
that the investment gap is bigger and the momentum profit is more pronounced 
during economic upturns. Together with the evidence supporting hypotheses H3.2, 
H3.3 and H3.4, this evidence suggests that the momentum profit and the investment 
gap are related. 
[Insert Figure 3.2 about here] 
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It is interesting to see how the investment gap and the momentum profit 
vary across the economic upturns and downturns in each subsample by firms’ 
financial constraints. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.6, the investment gaps 
among firms with high financial constraints are approximately 23% and 7% during 
economic upturns and downturns respectively. The difference in the investment 
gaps is statistically significant. In the subsamples of firms with medium and low 
financial constraints, it is not statistically significant. Panel A of Figure 3.2 shows 
that while the investment gaps across the formation and the holding periods of the 
three subsamples during downturns approximate each other, the investment gaps 
during economic upturns mirror those across economic upturns and downturns (see 
Figure 3.1). Panel B of Figure 3.2 reinforces this observation. The investment gaps 
in the subsamples with high and low financial constraints during downturns 
approximate each other, whereas those during economic upturns mirror the pattern 
in Panel B of Figure 3.1. 
The cyclical patterns of the investment gaps in the three subsamples further 
support that the difference in the investment patterns of past winners and past 
losers could be explained by the argument in Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009). 
This explanation maintains that stock prices reflect the quality of growth 
opportunities, and the investments of financially constrained firms are more 
sensitive to changes in the investment opportunity set. The evidence is also 
consistent with the share issuance channel in Baker et al. (2003) where overpriced 
stocks of financially constrained firms are issued to finance the investments that 
would otherwise be forgone.  
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 However, the evidence contradicts the catering theory of Polk and 
Sapienza (2009), i.e. the investment gap between past winners and past losers is 
due to managers of past winners investing more to cater for investor sentiment. If 
catering for investor sentiment drives the difference in the investment patterns of 
past winners and past losers, the investment gap should be (a) bigger, and (b) more 
cyclical among firms with low financial constraints. This is because (a) it is easier 
to cater for investor sentiment if firms have financial resources, and (b) the 
sentiment is higher during economic upturns, making it easier for the catering 
activity. The evidence reinforces the evidence for hypothesis H3.3 in section 3.5.2 
(p. 165) that the investment gap patterns among firms with high and low financial 
constraints support an explanation based on Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) 
or based on Baker et al. (2003) but not on Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
 Table 3.8 presents the cyclicality of the momentum profits in the three 
subsamples by firms’ financial constraints. Given that the subsample of firms with 
high financial constraints is the only group with a statistically cyclical investment 
gap, one would expect the momentum profit it generates to be the most cyclical. It 
is evident in columns (3) and (4). In the subsample of firms with medium financial 
constraints, the momentum profit is significant during economic upturns and 
insignificant during downturns. The difference in the momentum profit during 
economic upturns versus downturns is weakly significant. In the subsample of 
firms with low financial constraints, the difference in the momentum profits during 
economic upturns and downturns is significant. However, the individual 
momentum profit is either economically insignificant (during economic upturns) or 
statistically insignificant (during downturns).  
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[Insert Table 3.8 about here] 
Furthermore, the momentum profit being positive and significant during 
economic upturns and negative and significant during downturns among firms with 
high financial constraints is the necessary but not the sufficient condition for past 
winners having higher risks than past losers. This argument is based on Lakonishok 
et al. (1994), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), and Petkova and Zhang (2005). These 
studies argue that, in the context of the value premium, if the value premium is due 
to the difference in risks between value and growth stocks, value stocks should 
outperform growth stocks in economic upturns and underperform in downturns. 
Similarly, Griffin et al. (2003) also argue that if the momentum profit is due to the 
risks relating to the aggregate stock market movement, the momentum profit 
should be positive during the periods of positive market returns and negative 
during the periods of negative market returns. 
 The evidence so far is in line with the existing literature on the momentum 
profit. Firms tend to pay dividends when they are not financially constrained. They 
also tend to have low credit ratings and be more exposed to higher distress risk 
when they are financially constrained. Hence, the evidence reported in Asem 
(2009), Avramov et al. (2007) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008) respectively is 
consistent with hypothesis H3.4 in this chapter that the momentum profit is higher in 
the subsample with high financial constraints.  
Avramov et al. (2007) find it puzzling that the momentum profit exists 
only among firms with low credit ratings but stronger during economic expansions 
when the default risk is lower. This puzzle is in fact consistent with the hypotheses 
H3.3, H3.4 and H3.5 that are supported in this chapter. Hence, this chapter can 
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reconcile two puzzling pieces of evidence in Avramov et al. (2007) by either (a) an 
explanation based on Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009); or (b) an explanation 
based on Baker et al. (2003). 
3.5.5. The Momentum Profit – Investment based Risk vs. Mispricing 
Explanations 
 So far this chapter has established that there is a relationship between the 
momentum profit and the investment pattern of past winners and losers. This 
relationship can be explained by either a risk based explanation based on 
Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009), a mispricing explanation based on Baker et 
al. (2003), or a mispricing explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). When 
taking into account firms’ financial constraints, the evidence can also be explained 
by either the risk based explanation based on Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) 
or the mispricing explanation based on Baker et al. (2003). 
This section examines whether the cross section of the returns to past 
winners and past losers can be explained by the risk based explanation or the 
mispricing explanations. If the risk based explanation based on Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell (2009) alone can explain the momentum profit, it would be explained 
by an asset pricing model that incorporates the relevant factors, including firms’ 
investments, their financial constraints, and the business cycle state (hypothesis 
H3.6). 
In Table 3.9, scenario 3 adjusts returns for risks using the conditional Fama 
and French model in which the betas are conditioned on the financial constraints 
variable (the net payout ratio). In scenario 4, the betas are conditioned on the 
investments variable (the CAPEX ratio). Finally, in scenario 5, the betas are 
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conditioned on both the financial constraints and investments variables. The time 
series regressions in stage one are described in equation 3.1 (p. 157) with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . The risk adjusted returns are regressed against the 
firm level variables as described in equation 3.2 (p. 158).  
[Insert Table 3.9 about here] 
In all the three scenarios, the 2-3 month and 4-6 month cumulative return 
coefficients (from 0.80 to 0.97) are higher than the 7-12 month cumulative return 
coefficients (from 0.32 to 0.37). All the coefficients are statistically significant 
particularly the coefficients at the shorter lags. The evidence suggests that 
cumulative returns exhibit predictability (thus suggesting that the momentum profit 
exists) even when accounting for risks using the Fama and French model 
supplemented with the information about firms’ financial constraints and / or 
investments.  
Given the evidence documented in the literature and the evidence in 
section 3.5.4 (p. 174) on the momentum profit and the business cycle, scenarios 6 
to 9 adjust the returns for risks using the Fama and French model supplemented 
with the business cycle variable. In scenario 6, the betas are solely conditioned on 
the business cycle variable. The time series regression in stage one is described in 
equation 3.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . In scenario 7, the conditioning 
variables include both the business cycle variable and the financial constraints 
variable. In scenario 8, they include the business cycle variable and the investments 
variable. Finally, in scenario 9, they include all of the business cycle variable, the 
financial constraints variable, and the investments variable. Scenarios 7 to 9 
employ the full versions of both equation 3.1 and equation 3.2. 
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In scenario 6, all the cumulative return coefficients, varying between 0.44 
and 0.81, are significant. Hence, cumulative returns continue to exhibit 
predictability (thus suggesting that the momentum profit continues to exist) when 
accounting for risks using the Fama and French model supplemented with the 
business cycle information. In scenario 7, the cumulative return coefficients at the 
two longer lags become economically small (0.43 and 0.18) and statistically 
insignificant. Compared to the result in scenario 6, the result in scenario 7 suggests 
that the return predictability of cumulative returns reduces considerably. The 
evidence suggests that firms’ financial constraints and the business cycle play an 
important role in rationally explaining the momentum profit. However, a 
cumulative return coefficient is still positive and significant. It is therefore possible 
that either (a) the asset pricing model to adjust returns for risks in stage one is still 
misspecified, or (b) the risk based explanation does not solely account for the 
momentum profit (i.e. the joint hypothesis problem). 
In scenario 8, all the cumulative return coefficients remain positive (0.57 to 
0.84) and significant. The results are similar in scenario 9. Given that the return 
predictability of cumulative returns is weak in scenario 7 when returns are adjusted 
for risks using the Fama and French model conditioned on the financial constraints 
and the business cycle variables, scenarios 8 and 9 suggest that at least part of 
firms’ investments influences the momentum profit through a mispricing channel. 
Scenarios 10 to 12 incorporate the possibility of a mispricing explanation 
for the momentum profit. In this case, the momentum profit should exist even after 
returns are adjusted for risks using an asset pricing model in stage one. Only when 
returns are adjusted for risks and the mispricing is accounted for would the return 
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predictability of cumulative returns be eliminated. The two investment based 
mispricing explanations identified in this chapter are the explanation based on the 
share issuance channel of Baker et al. (2003) and the one based on the catering 
theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009). The explanation based on Baker et al. (2003) 
suggests that the momentum profit should only exist among firms with high 
financial constraints. The mispricing explanation based on Polk and Sapienza 
(2009) suggests that the more financial capacity a firm has, the more easily the 
manager can invest to cater for investor sentiment. 
To account for the mispricing possibility, in the cross sectional regression 
in stage two, the three interaction terms between the cumulative returns and the 
firm level variables are supplemented to equation 3.2 as follows: 
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where *jtR , 1,, −tjmPR , 1−jtSize , 1−jtBM , and 1−jtTurnover are defined as in equation 
3.2, and 1−jtFirm is the firm level financial constraints and investments variables 
defined as in equation 3.1. A positive and significant coefficient attached to the 
interaction term between a cumulative return and the firm level financial 
constraints variable in equation 3.6 would suggest that the higher the firms’ 
financial constraints, the stronger the return predictability of the cumulative return 
after controlling for risks. This would be evident for the momentum profit that is 
due to mispricing. Similarly, a positive and significant coefficient attached to the 
interaction term between a cumulative return and the firm level investments 
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variable in equation 3.6 would suggest that the higher the firms’ investments, the 
stronger the return predictability of the cumulative return after controlling for risks. 
In scenario 10, returns are adjusted for risks in stage one using the 
unconditional Fama and French model (i.e. the constraint 
0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ is imposed on equation 3.1). The stage-two regression 
is described in equation 3.6 where 1−jtFirm is the investments variable defined as 
in equation 3.1. The coefficients attached to the three interaction terms are positive, 
and two of them (1.10 and 0.91) are statistically significant. Therefore, an 
investment based mispricing explanation could be partially responsible for the 
return predictability of cumulative returns when firms’ investments are high. Yet, 
the cumulative return coefficients at the two shorter lags are both positive (0.52 and 
0.80 respectively) and significant. Hence, cumulative returns continue to predict 
future returns even when (a) controlling for risks using the unconditional Fama and 
French model and (b) accounting for the mispricing among firms with high 
investments. The evidence suggests that the momentum profit is not explained. 
In scenario 11, returns are adjusted for risks using the unconditional Fama 
and French model. The stage-two regression is described in equation 3.6 where 
1−jtFirm is the financial constraints variable defined as in equation 3.1. Similar to 
scenario 10, the cumulative return coefficients at the two shorter lags are both 
positive (0.89 and 0.79 respectively) and significant. Hence, cumulative returns 
continue to predict future returns, and the momentum profit is not explained. 
Furthermore, none of the coefficients attached to the interaction terms (between -
0.02 and 0.09) is statistically significant. This evidence suggests that information 
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about firms’ financial constraints is not relevant to the return predictability of 
cumulative returns in a mispricing context. 
In scenario 12, returns are also adjusted for risks using the unconditional 
Fama and French model. The stage-two regression is described in equation 3.6 
where 1−jtFirm refers to both the financial constraints and investments variables 
defined in equation 3.1. The cumulative return coefficient at lag 4-6 month is 
positive (0.79) and significant. Hence, the cumulative return at this lag continues to 
predict future returns (thus suggesting that the momentum profit continues to 
exist). Similar to scenario 11, all of the three interaction terms between cumulative 
returns and the financial constraints variable have insignificant coefficients. 
Closely similar to scenario 10, two out of the three interaction terms between 
cumulative returns and the investments variable have positive and significant 
coefficients. The evidence reinforces the observation from scenarios 10 and 11 that 
the investments variable rather than the financial constraints variable is likely to be 
relevant to the return predictability of cumulative returns through a mispricing 
channel. 
Finally, given some success of scenarios 7 and 10, it is possible that the 
predictability of cumulative returns (or the momentum profit) is due to a 
combination of both a risk based explanation (scenario 7) and a mispricing 
explanation (scenario 10). In scenario 13, returns are adjusted for risks using the 
Fama and French model conditioned on the financial constraints variable and the 
business cycle variable similar to scenario 7. The stage-two regression is described 
in equation 3.6 where 1−jtFirm refers to the investments variable as defined in 
equation 3.1. For the first time, none of the cumulative return coefficients is 
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statistically significant. Furthermore, of the three coefficients attached to the 
interaction terms, only one remains significant.  
The evidence suggests that the return predictability of cumulative returns, 
or the momentum profit, can be explained by a combination of two explanations. 
The first component is a risk based explanation based on firms’ financial 
constraints and the business cycle. The second component is a mispricing 
explanation based on firms’ investments. The evidence partially supports 
Hypothesis H3.6 that the momentum profit can be explained by an asset pricing 
model containing relevant fundamental information. It is consistent with the other 
evidence in this chapter that the investment patterns of past winners and past losers 
and the momentum profit are consistent with a risk based explanation based on 
Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009), and a mispricing explanation based on Baker 
et al. (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
3.6. Conclusions 
This chapter examines the relationship between firms’ investment activities 
and the profitability of the momentum trading strategy. Consistent with the 
literature, this chapter finds that the momentum profit exists in the sample 
examined. All the momentum strategies with the formation and the holding periods 
of three to twelve months, with and without skipping a month between the two 
periods, generate positive and significant momentum profits. The widely successful 
6 x 6 strategy that skips one month between the formation and the holding period 
generates a statistically significant momentum profit of 1.21% per month. 
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The findings show that the momentum profit could be explained by the 
difference in the investment patterns of past winners and past losers based on three 
different explanations – the explanation using the credit multiplier effect based on 
Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) / Hahn and Lee (2009), the explanation using 
the share issuance channel of Baker et al. (2003), and the explanation using the 
catering theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009). All of these explanations link past 
stock prices with firms’ investments and future stock prices. 
The evidence in this chapter lends support to a combination of the above 
explanations. Past winners invest more than past losers, and the investment gap is 
higher during economic upturns than during downturns, consistent with all the 
three explanations. The investment gap is higher among the firms with high 
financial constraints than among the firms with low financial constraints. 
Moreover, the speed of change over time of the investment gap among the firms 
with high financial constraints is positive. By contrast, it is zero among the firms 
with low financial constraints. The momentum profit is positive and significant 
among firms with high financial constraints albeit insignificant among firms with 
low financial constraints. These observations are consistent with the explanation 
based on Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) and the explanation based on Baker 
et al. (2003), while they are inconsistent with the explanation based on Polk and 
Sapienza (2009).  
However, the subsample of firms with medium financial constraints 
generates a positive and significant momentum profit. Also, its investment gap has 
a positive speed of change over time. Of the three explanations, this evidence can 
only be reconciled with the one based on the catering theory of Polk and Sapienza 
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(2009). The theory does not require firms to be financially constrained. 
Management can cater for investor sentiment as long as firms are not too 
financially constrained. The patterns of the investment gap and the momentum 
profit during economic upturns generally amplify those averaging across upturns 
and downturns, hence lending support to the corresponding explanations tested in 
this chapter. 
Finally, this chapter reports that cumulative returns can predict future 
returns even when controlling for risks using the unconditional Fama and French 
three factor model. This is evident for the existence of the momentum profit. The 
return predictability is weak when the betas are conditioned on firms’ financial 
constraints and the business cycle variable. Cumulative returns retain their 
predictability when returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French model 
conditioned on firms’ investments. This evidence suggests that at least part of the 
information on firms’ investments is not relevant to the momentum profit through a 
risk-return channel. The return predictability of cumulative returns is explained 
when (a) controlling for risks using the Fama and French model conditioned on 
firms’ financial constraints and the business cycle variables, and (b) accounting for 
the interaction between the momentum profit and firms’ investments as suggested 
in the mispricing explanations based on Polk and Sapienza (2009) and Baker et al. 
(2003). 
The evidence suggests that the momentum profit can be explained by a 
combination of a risk based explanation based on firms’ financial constraints and 
the business cycle along the lines of Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) and the 
mispricing explanations based on the share issuance channel of Baker et al. (2003) 
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and the catering theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009). The findings of this chapter 
can also be reconciled with several results documented in the literature, such as the 
stronger momentum profit among firms that do not pay dividends (Asem, 2009), 
have low credit ratings (Avramov et al., 2007), and have high distress risk 
(Agarwal and Taffler, 2008). This chapter offers an explanation to a puzzle from 
Avramov et al. (2007) that the momentum profit exists only among firms with low 
credit rating but appears stronger during economic expansions when the default 
risk is lower.  
Implications 
The findings in this chapter have several implications. This chapter reports 
that a risk-return relationship cannot fully explain the momentum profit. Hence, 
future stock returns can be predicted using past stock returns even when accounting 
for risks. This return predictability can be explained by the management’s 
behaviours - timing the share issuance at the time of over-valuation to finance the 
investments that are otherwise forgone (Baker et al., 2003), and catering the 
investor sentiment by means of investing (Polk and Sapienza, 2009). In the 
language of the market efficiency literature, the market is not fully efficient with 
regards to the information about past stock returns. Furthermore, the profitability of 
the momentum trading strategy is affected by firms’ investment and their financial 
constraints. It generally suggests that the understanding of corporate finance can 
help extend the understanding of the securities markets. 
Finally, investors would benefit more from pursuing the strategy among 
firms with high financial constraints and in economic upturns than among those 
with low financial constraints and in downturns. Implementing the trading strategy 
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among past winners and past losers that are far different in their current investment 
activities can also improve the performance of the strategy. The momentum profit 
can be partially explained when risks are controlled for using the asset pricing 
model conditioned on these financial inflexibility characteristics. Hence investors 
should bear in mind that part of the improved performance of the momentum 
trading strategy might just be a compensation for higher risks, i.e. higher exposure 
to the credit multiplier effect. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses examined in chapter 3 are summarised below: 
 
 O&M/KM, 
HL 
B&W BSW P&S 
H3.1 Accept  Accept Accept 
H3.2 Accept Accept Accept Accept 
H3.3 Accept Reject Accept Reject 
H3.4 Accept  Accept Reject 
H3.5 Accept  Accept Accept 
H3.6 Accept  Reject Reject 
 
O&M / KM, HL represent the explanation based on firms’ growth 
opportunities (Ovtchinnikov and McConnell, 2009) and the credit multiplier effect 
described  in Kiyotaki and Moor (1997) and tested in Hahn and Lee (2009). B&W 
represents the explanation based on private information embedded in the stock 
price of Bakke and Whited (2010). BSW represents the explanation based on the 
share issuance channel of Baker et al. (2003). Finally, P&S represents the 
explanation based on the catering theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
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Table 3.2: Construction of Key Variables 
The key variables used in chapter 3 are constructed as follows: 
A. Key variables in portfolio sorting 
 
Key variables Construction 
Holding period 
cumulative returns 
The cumulative six month returns during the momentum portfolio 
holding period in a 6x6 strategy which skips one month between 
the formation and the holding periods. The strategy is formed as 
follows. In each month, stocks are sorted in ascending order into 
deciles by the cumulative returns from month t-6 to month t-1 
(i.e. the formation period) using the sample decile breakpoints. 
The resulting ten portfolios are held for six months from month 
t+1 to month t+6 (i.e. the holding period). 
CAPEX ratio The ratio of capital expenditures incurred during a year divided 
by the beginning of the year net fixed assets. The reported 
monthly CAPEX is the contemporaneous CAPEX. For example, 
if the current month is March 2005, the CAPEX ratio for each 
stock is measured for the financial year ended in December 2005. 
Net payout ratio Dividends plus repurchases minus share issuance, scaled by the 
net incomes, measured in December of the previous year. 
 
B. Key variables in the regression of the Avramov and Chordia (2006) framework 
The construction of these variables is described in Panel B of Table 2.2 (p. 
103). 
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Table 3.3: Sample Description 
Table 3.3 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample of non-financial, non-
utilities firms listed in the three main exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the 
U.S. market from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate the 
CAPEX ratio for the current year and the net payout ratio in December the previous year 
are considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market 
value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded.  
 
 
Mean Median Standard deviation 
 A – Key variables in portfolio sorting    
Returns (%) 1.15  0.76  10.61  
Holding period cumulative returns (%) 9.48  12.20  30.14  
CAPEX ratio (%) 33.38  23.88  58.07  
Net payout ratio (%) 2.93  19.84  1,320.33  
Correlation, CAPEX and net payout -0.00      
 p-value 0.47      
     
B – Key variables in regressions    
Market capitalisation ($ billion) 2.33 0.35 8.35 
Book-to-Market ratio 0.76 0.64 0.55 
Cumulative returns, months 2 to 3 (%) 3.36 2.26 15.26 
Cumulative returns, months 4 to 6 (%) 5.13 3.43 19.19 
Cumulative returns, months 7 to 12 (%) 10.87 6.92 30.24 
Turnover, NYSE and AMEX (%) 16.41 11.53 17.29 
Turnover, NASDAQ (%) 7.12 5.44 6.45 
 
A. Key variables in portfolio sorting 
Panel A reports the statistics for the variables used in the portfolio sorting 
methodology. Returns measure the monthly stock returns. The construction of the other 
variables is described in Panel A of Table 3.2. Panel A also reports the correlation 
coefficient between these variables, and the two tailed p-value to test whether the 
correlation coefficient is different from zero. 
B. Key variables in the regression of the Avramov and Chordia (2006) framework 
Panel B describes the statistics for the variables used in the regression of the 
Avramov and Chordia (2006) asset pricing framework. The sample is further constrained in 
that there should be data on stock returns, market capitalisation, and the Book-to-Market 
ratio in the current year and in the 36 months prior to the current month. The construction 
of the variables is described in Panel B of Table 2.2. 
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Table 3.4: Returns to the Alternative Momentum Trading Strategies 
Table 3.4 presents the returns to the momentum trading strategies with different 
formation and holding periods. The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed 
in the three main exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the U.S. market from 1972 
to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate the CAPEX ratio for the 
current year and the net payout ratio in December the previous year are considered. The 
firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling within the 
smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. 
 
  Panel A Panel B 
J  K= 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 
3 Losers 0.85 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.65 
  2.17 1.77 1.78 1.78 1.55 1.51 1.54 1.77 
3 Winners 1.36 1.41 1.45 1.41 1.46 1.49 1.49 1.40 
  3.89 4.06 4.21 4.10 4.12 4.26 4.30 4.05 
3 W-L 0.51 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.75 
  1.95 3.32 3.81 4.38 3.47 4.22 4.78 4.51 
6 Losers 0.72 0.60 0.57 0.66 0.57 0.52 0.57 0.71 
  1.80 1.50 1.46 1.73 1.43 1.32 1.48 1.88 
6 Winners 1.60 1.66 1.64 1.53 1.70 1.73 1.64 1.50 
  4.47 4.67 4.65 4.37 4.73 4.84 4.64 4.26 
6 W-L 0.88 1.06 1.08 0.87 1.13 1.21 1.07 0.79 
  2.99 3.98 4.52 4.00 3.99 4.73 4.73 3.70 
9 Losers 0.73 0.64 0.72 0.82 0.57 0.63 0.75 0.88 
  1.81 1.63 1.88 2.17 1.45 1.65 1.98 2.36 
9 Winners 1.79 1.76 1.67 1.54 1.86 1.76 1.64 1.51 
  4.94 4.90 4.71 4.37 5.11 4.91 4.61 4.25 
9 W-L 1.06 1.12 0.95 0.72 1.29 1.13 0.89 0.62 
  3.49 4.14 3.75 3.03 4.51 4.33 3.60 2.68 
12 Losers 0.75 0.80 0.90 0.98 0.62 0.76 0.87 0.95 
  1.92 2.07 2.37 2.61 1.62 2.00 2.32 2.57 
12 Winners 1.71 1.66 1.58 1.50 1.71 1.63 1.53 1.44 
  4.72 4.63 4.45 4.22 4.73 4.52 4.28 4.05 
12 W-L 0.96 0.86 0.68 0.52 1.10 0.87 0.66 0.49 
  3.21 3.09 2.59 2.07 3.90 3.25 2.62 2.06 
 
A. The momentum strategies without skipping one month between the formation and 
the holding periods 
Panel A reports the returns to the equally weighted portfolios of stocks sorted in 
ascending order by the cumulative returns in the last J months (the formation period) using 
the sample decile breakpoints. Ten portfolios with equal number of stocks are composed 
and positions (long and short) are taken and held for the following K months. The raw 
returns of the ten equally weighted deciles and of the long-short portfolio that goes long in 
past winners (i.e. the portfolio with top ranking in the formation period’s cumulative return) 
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and short in past losers (i.e. the portfolio with bottom ranking in the formation period’s 
cumulative return) are reported.  
B. The momentum strategies that skip one month between the formation and the 
holding periods 
Panel B reports the returns of the deciles and of the long-short portfolios when the 
momentum strategies skip one month between the formation and the holding periods.  
In both Panels A and B, the lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the 
lines that are not in bold are the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether a portfolio’s 
return is different from zero. 
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Table 3.5: The Financial Constraints and Investments of the Momentum 
Deciles 
Table 3.5 presents the average CAPEX ratios of past winners and past losers 
during the holding period in the overall sample and the three subsamples by firms’ financial 
constraints. The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main 
exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the U.S. market from 1972 to 2006. Only 
stocks with available information to calculate the CAPEX ratio for the current year and the 
net payout ratio in December of the previous year are considered. The firm-month 
observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling within the smallest 
NYSE size decile are excluded. The momentum strategy is a 6 x 6 one which skips one 
month between the formation and the holding period. The design of the strategy is 
described in Table 3.4. The construction of the CAPEX ratio and the net payout ratio is 
described in Table 3.2. 
The portfolio CAPEX is determined as follows: (1) calculate the mean 
contemporaneous CAPEX of the portfolio in each calendar month; and (2) calculate the 
average of this mean contemporaneous CAPEX across the calendar month for each 
portfolio. To calculate the investment gap between the past winners and past losers (W-L), 
this chapter (a) first takes the difference in the mean contemporaneous CAPEX ratio of the 
winner and the loser portfolios in each calendar month; and (b) calculates the average of 
this CAPEX gap across the calendar months.  
The overall sample is divided into three subsamples. Firms having the net payout 
ratio in the bottom 30% are included in the subsample with high financial constraints. Firms 
having the net payout ratio in the top 30% are included in the subsample with low financial 
constraints. The remaining firms are included in the subsample with medium financial 
constraints. The two tailed t-statistics to test whether the investment gaps are different from 
zero are presented. *, ** and *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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 Overall sample 
High financial 
constraints 
Medium financial 
constraints 
Low financial 
constraints 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Losers 35.39 43.96 29.31 31.67 
2 31.75 41.73 28.07 25.13 
3 29.71 40.97 27.92 23.31 
4 29.31 41.73 27.51 23.07 
5 29.49 42.47 27.63 22.87 
6 29.56 44.29 28.52 23.21 
7 30.78 46.43 29.24 23.88 
8 32.49 48.41 30.63 24.31 
9 36.36 52.29 32.68 26.19 
Winners 48.92 64.81 38.18 46.00 
W-L 13.53 20.84 8.87 14.33 
t-stat 14.86 21.95 14.54 4.46 
 *** *** *** *** 
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Table 3.6: The Financial Constraints and Investments of the Momentum 
Deciles across the Business Cycle 
Table 3.6 presents the average CAPEX ratios of past winners and past losers 
during the holding period in the overall sample and the three subsamples by firms’ financial 
constraints. The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main 
exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the U.S. market from 1972 to 2006. Only 
stocks with available information to calculate the CAPEX ratio for the current year and the 
net payout ratio in December of the previous year are considered. The firm-month 
observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling within the smallest 
NYSE size decile are excluded. 
The momentum strategy is a 6 x 6 one which skips a month between the formation 
and the holding period. The design of the strategy is described in Table 3.4. The 
construction of the CAPEX ratio and the net payout ratio is described in Table 3.2. The 
measurement of the portfolio CAPEX is described in Table 3.5. The construction of the 
subsample of firms with high, medium and low financial constraints is also described in 
Table 3.5. 
Economic upturns and downturns are classified using the lagged three year 
cumulative market returns. If the cumulative market return is positive (negative), the 
following month is classified as the upturn (downturn). The cumulative CAPEX ratio of the 
holding period is calculated as the sum of the mean CAPEX ratio of the portfolio for the six 
month holding period. For each momentum decile, the cumulative CAPEX ratio series is 
regressed against an UP and a DOWN dummy variables. The coefficients attached to these 
UP and DOWN dummies measure the average CAPEX ratio of the corresponding decile 
portfolio during economic upturns and downturns respectively.  
Defining the cumulative investment gap as the sum of the gap for the six month 
holding period, the coefficients in the regression of the cumulative investment gap against 
an UP dummy and a DOWN dummy measure the average cumulative investment gaps 
during economic upturns and downturns respectively. The cumulative investment gap is 
then regressed against the UP dummy variable and a constant. The coefficient attached to 
the UP dummy variable measures the difference between the investment gap following 
economic upturns versus downturns. All the coefficients from the regressions are divided 
by six to report the monthly figures in this table. The two tailed t-statistics are corrected for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West (1987) method to test 
whether the investment gaps during upturns and downturns are different from zero, and 
different from each other. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
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Overall  sample 
High financial 
constraints 
Medium financial 
constraints 
Low financial 
constraints 
 Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Losers 36.22  29.65 44.78 36.44 29.72 24.80 32.51 24.79 
2 32.48  26.59 43.16 32.06 28.46 24.17 25.52 21.51 
3 30.32  25.50 42.07 34.12 28.50 23.76 23.39 21.53 
4 29.93  25.05 43.27 31.96 27.99 23.69 23.28 20.65 
5 30.24  24.54 44.29 31.46 28.01 24.47 23.23 19.45 
6 30.13  25.59 46.45 30.46 28.82 26.21 23.43 20.74 
7 31.56  25.71 48.63 33.18 29.84 25.47 24.28 20.91 
8 33.31  27.12 50.77 35.39 31.25 26.30 24.72 21.05 
9 37.46  29.51 54.71 37.11 33.19 29.48 26.51 22.96 
Winners 50.96  36.20 67.63 43.64 38.79 34.14 47.95 31.40 
W-L 14.75  6.55 22.85 7.20 9.07 9.34 15.44 6.61 
t-stat 6.77  2.30 10.42 2.04 6.60 3.66 2.02 1.40 
 *** ** *** ** *** *** **  
 
 
 
Overall 
sample 
High financial 
constraints 
Medium financial 
constraints 
Low financial 
constraints 
 (1) – (2) (3) – (4) (5) – (6) (7) – (8) 
t-stat            2.30             3.78             -0.10             0.99  
p-value 2% 0% 92% 32% 
 ** ***   
 199 
Table 3.7: Financial Constraints and the Momentum Trading Strategy 
Table 3.7 presents the returns to the momentum trading strategy in the overall 
sample and the three subsamples by firms’ financial constraints. The sample includes non-
financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ) in the U.S. market from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information 
to calculate the CAPEX ratio for the current year and the net payout ratio in December of 
the previous year are considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 
or the market value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. The 
momentum strategy is a 6 x 6 one which skips a month between the formation and the 
holding period. The design of the strategy is described in Table 3.4. The construction of the 
net payout ratio is described in Table 3.2. The construction of the subsamples with high, 
medium and low financial constraints is described in Table 3.5.  
 
 
Overall 
sample 
High financial 
constraints 
Medium financial 
constraints 
Low financial 
constraints 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Losers 0.52 1.23 1.25 1.35 
 1.32 2.72 3.68 3.76 
2 0.86 1.14 1.23 1.22 
 2.78 2.97 4.38 4.66 
3 0.96 0.99 1.29 1.19 
 3.38 2.71 4.80 5.03 
4 1.09 1.05 1.29 1.25 
 4.07 2.99 4.97 5.47 
5 1.14 1.10 1.31 1.28 
 4.38 3.19 5.20 5.85 
6 1.23 1.21 1.43 1.30 
 4.81 3.52 5.68 5.91 
7 1.22 1.29 1.40 1.34 
 4.75 3.76 5.52 6.07 
8 1.35 1.49 1.41 1.35 
 5.10 4.28 5.46 6.07 
9 1.44 1.68 1.49 1.44 
 4.99 4.58 5.33 6.12 
Winners 1.73 1.88 1.74 1.55 
 4.84 4.51 5.14 5.17 
W-L 1.21 0.65 0.50 0.20 
 4.73 2.14 2.06 0.75 
 *** ** **  
 
The raw returns of the ten equally weighted deciles and of the long-short portfolios 
that go long in past winners (i.e. the portfolio with top ranking in the formation period’s 
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cumulative return) and short in past losers (i.e. the portfolio with bottom ranking in the 
formation period’s cumulative return) are reported. The lines in bold are the portfolio 
returns, whereas the lines that are not in bold are the associated two tailed t-statistics to test 
whether a portfolio’s return is different from zero. *, ** and *** denote the statistical 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3.8: Financial Constraints and the Momentum Trading Strategy across 
the Business Cycle  
Table 3.8 presents the returns to the momentum trading strategy in the overall 
sample and the three subsamples by firms’ financial constraints. The sample includes non-
financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ) in the U.S. market from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information 
to calculate the CAPEX ratio for the current year and the net payout ratio in December of 
the previous year are considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 
or the market value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. The 
momentum strategy is a 6 x 6 one which skips a month between the formation and the 
holding period. The design of the strategy is described in Table 3.4. The construction of the 
net payout ratio is described in Table 3.2. The construction of the subsamples of firms with 
high, medium and low financial constraints is described in Table 3.5. 
This chapter uses the methodology used in Cooper et al. (2004) to determine 
portfolio returns following economic upturns and downturns. Economic upturns and 
downturns and the associated dummy variables UP and DOWN are defined in Table 3.4. 
For each momentum decile portfolio, the cumulative return of the holding period is 
calculated as the sum of the return of the portfolio for the six month holding period. The 
cumulative return series is regressed against an UP dummy and a DOWN dummy variable. 
The coefficients attached to these UP and DOWN dummies measure the average 
cumulative return of the corresponding decile portfolio during economic upturns and 
downturns respectively. 
W-L measures the momentum profit, i.e. the return of the long-short portfolios that 
go long in past winners (i.e. the portfolio with top ranking in the formation period’s 
cumulative return) and short in past losers (i.e. the portfolio with bottom ranking in the 
formatio period’s cumulative return). The coefficients in the regression of the cumulative 
momentum profit against an UP dummy and a DOWN dummy measure the average 
cumulative momentum profit during economic upturns and downturns respectively. The 
cumulative momentum profit is then regressed against the UP dummy variable and a 
constant. The coefficient attached to the UP dummy variable measures the difference 
between the momentum profit following economic upturns versus downturns. All the 
coefficients from the regressions are divided by six to report the monthly figures in this 
table. In the main table, the lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are 
not in bold are the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether a portfolio’s return is 
different from zero. In the supplementary table, the two tailed t-statistics test whether the 
returns to a long-short portfolio during upturns and downturns are different from each 
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other. The t-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the 
Newey and West (1987) method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Overall sample 
High financial 
constraint 
Medium financial 
constraint 
Low financial 
constraint 
 Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Losers 0.35  2.03 1.10 2.80 1.12 2.37 1.16 2.96 
 1.51  1.88 3.95 2.39 5.16 2.34 5.23 4.00 
2 0.76  1.83 1.02 2.29 1.12 2.26 1.12 2.11 
 3.69  2.03 4.15 2.41 5.48 2.84 6.28 2.82 
3 0.90  1.67 0.88 2.09 1.20 2.14 1.15 1.69 
 4.54  1.98 3.46 2.11 6.15 2.70 6.89 2.24 
4 1.03  1.74 0.98 1.86 1.19 2.18 1.20 1.76 
 5.43  2.18 4.13 2.07 6.18 2.98 7.50 2.48 
5 1.09  1.66 1.09 1.56 1.24 1.99 1.23 1.77 
 5.91  2.29 4.57 1.49 6.91 2.83 7.98 2.85 
6 1.21  1.58 1.21 1.67 1.38 2.01 1.26 1.77 
 6.82  2.13 4.81 2.04 7.36 2.77 8.21 2.77 
7 1.19  1.67 1.32 1.43 1.35 1.97 1.30 1.72 
 6.44  2.30 5.33 1.62 7.30 2.85 8.40 2.82 
8 1.33  1.69 1.53 1.57 1.38 1.87 1.30 1.82 
 7.11  2.40 5.94 2.00 7.32 2.59 8.02 3.00 
9 1.45  1.52 1.74 1.60 1.47 1.79 1.43 1.76 
 6.97  2.20 6.16 2.07 7.10 2.73 8.26 2.53 
Winners 1.78  1.59 2.00 1.42 1.75 1.93 1.50 2.05 
 6.43  2.03 6.14 1.68 6.61 2.67 6.87 2.86 
W-L 1.42  -0.44 0.89 -1.37 0.63 -0.44 0.34 -0.91 
 8.28  -0.83 3.82 -1.98 3.51 -0.74 1.86 -1.59 
 ***  *** ** ***  *  
 
 
 
Overall 
sample 
High financial 
constraint 
Medium financial 
constraint 
Low financial 
constraint 
 (1) – (2) (3) – (4) (5) – (6) (7) – (8) 
t-stat            3.33             3.11             1.73             2.09  
p-value 0% 0% 9% 4% 
 *** *** * ** 
 203 
Figure 3.1: The Investments of the Momentum Deciles 
Figure 3.1 presents the average CAPEX ratios of past winners and past losers 
during the holding period in the overall sample and the three subsamples by firms’ financial 
constraints. The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main 
exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the U.S. market from 1972 to 2006. Only 
stocks with available information to calculate the CAPEX ratio for the current year and the 
net payout ratio in December of the previous year are considered. The firm-month 
observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling within the smallest 
NYSE size decile are excluded. The momentum strategy is a 6 x 6 one which skips a month 
between the formation and the holding period. The design of the strategy is described in 
Table 3.4. The construction of the CAPEX ratio and the net payout ratio is described in 
Table 3.2. The construction of the subsample of firms with high, medium and low financial 
constraints is described in Table 3.5. 
An event window consisting of the formation period (month -6 to month -1) and 
the holding period (month 1 to month 6) is considered. For each of the twelve event months 
within this window, the average contemporaneous CAPEX ratios of the ten deciles are 
calculated. This is done by first taking the average contemporaneous CAPEX ratios of each 
portfolio in each calendar month for each event month. Then the gap in the mean CAPEX 
ratios between past winners and past losers in each calendar month is calculated. Finally, 
the average of this CAPEX gap is taken across the calendar months. 
 
A. Investment gaps between past winners and past losers across the formation and 
holding periods 
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B. Investment gaps between past winners and past losers across the holding period 
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C. Data supporting Figures 3.1 A & B 
Event month -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Overall sample -2.25 -0.70 1.40 3.16 5.21 7.15 9.15 10.63 11.95 13.45 14.43 15.12 15.85 
High financial constraint subsample 2.45 4.83 7.33 9.87 12.75 14.93 17.16 18.53 19.57 20.51 21.21 21.69 22.28 
Medium financial constraint subsample -0.96 -0.12 0.89 1.96 3.13 4.41 5.66 6.80 7.84 8.93 9.75 10.44 11.15 
Low financial constraint subsample -2.91 0.39 3.68 5.33 8.91 10.94 13.02 14.01 15.01 14.52 14.58 14.51 13.94 
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Figure 3.2: The Investments of the Momentum Deciles across the Business 
Cycle 
Figure 3.2 presents the average CAPEX ratios of past winners and past losers 
during the holding period in the overall sample and the three subsamples by firms’ financial 
constraints in different states of the business cycle. The sample includes non-financial, non-
utilities firms listed in the three main exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the 
U.S. market from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate the 
CAPEX ratio for the current year and the net payout ratio in December of the previous year 
are considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market 
value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. The momentum strategy is 
a 6 x 6 one which skips a month between the formation and the holding period. The design 
of the strategy is described in Table 3.4. The construction of the CAPEX ratio and the net 
payout ratio is described in Table 3.2. The construction of the subsample of firms with 
high, medium and low financial constraints is described in Table 3.5. 
 
A. Investment gaps between past winners and past losers across the formation and 
holding periods in economic upturns vs. downturns 
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An event window consisting of the formation period (month -6 to month -1) and 
the holding period (month 1 to month 6) is considered.  The calendar months are classified 
into economic upturns and downturns as defined in Table 3.6. During upturn months, for 
each of the twelve event months within this window, the average contemporaneous CAPEX 
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ratios of the ten deciles are calculated. This is done in a similar way as the average 
contemporaneous CAPEX ratios are calculated for all months in Figure 3.1. The same 
procedure is repeated to determine the average CAPEX ratios of the past winners and past 
losers, and the average investment gap between them during downturns. 
 
B. Investment gaps between past winners and past losers during the holding period in 
economic upturns vs. downturns 
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C. Data supporting Figures 3.2 A & B 
Event month -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Overall sample – 
Upturn -1.86 -0.32 1.90 3.79 5.97 7.94 10.05 11.60 12.95 14.50 15.49 16.19 16.90 
Overall sample – 
Downturn -4.90 -3.28 -2.00 -1.15 0.06 1.82 3.05 4.03 5.10 6.32 7.21 7.86 8.78 
High constraint – 
Upturn 3.14 5.75 8.45 11.23 14.29 16.58 18.96 20.37 21.48 22.51 23.29 23.75 24.31 
High constraint – 
Downturn -2.26 -1.47 -0.27 0.59 2.24 3.61 4.94 5.98 6.54 6.94 7.17 7.83 8.62 
Medium Constraint 
– Upturn -1.12 -0.34 0.71 1.87 3.08 4.41 5.68 6.86 7.92 8.91 9.64 10.32 11.03 
Medium Constraint 
– Downturn 0.17 1.39 2.10 2.56 3.40 4.43 5.55 6.38 7.30 9.11 10.50 11.23 12.00 
Low constraint – 
Upturn -2.31 1.25 4.69 6.39 10.23 12.19 14.34 15.35 16.37 15.75 15.73 15.52 14.86 
Low constraint – 
Downturn -7.02 -5.44 -3.19 -1.91 -0.12 2.41 4.01 4.87 5.71 6.20 6.82 7.64 7.69 
 
 
 209 
Table 3.9: The Momentum Profit - Investment based Risk versus Mispricing 
Explanations 
Table 3.9 presents the results of the regressions of risk adjusted returns on the 
momentum variables and other firm level variables using the framework of Avramov and 
Chordia (2006). The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three 
main exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the U.S. market from 1972 to 2006. 
Only stocks with available information to calculate the CAPEX ratio for the current year 
and the net payout ratio in December of the previous year are considered. The firm-month 
observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling within the smallest 
NYSE size decile are excluded. The sample is further constrained in that there should be 
data on stock returns, market capitalisation, and the Book-to-Market ratio in the current 
year and in the 36 months prior to the current month.  
This chapter uses the Fama and French model as the base model in the time series 
regression described in equation 3.1 (p. 157). The part of returns unexplained by the asset 
pricing model in equation 3.1 is regressed against the cumulative past returns in a cross 
sectional regression to assess the explanatory power of the model with regards to the 
momentum anomaly, i.e. the positive relationship between current stock returns and 
cumulative past stock returns. Size, the Book-to-Market ratio, and stock turnovers are 
included in the cross sectional regression to control for the predictability of stock returns 
with regards to these variables. The cross sectional regression is described in equation 3.2 
(p. 158). The construction of the key variables in stage two is described in Table 3.2. Their 
transformation is described in section 3.4.2 (p. 155). 
The specifications of the regressions for the scenarios tested are as follows: 
 Scenario 1: Returns are not adjusted for risks, hence no stage one regression is 
run. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 3.2. 
 Scenario 2: Returns are adjusted for risks using the unconditional Fama and 
French model. The regression is described in equation 3.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . In stage two, the regression is 
described in equation 3.2. 
 Scenarios 3, 4 and 5: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama 
and French model. The regression is described in equation 3.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . In scenario 3, the variable 1, −tjFirm refers to 
the financial constraints variable; in scenario 4 it refers to the investments 
variable; and in scenario 5, both the financial constraints and the investments 
variables. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 3.2. 
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  Scenario 6: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model on the business cycle variable. The regression is described in 
equation 3.1 with the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . In stage two, the 
regression is described in equation 3.2. 
 Scenarios 7, 8, 9: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama 
and French model as described in equation 3.1. In scenario 7, the variable 
1, −tjFirm refers to the financial constraints variable; in scenario 8 it refers to 
the investments variable; and in scenario 9, both the financial constraints and 
the investments variables. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 
3.2. 
 Scenarios 10, 11, 12: Returns are adjusted for risks using the unconditional 
Fama and French model. The regression is described in equation 3.1 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . In stage two, the regression is 
described in equation 3.6 (p. 182). In Scenario 10, 1, −tjFirm refers to the 
financial constraints variable; in scenario 11 it refers to the investments 
variable; and in scenario 12, both the financial constraints and the investments 
variables. 
 Scenario 13: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model as described in equation 3.1 where the variable 1, −tjFirm refers 
to the financial constraints variable. In stage two, the regression is described 
in equation 3.6 with 1, −tjFirm referring to the investments variable. 
The coefficients and t-statistics are reported. The coefficients are multiplied by 
100. The two tailed t-statistics to test whether a coefficient is different from zero are 
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West (1987) 
procedure. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.   
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 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
Momentum variables 
lagRET23 0.76 ** 0.87 *** 0.85 *** 1.01 *** 0.97 *** 
 2.54  3.12  3.05  3.71  3.57  
lagRET46 0.80 *** 0.81 *** 0.86 *** 0.81 *** 0.87 *** 
 3.22  3.61  3.97  3.77  4.23  
lagRET712 0.48 ** 0.26  0.32 * 0.32 * 0.37 ** 
 2.47  1.35  1.68  1.76  2.02  
Control variables 
lagBM 0.00 *** 0.09 * 0.07  0.05  0.04  
 3.37  1.67  1.32  1.03  0.83  
lagSize 0.00 *** -0.27 *** -0.26 *** -0.27 *** -0.26 *** 
 -7.66  -12.79  -12.89  -13.06  -13.05  
lagTONQ 0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.02  0.01  
 -0.25  -0.52  -0.01  -0.34  0.15  
lagTONX 0.00  -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  
 -0.38  -1.00  -0.81  -0.78  -0.84  
NASDAQ 0.00 * 0.27 *** 0.27 *** 0.26 *** 0.26 *** 
 1.81  3.50  3.70  3.57  3.70  
Intercept -0.48 *** 0.32 *** 0.35 *** 0.35 *** 0.37 *** 
 -16.52  4.22  4.99  5.19  5.79  
           
Adjusted R2 6.20%  2.74%  2.62%  2.55%  2.51%  
 
 
 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 
Momentum variables 
lagRET23 0.81 *** 0.82 ** 0.81 *** 0.85 *** 
 3.14  1.98  2.57  3.26  
lagRET46 0.79 *** 0.43  0.84 *** 0.66 *** 
 3.46  1.07  3.75  3.18  
lagRET712 0.44 *** 0.18  0.57 *** 0.47 *** 
 2.79  0.65  3.19  3.35  
Control variables 
lagBM 0.06  0.17 * -0.03  0.05  
 1.07  1.88  -0.52  0.99  
lagSize -0.27 *** -0.26 *** -0.27 *** -0.24 *** 
 -11.94  -9.26  -9.81  -10.60  
lagTONQ -0.02  -0.08  -0.08  0.07  
 -0.41  -1.49  -1.62  1.13  
lagTONX -0.05  -0.02  -0.10 ** -0.06  
 -1.02  -0.41  -1.94  -1.14  
NASDAQ 0.28 *** 0.20 *** 0.19 *** 0.26 *** 
 4.24  3.00  3.14  4.06  
Intercept 0.32 *** 0.38 *** 0.38 *** 0.36 *** 
 4.46  5.68  5.68  6.21  
         
Adjusted R2 2.56%  2.34%  2.44%  2.16%  
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Scenario 10 Scenario 11 Scenario 12 Scenario 13 
Momentum variables         
lagRET23 0.52 * 0.89 *** 0.50  0.34  
 1.70  3.13  1.59  0.53  
lagRET46 0.80 *** 0.79 *** 0.79 *** 0.13  
 3.10  3.46  3.06  0.17  
lagRET712 -0.07  0.25  -0.09  -0.49  
 -0.28  1.35  -0.37  -1.03  
Interaction variables         
lagRET23 x lagFC   0.01  0.04    
   0.08  0.39    
lagRET46 x lagFC   0.09  0.08    
   0.84  0.72    
lagRET712 x lagFC   -0.02  0.01    
   -0.28  0.10    
lagRET23 x 
lagCAPEX 1.10 **   1.21 ** 1.21  
 2.04    2.20  0.86  
lagRET46 x 
lagCAPEX 0.02    -0.04  0.81  
 0.02    -0.07  0.54  
lagRET712 x 
lagCAPEX 0.91 **   0.98 *** 2.08 ** 
 2.47    2.70  2.14  
Control variables         
lagBM 0.10 * 0.09 * 0.10 * 0.19 * 
 1.73  1.64  1.68  1.90  
lagSize -0.27 *** -0.27 *** -0.26 *** -0.26 *** 
 -12.65  -12.72  -12.62  -9.44  
lagTONQ -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.09 * 
 -0.63  -0.45  -0.56  -1.66  
lagTONX -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.03  
 -1.02  -0.99  -1.00  -0.62  
NASDAQ 0.27 *** 0.27 *** 0.27 *** 0.20 *** 
 3.48  3.51  3.48  3.09  
Intercept 0.31 *** 0.32 *** 0.31 *** 0.36 *** 
 4.13  4.17  4.10  5.48  
Adjusted R2 3.08%  2.94%  3.28%  2.85%  
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Chapter 4 – Firms’ Investment and Financing 
Flexibility and the Accruals based Trading Strategy 
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4.1. Introduction 
Sloan (1996) documents that the strategy to buy stocks of firms with low 
accounting accruals and sell stocks of firms with high accounting accruals 
generates positive and significant profits. Sloan’s finding suggests that high 
accruals predict low subsequent returns. The author first explains this profit (or the 
accruals premium) with the functional fixation hypothesis. In his hypothesis 
investors are irrational and ignore the difference in the persistence of cash based 
versus accrual based earnings when making their earnings forecasts. As the cash 
based earnings are more persistent than the accrual based earnings, accruals are 
mispriced. Firms with high accruals are overpriced whereas those with low 
accruals are underpriced.  
Subsequent to Sloan’s paper, several studies have been trying to explain 
the accruals premium. Of these studies, a growing line of research view accruals as 
a reflection of firm growth. Zhang (2007) and Fairfield et al. (2003) argue that the 
accruals premium arises due to investors’ failure to recognise the true contribution 
of growth to firm value. In addition, Wu et al. (2010) show that a risk based 
explanation based on firms’ investments can partially explain the accruals 
premium. 
Accruals reflect firm growth as they represent firms’ investment in 
working capital. The return predictability of accruals is likely related to the return 
predictability of firm growth. Cooper et al. (2008) document that high total asset 
growth predicts low subsequent stock returns. Furthermore, as firm growth often 
involves investment in both fixed capital and working capital, the return 
predictability of accruals and of fixed investments are related. Titman et al. (2004) 
 215 
document that a strategy that buys stocks with low fixed investments and sells 
those with high fixed investments also generates positive and significant profits 
(here after the fixed investment premium). 
Wei and Xie (2008) argue that both the accruals premium and the fixed 
investment premium are due to management over-optimism about firms’ future 
product market demands. Alternatively, Polk and Sapienza (2009) and Kothari et 
al. (2006) argue that the fixed investment premium and the accruals premium are 
due to the management of overvalued firms catering for investor sentiment. 
However, Wei and Xie (2008) document that the negative relationship between 
fixed capital investments and stock returns is related to the negative relationship 
between accruals and stock returns, but they are not subsumed by each other. 
While the debate on what explains the accruals premium remains in 
dispute, there arises another debate on whether it is disappearing. According to 
Green et al. (2009), the accruals premium has disappeared in the last few years. 
However, some studies show that the accruals premium varies over time, hence it 
is likely to reemerge in the future. Wu et al. (2010) argue that the accruals premium 
should vary with the business cycle, given that (a) the accruals premium shares 
some common characteristics with the value premium (Desai et al., 2004), (b) both 
are related to firms’ investments, and (c) the value premium is cyclical due to 
firms’ investment irreversibility (Zhang, 2005). From the mispricing perspective, 
Gerard et al. (2009), Livnat and Petrovits (2009), and Ali and Gurun (2009) 
suggest that the accruals premium varies with the investor sentiment cycle.  
The literature on the accruals premium as a reflection of firm growth is 
scattered and leaves several gaps to be filled. The return predictability of accruals 
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is related to but not subsumed by the return predictability of fixed capital 
investments (Wei and Xie, 2008). Hence, there should be a process by which 
changes in working capital investments are dependent on but asynchronous with 
changes in fixed capital investments. The implication of such a process on the 
accruals premium has yet to be examined. Furthermore, the work of Wu et al. 
(2010) could be extended to examine how the accruals premium varies across the 
business cycle due to, for example, firms’ investment irreversibility. This time 
varying pattern should be differentiated from any time varying pattern across the 
investor sentiment cycle identified in the literature. 
This chapter aims to fill in these gaps by investigating (a) whether the 
accruals premium exists, and (b) how it is affected by firms’ investments. The 
literature47 suggests that financial constraints and investment irreversibility could 
create inflexibility in investing and disinvesting in response to aggregate shocks. 
Hence if the accruals premium is driven by firms’ investments, it should be more 
pronounced among firms with high financial constraints and / or investment 
irreversibility. On the other hand, low financial constraints and investment 
irreversibility would give management more freedom. Hence, if the accruals 
premium is driven by the management of overvalued firms investing to prolong the 
stock overvaluation, it would be less pronounced among firms with low financial 
constraints and / or investment irreversibility. 
Furthermore, a risk based explanation for the accruals premium would 
predict a higher premium during economic upturns than in downturns, alongside 
                                                     
47
 For example, part of the literature reviewed in section 2.2.4 (p. 54) and the review on 
financial constraints in section 2.3 (p. 63). 
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the arguments in Lakonishok et al. (1994), Petkova and Zhang (2005), and Lettau 
and Ludvigson (2001) on the value premium. Caggese (2007) describes a process 
by which such a pattern of the accruals premium could arise in the presence of 
investment irreversibility and / or financial constraints. The pattern should be 
differentiated from the variability across the investor sentiment cycle of the 
accruals premium due to mispricing. 
Finally, central to this chapter is the relationship between firms’ 
investment irreversibility, financial constraints and the accrual premium. As the 
manufacturing industry is the brick-and-mortar industry with investment in fixed 
and working capitals playing a crucial role as compared to other industries, the 
predictions so far are expected to hold more strongly among the manufacturing 
firms. 
This chapter makes the following main contributions. It takes the work of 
Wu et al. (2010) a step further by examining how the accruals premium varies 
across the business cycle in the presence of firms’ financial inflexibility. It is the 
first, to the author’s knowledge, to differentiate the pattern of the accruals premium 
due to fundamental forces versus management’s attempt to cater investor 
sentiment. This is also the first study to examine whether the accrual premium 
exists after removing the cyclical component of returns. 
This chapter finds that the accruals premium exists in a sample of non-
financial, non-utilities firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from 1972 – 
2006. The accruals premium is more pronounced among firms with high financial 
constraints. Wu et al. (2010) suggest that when the discount rate is high, firms 
invest less in both working capitals and fixed capitals. This chapter argues that if 
 218 
the firm is also subject to financial constraints, it would be subject to an even 
higher effective discount rate, leading to even lower investment levels and higher 
subsequent returns.  
Furthermore, the accruals premium is more prominent in firms with low 
investment irreversibility. Polk and Sapienza (2009) suggest that the management 
of overvalued firms invests to cater for investor sentiment. This chapter argues that 
the management would also invest in working capitals for the same purpose. Low 
investment irreversibility might induce management to be more comfortable in 
pursuing their aim of catering investor sentiment. Hence it explains the more 
pronounced accruals premium in the firms with low investment irreversibility. This 
chapter also finds that the accruals premium is most pronounced at the two 
extremes of the inflexibility spectrum. The evidence at the high end of the 
spectrum supports an explanation based on Wu et al. (2010) whereas the evidence 
at the low end supports an explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
The relationship between the inflexibility measures and the accruals 
premium is concentrated in the manufacturing industries where physical 
investments are of high importance. The evidence reinforces that the accruals 
premium is related to firms’ investments. The return predictability of accruals 
remains when risks are controlled for using the Fama and French three factor 
model, unconditional and conditional on the business cycle and the inflexibility 
measures. Finally, when isolating the cyclicality in stock returns using the term 
spread, the default spread, the aggregate dividend yield, and the Treasury bill rate, 
accruals cease to predict future returns, hence the accruals premium disappears. 
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Any explanation for the profitability of the accruals based trading strategy should 
therefore be able to explain its cyclical nature. 
4.2. Literature Review 
Sloan (1996) documents an interesting finding that the strategy of buying 
stocks of firms with low accounting accruals and selling stocks of firms with high 
accounting accruals generates positive and significant profits in one to three years 
from the portfolio formation date for stocks listed in the U.S. market. The accruals 
premium is also documented in international markets (LaFond, 2005, and Pincus et 
al., 2007). Some authors   question whether the accruals premium actually exists. 
For example, Desai et al. (2004) argue that the accruals premium is a manifestation 
of the value premium. However, this result only holds if the value premium is 
defined as the return predictability of the ratio of operating cash flows to price. On 
the other hand, the value premium is well documented when the value-growth 
characteristic is defined using a variety of other ratios48 such as the Book-to-
Market, the dividend yield and so on. Other studies question whether the research 
design is inappropriate (Kraft et al., 2006, and Leippold and Lohre, 2010).  
The majority of the research investigates the reasons why the accruals 
premium exists. There are two main explanations, i.e. the accruals premium arises 
due to either the mispricing of, or the difference in the risks between, the stocks of 
firms with high and low accruals. Other studies also attempt to explain the time 
series pattern of the accruals premium. The following sections review the literature 
in these directions. 
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 For details, refer to the literature review in section 2.2 (p. 45) of chapter 2. 
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4.2.1. The Mispricing of Accruals and the Accrual Premium 
Sloan (1996) first argues that the accruals premium can be explained by the 
functional fixation hypothesis. In this hypothesis investors are irrational and ignore 
the difference in the persistence of cash based versus accrual based earnings when 
making their earnings forecasts. Accruals tend to reverse in the subsequent periods. 
Hence the cash based earnings are more persistent than the accrual based earnings. 
If investors ignore this difference, they would over-weigh the accruals component 
and under-weigh the cash component in earnings forecasts. Investor irrationality 
therefore causes the overpricing of firms with high accruals and underpricing of 
firms with low accruals. As the mispricing is corrected, a strategy that goes long in 
stocks with low accruals and short in high accruals can earn positive and 
significant returns.  
Sloan’s (1996) hypothesis received mixed support. Richardson et al. 
(2005) argue that because less reliable accruals lead to low earnings persistence, 
they induce stronger mispricing. The authors report that the zero cost trading 
strategy based on less reliable accruals generates higher returns. On the other hand, 
Zach (2006) provides evidence against the functional fixation hypothesis. For 
example, firms in the extreme accrual portfolios do not migrate to a different 
portfolio in the subsequent year. This evidence suggests that accruals do not 
reverse, and investors underreact rather than overreact to the information about 
accruals.  
Recently some studies have attributed the mispricing of accruals to 
investor irrationality towards the understanding of growth. Fairfield et al. (2003) 
argue that accruals contribute to both the growth in net operating assets as part of 
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the overall growth of a firm, and its profitability. The growth component in 
accruals can lead to lower future profitability in the same manner as the long term 
investment growth does. According to Fairfield et al. (2003), this pattern is due to 
both the diminishing marginal returns to investment and the conservative 
accounting principle. Fairfield et al. (2003) attribute the mispricing of accruals to 
investors’ failure to recognise that the association between growth and future 
profitability is weaker than that between current aggregate earnings and future 
profitability. Zhang (2007) finds that the mispricing of accruals increases with the 
embedded growth information. This finding corroborates with the view of Fairfield 
et al. (2003) view. It is also consistent with the finding in Thomas and Zhang 
(2002) that inventories contribute the majority of the predictive power of accruals, 
given that inventories are closely tied with firm growth. 
It is also possible that the management’s suboptimal behaviours induce 
investor irrationality. Sloan (1996) attributes the mispricing to investors’ failure to 
recognise the different persistence of cash based and accrual based earnings, 
Richardson et al. (2006) suggest that the different persistence is due to managers’ 
manipulation of earnings. This view is consistent with the evidence in Xie (2001) 
that the mispricing of the abnormal accruals49 drives the mispricing of the total 
accruals documented in Sloan (1996).  
Chan et al. (2006) support the earnings management hypothesis. They 
report that firms that have high stock returns and high earnings growth 
subsequently increase accruals suddenly. These firms then experience tumbling 
earnings and stock prices. The authors attribute this evidence to management trying 
                                                     
49
 I.e. the accruals made at the discretion of managers or discretionary accruals. 
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to delay reporting the slow growth by manipulating earnings through accruals. 
Chan et al. (2006) do not find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that managers 
genuinely accumulate inventories and other working capital items to anticipate 
high future growth, and make errors in extrapolating past high growth into the 
future50. This argument is put forward in Wei and Xie (2008) to explain the return 
predictability of both accruals and fixed capital investments. Chan et al. (2006) 
argue that if the accruals premium is driven by changes in the business conditions, 
then it should be roughly uniform across accrual components and industries. They 
report that the return predictability of accounts receivable and inventories are 
different, and the accruals premium varies across different industries.  
Kothari et al. (2006) suggest that the accruals premium is due to stock 
mispricing caused by managers’ misbehaviour. The literature suggests that when 
stocks are overpriced, managers might invest more to cater for investor sentiment 
in order to maintain the overvaluation (Polk and Sapienza, 2009). According to 
Kothari et al. (2006), managers of overpriced firms might distort earnings upwards 
to nurture investors’ expectations, whereas managers of underpriced firms have no 
motivation to distort earnings downwards. They find that there is an asymmetry in 
the response of firms with high and low accruals to past returns. Firms with high 
accruals have high previous returns, whereas those with low accruals do not 
necessarily have low previous returns. The authors also report the expected 
behaviours of managers of overpriced firms with high accruals. Some examples 
                                                     
50
 This argument is similar to the error-in-expectation hypothesis to explain the value 
anomaly proposed in Lakonishok et al. (1994) whereby investors make the estimation 
errors based on past performance. 
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include high equity issuance, high capital expenditure, active mergers and 
acquisitions as suggested by Baker et al. (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009)51.  
Firms with high accruals might simply correspond to the higher level of 
fixed investments undertaken. Fairfield et al. (2003) suggest that the mispricing of 
accruals can be considered as part of the family of research on the mispricing of 
fixed capital investments (Titman et al., 2004), or the mispricing of total asset 
growth (Cooper et al., 2008). Wei and Xie (2008) test the predictability of fixed 
capital investment and of accruals to future stock returns. They find that the return 
predictability of fixed capital investments is related to the return predictability of 
accruals.  
However, Wei and Xie (2008) find that the two return predictability 
relationships are not subsumed by each other. Accruals continue to predict 
subsequent returns even after controlling for the return predictability of fixed 
investments. Wei and Xie (2008) attribute the return predictability of accruals, or 
the accruals premium, to the management’s over-optimism about firms’ future 
product demands and the consequent overinvestments. However, Chen et al. (2006) 
do not find evidence to support this view. Hence, although there appears to be 
some connection between the mispricing of fixed capital investments and accruals, 
this connection is far from direct. 
4.2.2. The Risk based Explanations for the Accruals Premium 
There has been only limited attempt to explain the accruals premium on a 
risk basis. A common feature of the existing risk based explanations for the 
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 For a review of stock prices and firms’ investment, refer to section 3.2.2 (p. 152). 
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accruals premium is that none can completely explain it. Khan (2008) finds that the 
stocks of firms with low accruals possess the characteristics of distress stocks such 
as negative earnings, high leverage, low sales growth, and high bankruptcy risks. 
Ng (2005) also suggests that the return to the accruals based trading strategy is 
subject to distress risks, and controlling for distress risks lowers it. Khan (2008) 
concedes that a considerable portion of the accruals premium can be explained by a 
four factor model. The four factors consist of two factors describing news about 
futures expected dividends and future expected returns on the market portfolio, and 
two Fama and French factors (SMB and HML).  
To explain the accruals premium, Wu et al. (2010) suggest the discount 
hypothesis. In their hypothesis, the management rationally adjusts firms’ 
investment in working capitals as the discount rate changes. When the discount rate 
is lower, more investment projects become profitable, hence firms would invest in 
presumably both fixed capitals and working capitals. Furthermore, lower discount 
rate means lower expected returns going forward. Hence, to the extent that accruals 
reflect firms’ investments in working capitals, higher accruals would be followed 
by lower expected stock returns. The opposite happens when the discount rate is 
higher. Wu et al (2010) document that the accruals premium is significantly 
reduced when returns are adjusted for risks using the CAPM or Fama and French 
model supplemented with an investment factor. 
4.2.3. The Time Series Pattern of the Accruals Premium 
 Since the discovery of the accruals premium in the U.S. market in Sloan 
(1996), its existence has been confirmed in numerous subsequent studies. If the 
accruals premium is due to mispricing, its strength would be diminished over time 
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as it is more widely exploited. To explain the persistence of the accruals premium, 
Mashruwala et al. (2006) point to idiosyncratic risk and transaction costs. 
Alternatively Hirshleifer et al. (2009) suggest that the accruals premium persists 
thanks to short sale constraints. 
Lev and Nissim (2006) concede that the accruals premium is not 
weakening. They explain its persistence by the lack of interest from institutional 
investors due to the unfavourable characteristics of the firms with extreme accruals. 
According to Ali et al. (2008), very few mutual funds exploit the accrual anomaly. 
However, Green et al. (2009) concede that the accruals premium has been driven 
down to negative recently. They attribute this pattern to hedge funds’ active 
deployment of the accruals based trading strategy in addition to the weakening of 
the mispricing signal. 
 Wu et al. (2010) suggest that the weakening accruals premium in the recent 
year documented in Green et al. (2009) is only temporary due to its cyclicality. Wu 
et al. (2010) argue that this pattern is due to the common characteristics shared 
between the accruals premium and the value premium as identified by Desai et al. 
(2004). In addition, the value premium and the accruals premium can be explained 
by the risk-return relationships based on firms’ investments in Zhang (2005) and 
Wu et al. (2010) respectively. As the value premium is expected to be cyclical52, 
the accruals premium is likely to be cyclical. It can be predicted using the variance 
risk premium of Bollerslev et al. (2009, cited in Wu et al., 2010). However, 
according to Wu et al. (2010), the more widely used variables, i.e. the term spread, 
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 For a review of the literature on the cyclicality of the value premium, refer to section 
2.2.5 (p. 58). 
 226 
the default spread and the relative Treasury bill rate, are individually less 
successful in predicting the accruals premium. 
 Some studies argue that the accruals based trading strategy works better in 
different phases of the investor sentiment cycle. Ali and Gurun (2009) and Gerard 
et al. (2009) concede that the strategy works better during high investor sentiment 
periods. Ali and Gurun (2009) attribute this tendency to investors paying less 
attention to the difference in accruals based and cash based earnings. Gerard et al. 
(2009) attribute it to investor optimism in investing in high distress stocks. Livnat 
and Petrovits (2009) find that stocks with low accruals generate higher returns 
following low sentiment periods. The authors attribute this pattern to investor 
under-reaction to the accrual information that disconfirms their belief about the 
current market state. To the extent that investors tend to be optimistic during 
economic upturns and pessimistic during economic downturns, the evidence to 
support the economic cyclicality of the accruals premium could be similar to the 
evidence to support its sentiment cyclicality. 
4.2.4. The Gaps in the Literature 
The literature leaves several gaps to be filled. Firstly, the return 
predictability of accruals is related to but not subsumed by the return predictability 
of fixed capital investments (Wei and Xie, 2008). Hence there should be a process 
by which changes in working capital investments are dependent on changes in 
fixed capital investments, but the relationship is not a contemporaneous one. An 
example is described in Caggese (2007). Due to investment irreversibility, fixed 
capital investments may not be cut back but working capitals could be, hence they 
may not move together. Furthermore, as changes in working capitals are part of 
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accruals, the accruals should also be related to the relative movement of fixed 
capitals and working capitals. The implication of such a process on the accruals 
premium has yet to be discussed in the literature.  
Secondly, Wu et al. (2010) suggest that the return to the accruals based 
trading strategy should follow the business cycle pattern. This is because (a) the 
accrual premiums share some common characteristics with the value premium 
(Desai et al., 2004), (b) both are related to firms’ investments, and (c) the value 
premium is cyclical due to firms’ investment irreversibility (Zhang, 2005). 
Therefore, it is important to extend the work of Wu et al. (2010) to examine how 
the accruals premium varies across the business cycle in the presence of, for 
example, firms’ investment irreversibility.  
Finally, the three studies that explain the accruals premium by the 
mispricing of accruals suggest that the premium varies with investor sentiment. 
Gerard et al. (2009) rely on investors’ optimism when investing in distress stocks. 
Livnat and Petrovits (2009) attribute the pattern to investors’ under-reaction in 
updating new information. Ali and Gurun (2009) argue in favour of investors’ lack 
of attention to the difference in cash based and accrual based earnings during the 
high sentiment period. Kothari et al. (2006), while also seek to explain the accruals 
premium by the mispricing of accruals, rely on the initial overvaluation of stocks. 
Given that stocks are more likely to be overvalued when the sentiment is high and 
management purposely invest to cater for this sentiment (Polk and Sapienza, 2009), 
it is possible that an investment based mispricing explanation would also predict a 
time varying accrual premium. 
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This chapter aims to address the gaps identified in this section. The 
following section develops the research questions and the hypotheses to fill in these 
gaps on the relationship between firms’ investments and the accruals premium. 
4.3. The Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This chapter aims to investigate how firms’ investments affect the return to 
the accruals based trading strategy. The questions that this chapter aims to address 
are as follows: 
(1) Whether the accruals premium exists; and 
(2) If it does, how firms’ investments affect it. 
Wu et al. (2010) suggest that the accruals premium arises due to firms’ 
varying level of working capital investments in response to the varying discount 
rate. On the other hand, motivated by the catering theory in Polk and Sapienza 
(2009), Kothari et al. (2006) argue that it is due to management’s manipulation of 
earnings and accruals upwards to extend the overvaluation of high accrual stocks. 
However, even without earnings manipulation, overvalued firms can also have high 
accruals, given that new working capitals are often needed to deploy new capital 
investment to cater for investor sentiment as stipulated in Polk and Sapienza 
(2009).  
This chapter argues that the accruals premium can be explained by two 
explanations from the perspective that accruals reflect firms’ working capital 
investments. The first one is based on the risk-return relationship, i.e. stocks with 
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low accruals are riskier than stocks with high accruals53. Furthermore, the cross 
section of returns of stocks with low versus high accruals can be explained when 
returns are adjusted for risks using an asset pricing model with an additional 
investment factor (Wu et al., 2010). Alternatively, along the lines of Polk and 
Sapienza (2009), stocks of firms with high accruals could be overpriced as their 
managers invest in working capitals to cater for investor sentiment and prolong the 
overvaluation.  
To address the first research question, this chapter expects to find evidence 
of the accruals premium in the sample examined, given the extensive existing 
evidence on its existence in the literature reviewed in section 4.2 (p. 219). The first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H4.1: The strategy of buying stocks with low accruals and selling stocks 
with high accruals generates positive returns. 
As the explanations for the accruals premium examined in this chapter are 
both related to firms’ investments, the factors affecting firms’ investments are 
likely to affect the accruals premium. Consistent with the approach in chapters 2 
and 3, this chapter focuses on the role of investment irreversibility and financial 
constraints, both of which reflect the firm level inflexibility. According to Livdan 
et al. (2009), firms with high financial constraints are unable to invest in all of the 
desired investment projects and smoothen dividend streams in facing the external 
aggregate shocks. Zhang (2005) also suggests that investment irreversibility makes 
it more difficult for value firms to disinvest compared to growth firms.  
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 See Khan (2008), Ng (2003) and Wu et al. (2010). Refer to section 4.2.2 (p. 234) for 
more details. 
 230 
Taken together, financial constraints and investment irreversibility create 
inflexibility in investing and disinvesting in response to aggregate shocks. If the 
accruals premium is due to an investment based risk factor (Wu et al., 2010), it 
should be more pronounced among firms with high financial constraints and / or 
high investment irreversibility. On the other hand, if the accruals premium is driven 
by the management of overvalued firms investing to prolong the overvaluation 
along the lines of Polk and Sapienza (2009), financial constraints and investment 
irreversibility make it harder for management to act. In this case, the accruals 
premium would be less pronounced. 
The opposite forces that financial constraints and / or investment 
irreversibility exert on the accruals premium might cancel each other out. If the 
impact of the risk based force based on Wu et al. (2010) outweighs the impact of 
the mispricing force based on Polk and Sapienza (2009), the accruals premium 
would be higher among firms with higher financial constraints and / or investment 
irreversibility. By contrast, if the impact of the mispricing force outweighs the 
impact of the risk based force, it would be lower. Taking the risk based explanation 
as the basis, the following hypothesis is formed: 
H4.2: The accruals premium among firms with higher financial constraints 
and / or investment irreversibility is higher than that among firms with 
lower financial constraints and / or investment irreversibility. 
From the perspective that accruals reflect firms’ working capitals 
necessary to support the deployment of fixed capitals, one would expect that both 
accruals and fixed capital investments predict stock returns in the same way. 
However, Wei and Xie (2008) document that the return predictability of accruals 
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and fixed capital investments are not subsumed by each other. Caggese (2007) 
suggests that working capital and fixed capital investments do not move together 
due to the firm level frictions of investment irreversibility and financial constraints. 
At the beginning of an economic downturn, firms might want to downsize their 
fixed capitals but are prevented from doing so as fixed capitals tend to be difficult 
to reverse, i.e. having high degree of irreversibility. As the downturn continues, 
revenues become worsen. If firms also face financial constraints, they may be 
forced to cut working capital investments. When the downturn ends, firms would 
be more cautious about increasing their fixed capitals. As a result, during 
downturns, firms with high investment irreversibility and / or financial constraints 
would have fixed investments at a level higher than the optimal level given the 
fundamentals. On the other hand, their working capital investments would be at a 
level lower than the optimal level given the fundamentals. During economic 
upturns, fixed capital investments might be inefficiently lower than the optimal 
level. 
According to Caggese (2007), the relationship between working capital 
investments and fixed capital investments varies across the business cycle. As they 
do not always move together, their return predictabilities might not be subsumed 
by each other, as evidenced by Wei and Xie (2008). The Caggese (2007) model can 
be extended to hypothesise the accruals premium across the business cycle in the 
presence of the firm level frictions. First, during downturns, firms’ working 
capitals are lower than the optimal level. Therefore firms with high working 
capitals or high accruals should be rewarded. This movement might neutralise the 
tendency that firms with low accruals are exposed to higher risks and are rewarded 
with higher returns than firms with high accruals. By contrast, the Caggese (2007) 
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model does not predict the working capital level during economic upturns. Across 
the business cycle, one could expect the accruals premium to be stronger during 
economic upturns among firms with higher financial constraints and / or 
investment irreversibility. 
The accruals premium can also be time varying if it is driven by the 
management of overvalued firms investing to cater for investor sentiment, along 
the lines of Polk and Sapienza (2009). In this case, the accruals premium would 
vary across the investor sentiment cycle, higher during the high sentiment phase 
and lower during the low sentiment phase. As argued in section 3.3 (p. 146) of 
chapter 3, the economic cycle and the sentiment cycle are closely related. 
Therefore, an observation that the accruals premium is stronger during (economic 
and sentiment) upturns than during downturns does not necessarily lend support to 
the risk based explanation based on Wu et al. (2010) or the mispricing explanation 
based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
In combination with hypothesis H4.2, the time varying pattern of the 
accruals premium can provide evidence to support either of the explanations 
examined in this chapter. If the cyclicality is observed among firms with high 
financial constraints and / or high investment irreversibility, such evidence would 
support the explanation based on Wu et al. (2010). By contrast, if the cyclicality is 
observed among firms with low financial constraints and / or low investment 
irreversibility, the evidence would support the explanation based on Polk and 
Sapienza (2009). This chapter hypothesises that during economic upturns, which 
can coincide with sentiment upturns, the accrual premium is more pronounced. 
Hypothesis H4.3 is formed as follows: 
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H4.3: The accruals premium is stronger during economic upturns than 
during downturns. 
Central to the hypotheses developed in this chapter is the dynamic 
relationship between fixed capital and working capital investments in the presence 
of investment and financing inflexibility. The manufacturing industry is the brick-
and-mortar industry with investments playing a crucial role as compared to other 
industries. Hence the hypotheses developed in this section are expected to hold 
more strongly among the manufacturing firms. This expectation is consistent with 
Zhang (2007) who reports that (a) the manufacturing firms belong to the group 
with the highest covariance between accruals and growth, and (b) firms in this 
group generate higher returns to the accruals based trading strategy. Hypothesis 
H4.4 is formed as follows: 
H4.4: The manufacturing industry exhibits the strongest pattern in that the 
accruals premium is more pronounced among firms with high financial 
constraints / high investment irreversibility and during economic upturns. 
Of the explanations examined in this chapter, the one based on the 
argument in Polk and Sapienza (2009) attributes the accruals premium to the 
mispricing of the stocks of firms with high and low accruals. As a result, the return 
predictability of the accruals ratio would remain even when controlling for risks. 
Alternatively, the explanation based on Wu et al. (2010) attributes the accruals 
premium to the difference in the risks of firms with high and low accruals. In this 
case, the return predictability of the accruals ratio would disappear when 
controlling for risks. The null hypothesis using the risk-based explanation is as 
follows: 
 234 
H4.5: The accruals premium can be explained by an asset pricing model 
that incorporates relevant fundamental factors. 
The hypotheses developed and examined in this chapter are summarised in 
Table 4.1.  
[Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
4.4 The Methodology and Sample 
4.4.1. Measurement of Key Firm Level Variables 
This chapter follows the measure of total accruals originally proposed in 
the seminal paper by Sloan (1996). The indirect balance sheet method to measure 
the accruals ratio is as follows: 
( ) TADepCLCAACC /−∆−∆=  (4.1) 
in which CA∆ is changes in non-cash current assets, CL∆ is changes in current 
liabilities excluding short term debts and tax payable, Dep is the depreciation 
charge during the year, and TA is the average total assets. In addition to the 
objective of replicating the original measure of accruals in Sloan (1996), the choice 
of the measure used in Sloan (1996) is also due to the availability of data, since this 
chapter covers the data from 1972 to 2006, expanding well before 1988 when 
SFAS 95, which requires firms to report cash flow statements, took effect. 
 Of the three aspects of investment irreversibility described in section 2.4.1 
(p. 59), chapter 2, the data to calculate the depreciation charge ratio is most 
available. It also describes the most widely used source of funding to replace 
existing assets. Hence this chapter uses the depreciation charge ratio to measure 
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investment irreversibility. It is calculated as the ratio of depreciation expense 
during the year to the beginning of the year net fixed assets. The ratio is measured 
in December of year t-1 and is used to sort firms into the high and low investment 
irreversibility groups. Firms having the depreciation charge ratio in the top 30% are 
included in the subsample with low investment irreversibility. Firms having the 
depreciation charge ratio in the bottom 30% are included in the subsample with 
high investment irreversibility. 
Financial constraints are measured in a similar way as in chapters 2 and 3, 
using the net payout ratio. Sections 2.4 (p. 59) and 3.4 (p. 153) argue that this 
measure is appropriate as it reflects financial constraints in terms of the availability 
of funds, more relevant than in terms of the cost of borrowing. The net payout ratio 
is measured in December of year t-1 as dividends plus repurchases minus share 
issuance, all scaled by the net incomes. The ratio is used to sort firms into 
financially constrained and unconstrained groups from July of year t to June of 
year t+1. Firms having the net payout ratio in the top 30% are included in the 
subsample with low financial constraints. Firms having the net payout ratio in the 
bottom 30% are included in the subsample with high financial constraints. 
The construction of the key firm level variables described in this section is 
summarised in Panel A of Table 4.2. 
[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
To examine the time varying pattern of the accruals premium, this chapter 
uses the Chicago Fed National Activity Index, a weighted average of 85 existing 
monthly national economic indicators with the mean of zero and the standard 
deviation of one. A positive index indicates that growth is above the trend, and a 
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negative index indicates that growth is below the trend. Therefore this chapter 
assigns a positive index to economic upturns and a negative index to downturns. 
This approach is close to the definitions in Caggese (2007) of upturns and 
downturns based on whether sales are above or below the trend. The dummy 
variable UP is assigned the value of 1 if the index is positive, and zero otherwise. 
The dummy variable DOWN is assigned the value of 1 if the index is negative, and 
zero otherwise. 
4.4.2. Methodology 
This chapter uses two methods of analysis to address the research 
questions and the hypotheses set out in section 4.3 (p. 228). In the portfolio sorting 
approach, stocks are sorted by the accruals ratio as of 31st December (year t-1) in 
ascending order. Ten portfolios with equal number of stocks are composed and 
positions (long and short) are taken at the beginning of July of the following year 
(year t) and held until the end of June of the next year (year t+1). The gap of six 
months between the account year end and the beginning of the portfolio holding 
period ensures that the information that is necessary to compose portfolios (i.e. the 
accruals ratio) is available to investors. The raw returns of ten equally weighted 
deciles and of the long-short portfolio that goes long in stocks with low accruals 
ratios and short in stocks with high accruals ratios are reported. 
Similar to chapter 3, this chapter measures the accruals premium during 
economic upturns and downturns using the UP and DOWN dummy variables 
described in section 4.4.1 (p. 234). When the accruals premium is regressed against 
the UP and DOWN dummy variables, the coefficient attached to the UP (DOWN) 
variable gives the average accruals premium during economic upturns (downturns). 
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When the premium is regressed against the UP dummy variable and a constant, the 
coefficient attached to the UP dummy variable measures the difference between the 
accruals premium during economic upturns versus downturns. All the t statistics 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with the Newey and West 
(1987) method. According to Cooper et al. (2004), this approach allows the time 
series of returns to be preserved, while any serial correlation is reliably corrected. 
To test whether the accruals premium can be explained by risks, this 
chapter follows chapters 2 and 3 and uses the asset pricing framework of Avramov 
and Chordia (2006) to control for individual stock returns for risks. This approach 
has an advantage in that it uses all the information at the firm level rather than the 
aggregate information at portfolio level. For detailed discussion on the framework 
of Avramov and Chordia (2006), refer to section 2.4 (p. 59). 
The hypotheses established in section 4.3 (p. 228) relate firms’ investment 
irreversibility and financial constraints to the accruals premium. Hence the firm 
level investment irreversibility and financial constraints variables are used as the 
conditioning variables in the Avramov and Chordia (2006) framework. These 
variables are measured using the depreciation charge ratio and the net payout ratio 
as described in section 4.4.1 (p. 234). A business cycle variable is also used as the 
conditioning variable, as hypotheses H4.3 and H4.4 establish that the accruals 
premium potentially varies across the economic upturns and downturns. Similar to 
chapters 2 and 3, this chapter uses the default spread to describe the business cycle, 
on the basis that as a single indicator, it performs better than other popular 
alternatives. 
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The Fama and French model is used as the base model in the following 
general model specification: 
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in which jtR  is the return on stock j and FtR is the risk free rate at time t. 
ftF represents the priced risk factors, which include the market factor, the HML 
and SMB factors of the Fama and French model (1993, 1996). Firm characteristic 
1−jtFirm  is the one month lagged firm level measurement of the investment 
irreversibility and / or financial constraints. 1−tMWF is the one month lagged 
market wide factor describing the business cycle variable, proxied by the default 
spread – the spread between U.S. corporate bonds with Moody’s ratings of AAA 
and BAA. 
The part of returns unexplained by the asset pricing model in equation 
(4.2) is regressed against the accruals ratio in a cross sectional regression. The 
following regression helps assess the return predictability of the accruals ratio after 
controlling for risks: 
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in which *jtR  is the risk adjusted return of stock j at time t, measured as the sum of 
the constant and the residual terms from equation (4.2). 1, −tjACC  represents the 
accruals ratio of the individual firm. The vector of size, the Book-to-Market ratio, 
cumulative returns 1,, −tjmPR  for the periods of 1-3 month, 4-6 month, and 7-12 
month prior to the current month, and stock turnovers in equation (4.3) represents 
the control factors, being the size, value, momentum and liquidity that might also 
predict the cross section of stock returns. 
Size measures the market capitalisation at the end of each month. The 
Book-to-Market ratio is measured as the sum of the book value of common equity 
and balance sheet deferred tax, scaled by the market capitalisation. The accruals 
ratio is measured as in equation (4.1). The Book-to-Market ratio and the accruals 
ratio are measured in December of the previous year for the firm-month 
observations from July of the current year to June of the following year. There is a 
six month gap between (a) the time at which these ratios are measured and (b) the 
time at which stock returns are measured. This gap is to ensure the required 
accounting data needed to calculate the ratio is available to investors to consider 
their investment decisions. The turnover of the stocks listed on NYSE /AMEX 
stock exchanges is calculated as the trading volume divided by the outstanding 
number of shares. The turnover of the stocks listed on NASDAQ stock exchange is 
constructed in a similar manner. The construction of the key firm level variables 
described in this section is summarised in Panel B of Table 4.2. 
Similar to chapters 2 and 3, following Avramov and Chordia (2006) and 
Brennan et al. (1998), this chapter transforms the firm level variables in equation 
(4.3) by (1) lagging two months (size and turnovers), (2) taking natural logarithms 
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(size, turnovers and the Book-to-Market ratio), and (3) taking the deviation from 
the cross sectional mean (size, turnovers, the Book-to-Market ratio, the accrual 
ratio and past cumulative returns).  The transformation is described below: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑=−= 1 ,2,2, ln1ln_ i
n
titjtj Sizelag
n
SizelagdtransformeSize  (4.4) 
[ ] [ ]∑=−= 1 ,,, ln1ln_ i
n
titjtj BM
n
BMdtransformeBM  (4.5) 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑=−= 1 ,2,2, ln1ln_ i
n
titjtj Turnoverlag
n
TurnoverlagdtransformeTurnover   
 (4.6) 
in which tjSize , , tjBM , , and tjTurnover , are the measurements of size, Book-to-
Market, and turnover in NYSE / AMEX or NASDAQ for firm j at time t as 
described above. ( )txlag 2  refers to the two - month lag of  variable tx . 
[ ]yln refers to the natural log of variable y . n refers to the number of stocks in the 
sample at time t. tjdtransformeSize ,_ , tjdtransformeBM ,_ and 
tjdtransformeTurnover ,_  are the corresponding variables after the 
transformation and replace the role of  tjSize , , tjBM , , and tjTurnover , . These 
variables are lagged one month to become 1, −tjSize , 1, −tjBM , and 1, −tjTurnover in 
equation (4.3). 
The variables are lagged to avoid any biases by bid-ask effects and thin 
trading and are taken as natural logarithms to avoid skewness. Taking the deviation 
from the cross sectional mean implies that the average stock will have the firm 
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level characteristics at the average level (i.e. the deviation from the cross sectional 
mean is zero), and its expected return is driven solely by risks.  
The accruals ratio is not included in the original framework of Avramov 
and Chordia (2006). This chapter uses this variable to capture its return 
predictability, which is evident for the accruals premium. This approach uses the 
same logic that Avramov and Chordia (2006) capture, for example, the value 
premium. The accruals ratio in equation 4.3 is also transformed in the same manner 
as the Book-to-Market ratio: 
∑
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in which tjACC , is the accrual ratio assigned to firm j at time t as described above. 
The other symbols are defined as in equations (4.4) to (4.6). 
tjdtransformeACC ,_ is the corresponding variable after the transformation and 
replaces the role of  tjACC , in equation (4.3). This variable is lagged one month to 
become 1, −tjACC in equation (4.3). 
The statistical null hypothesis is whether the coefficient tACCc , attached to 
the accruals ratio is not significantly different from zero. This means the accruals 
ratio no longer predicts stock returns. It suggests that the accruals premium is 
explained when returns are adjusted for risks in stage one.  
H4.0: tACCc ,  = 0 
The coefficients and t-statistics are reported. As argued in chapters 2 and 3, 
the procedure employed in this chapter does not involve regressions with estimated 
independent variables. Therefore it is not subject to the error-in-variable problem 
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(Bauer et al., 2010 and Subrahmanyam, 2010). The t-statistics are corrected for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West (1987) 
method. 
4.4.3. Sample Description 
The sample includes all non-financial and non-utilities stocks listed in the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges. The sample period is between 
1972 and 2006. Similar to chapters 2 and 3, financial stocks are excluded as they 
have different asset structures compared to the non-financial stocks. Utilities stocks 
are excluded as utilities firms and potentially their investments are more strictly 
regulated than firms in other industries. The coverage period starts in 1972 due to 
the availability of the data to measure the net payout ratio. 
Only stocks with sufficient data to construct the variables used in this 
chapter are included. Following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), this chapter 
excludes the firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market 
value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile. According to Jegadeesh and 
Titman (2001), the purpose is to avoid our results to be driven by small and illiquid 
stocks or the bid-ask bounce. The sample has 490,025 firm-month observations and 
5,274 firms. The descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in Table 4.3. 
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
Panel A of Table 4.3 reports the statistics for the key variables used in the 
portfolio sorting methodology. All the variables, including the monthly returns, the 
accrual ratio, the depreciation charge ratio, and the net payout ratio are highly 
skewed. The correlations between the accrual ratio and (a) the depreciation charge 
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ratio, and (b) the net payout ratio are statistically significant, but the coefficient 
correlation is economically close to zero. The correlation between the depreciation 
charge ratio and the net payout ratio is both statistically and economically 
insignificant. The low correlation coefficients suggest that these variables reflect 
different economic forces. 
Panel B of Table 4.3 describes the statistics for the variables in the 
regressions of the Avramov and Chordia’s asset pricing framework. The sample is 
further constrained in that there should be data on stock returns, market 
capitalisation, and the Book-to-Market ratio in the current year and in the 36 
months prior to the current month. According to Avramov and Chordia (2006), this 
condition ensures that the estimation at the firm level is not noisy.  
An average stock has an average market capitalisation of $3.00 billion and 
an average Book-to-Market ratio of 0.76. The average cumulative returns of the 
past 2nd to 3rd month, 4th to 6th month, and 7th to 12th month are 2.67%, 3.95% and 
8.18% respectively.  All the variables in this panel show a significant level of 
skewness, with the mean values well above the median, which suggests that it is 
appropriate to transform them in accordance with Avramov and Chordia (2006) 
and Brennan et al. (1998) as described in section 4.4.2 (p. 236). 
4.5. The Results 
4.5.1. The Profitability of the Accruals based Trading Strategy 
Table 4.4 reports the returns to the ten equally weighted portfolios sorted 
by the accruals ratio and the long-short portfolios. All the accrual deciles earn 
positive and significant returns. The returns to the accrual deciles exhibit a 
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decreasing pattern from the portfolio with low to high accruals ratios. Furthermore, 
the return to the long-short portfolio is 0.54% per month and is statistically 
significant. The evidence suggests that stocks with low accruals outperform stocks 
with high accruals. 
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
Scenarios 1 and 2 in Table 4.14 provide evidence for the accruals premium 
using the Avramov and Chordia (2006) regression approach. In scenario 1, returns 
are not adjusted for risks in the stage one regression. The raw returns are regressed 
against the firm level variables similar to equation 4.3 (p. 238) in the stage two 
regression. The accruals coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that 
there is a negative and significant relationship between the cross section of stock 
returns and the accruals ratio. This result confirms the evidence so far that the 
accruals premium exists in the sample. The coefficients of the control variables 
also show the expected signs. The size coefficient is negative and significant (i.e. 
the return predictability of size), the Book-to-Market coefficient is positive and 
significant (i.e. the return predictability of the Book-to-Market ratio), while the 
cumulative return coefficients are positive and significant (i.e. the return 
predictability of cumulative returns). 
In scenario 2, the unconditional Fama and French three factor model is 
used to adjust returns for risks in stage one. The time series regression in stage one 
is described in equation 4.2 (p. 238) with the following 
constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . The risk adjusted returns are regressed 
against the firm level variables as described in equation 4.3. The adjusted R2 drops 
from 6.76% in scenario 1 to 3.45% in scenario 2, suggesting that the Fama and 
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French model in stage one helps better explain the return predictability of the 
variables in equation 4.3. However, the accruals coefficient is positive and 
significant. The evidence suggests that the accruals ratio predicts stock returns, or 
the accruals premium exists, even when returns are adjusted for risks using the 
unconditional Fama and French model. 
To conclude, there is evidence that the returns to the portfolios based on 
the accruals ratio increase from the portfolio with high accruals ratio to the 
portfolio with low accruals ratio. The return to the long-short portfolio is positive 
and significant. The accruals ratio is negatively related to the returns, including 
both raw returns and the risk adjusted returns using the unconditional Fama and 
French three factor model, at the firm level. The evidence supports hypothesis H4.1. 
The answer to the first research question, i.e. whether the accruals premium exists 
in the sample, is therefore affirmative.  
4.5.2. The Accruals Premium and the Investment Related Factors 
An interesting result from Scenario 2, Table 4.14, is that when controlling 
for risks using the unconditional Fama and French model, the Book-to-Market 
coefficient becomes statistically insignificant, while the accruals coefficient 
remains significant. This result differs from the result from Scenario 2, Table 2.10 
(p. 114) in chapter 2. In chapter 2, the Book-to-Market coefficient remains 
statistically significant when the firm level returns are adjusted for risks using the 
unconditional Fama and French model. The key difference between Scenario 2, 
Table 2.10, chapter 2 and Scenario 2, Table 4.14, chapter 4 is that the former 
includes an accruals variable in the stage two cross sectional regression. The result 
is consistent with Beaver (2002) and Desai et al. (2004) who advocate that the 
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accruals anomaly and the value anomaly are related. Beaver (2002, p.468) quotes 
the conclusion from McNichols (2000) that “aggregate accruals models that do not 
incorporate long-term earnings growth are potentially misspecified and can result 
in misleading inferences regarding earnings management” and concludes that “the 
mispricing of accruals may in fact be the “glamour stock” phenomenon … in 
disguise”. Desai et al. (2004) finds that the two anomalies are essentially one when 
and only when the value anomaly is defined using the operating cash flow to price 
ratio.  
Furthermore, the evidence in Scenario 2, Table 4.14 suggests that the value 
premium might be subsumed by the accruals premium, as the Book-to-Market 
coefficient becomes insignificant while the accruals coefficient remains significant. 
Several theoretical studies explain the value premium using firms’ investment 
characteristics54. Also, Beaver (2002) and several other studies55 observe that firm 
growth is reflected in accruals. Hence, the accruals premium is likely to be related 
to firms’ investments, which is a crucial factor of firm growth. Hypotheses H4.2 to 
H4.4 identify two factors, i.e. investment irreversibility and financial constraints, 
which affect firms’ investments. These factors therefore might influence the 
accruals premium. The relevant hypotheses are tested in the following sections. 
4.5.2.1. Investment Irreversibility, Financial Constraints and the Accruals 
Premium 
Hypothesis H4.2 hypothesises that the accruals premium is potentially 
explained by an explanation based on Wu et al. (2010). Along the lines of Wu et al. 
                                                     
54
 Examples include Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006), and Carlson et al. (2004). For a review 
on this topic, refer to section 2.2.4 (p. 54)  
55
 For example, Zhang (2007). For a review on this topic, refer to section 4.2.1 (p. 231). 
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(2010), firms with high investment irreversibility / high financial constraints have 
less flexibility in investing in response to aggregate shocks. Hence the accruals 
premium is expected to be higher among firms with high investment irreversibility 
/ financial constraints. Alternatively, if the accruals premium is driven by an 
explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009), the management of overvalued 
firms would hesitate investing to cater for investor sentiment when the financial 
resources are limited or the investment is difficult to be reversed. Hence the 
accruals premium is expected to be higher among firms with low investment 
irreversibility / financial constraints. 
Independent effects of investment irreversibility and financial constraints: 
This section reports the impact of investment irreversibility and financial 
constraints independently on the accruals premium. Table 4.5 presents the returns 
to the ten equally weighted portfolios sorted by the accruals ratio and the long-
short portfolios among firms with high vs. low investment irreversibility. Firms 
having the depreciation charge ratio in the bottom 30% are included in the 
subsample with high investment irreversibility. Firms having the depreciation 
charge ratio in the top 30% are included in the subsample with low investment 
irreversibility. In both subsamples, although the returns to the accruals ranked 
deciles do not strictly follow a monotonic pattern, they generally decline from the 
portfolios with low accruals to the portfolio with high accruals. 
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
The returns to the long-short portfolios are statistically significant in both 
subsamples. They are 0.30% per month and 0.65% per month in the subsamples 
with high and low investment irreversibility respectively. The higher return to the 
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accruals based trading strategy in the low investment irreversibility group lends 
support to the mispricing explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). This is 
because the management of overvalued firms might find it easier to invest to 
prolong the investor sentiment, and they are more likely to do so, when 
investments can be more easily reversed. Hypothesis H4.2 is rejected in the case of 
investment irreversibility. 
Similar to investment irreversibility, financial constraints also impose 
inflexibility to firms’ investments. Firms having the net payout ratio in the bottom 
30% are included in the subsample with high financial constraints. Firms having 
the net payout ratio in the top 30% are included in the subsample with low 
financial constraints. In Table 4.6, the return to the long-short portfolio is 0.57% 
per month and significant in the subsample with high financial constraints. It is 
only 0.24% per month and insignificant in the subsample with low financial 
constraints. The higher return to the accruals based trading strategy in the 
subsample with high financial constraints lends support to the explanation based on 
Wu et al. (2010). Hypothesis H4.2 is accepted in the case of financial constraints. 
[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
Collective effects of investment irreversibility and financial constraints: 
This section presents the performance of the accruals based trading 
strategy when both the inflexibility measures are binding or non-binding. In Table 
4.7, firms are first sorted by the depreciation charge ratio into the groups with high 
(bottom 30%) and low (top 30%) investment irreversibility. Within each group, 
firms are further sorted by the net payout ratio into the subsamples with high 
(bottom 30%) and low (top 30%) financial constraints. In each subsample by 
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investment irreversibility and financial constraints, returns to the ten equally 
weighted portfolios sorted by the accruals ratio and the long-short portfolios are 
reported. 
[Insert Table 4.7 about here] 
The returns to the long-short portfolios are positive and significant in two 
out of four scenarios when both the inflexibility measures are binding and when 
they are non-binding. At 0.73% per month and 0.80% per month, the returns to the 
long-short portfolios in the two subsamples with extreme inflexibility approximate 
each other. They are also more economically significant than those in the 
remaining two subsamples. 
As a robustness check, Table 4.8 presents evidence when the sample is 
dependently sorted by the net payout ratio and the depreciation charge ratio as the 
primary and the secondary sorting criteria respectively. Similar patterns to the 
results in Table 4.7 are observed. The returns to the long-short portfolios are 
statistically and economically significant only when firms are in the subsample 
with extreme inflexibility. When both criteria are binding, the return to the long-
short portfolio is 0.75% per month. When none of them is binding, it is 0.60% per 
month. The magnitude of the returns in these two extreme subsamples is close to 
the magnitude of the corresponding returns in the two extreme subsamples in Table 
4.7. The evidence suggests that hypothesis H4.2 is accepted in the case both 
investment irreversibility and financial constraints are high, and rejected when both 
of them are low. 
[Insert Table 4.8 about here] 
 250 
Discussion: 
Overall, the evidence in this section supports both a risk based explanation 
based on Wu et al. (2010) and a mispricing explanation based on Polk and 
Sapienza (2009). The explanation based on Wu et al. (2010) would predict the 
accruals premium to be more pronounced among firms with high inflexibility, i.e. 
high investment irreversibility and high financial constraints. This is because the 
high inflexibility would prevent firms from investing / disinvesting to respond to 
the aggregate shocks. Consequently, the difference in risks and returns between the 
stocks with high and low accruals is reinforced.  
A mispricing explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009) would 
predict the accruals premium to be more pronounced among firms with low 
inflexibility, i.e. low investment irreversibility and low financial constraints. This is 
because the low inflexibility would make managers of overvalued firms less 
hesitant in investing to cater for investor sentiment and prolong the overvaluation 
of stocks with high accruals. 
Independently, financial constraints appear to be related to a risk-based 
explanation based on Wu et al. (2010) and investment irreversibility, a mispricing 
one based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). Collectively, the former explanation is 
supported in the subsample when both the inflexibility criteria are binding, whereas 
the latter explanation is supported when none of the criteria is binding. Hence, the 
mispricing and risk based explanations appear to coexist. The evidence is 
consistent with the existing studies, including Khan (2008), Ng (2003) or Wu et al. 
(2010), where a risk based explanation cannot completely explain the accruals 
premium.  
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One caveat to the results in this section is that the returns to the deciles 
sorted by the accruals ratio in the subsamples do not follow a strict monotonic 
pattern. A possible reason is that both the investment based explanations might be 
more relevant to a brick-and-mortar industry where accruals reflect more 
information on firms’ investments. The industry level analysis is presented in 
section 4.5.2.3 (p. 257) below. Furthermore, given that firms’ investments vary 
over time, the following section examines the time varying pattern of the accruals 
premium and its relationship with the inflexibility measures. 
4.5.2.2. The Time Varying Pattern of the Accruals Premium 
Hypothesis H4.3 predicts that the accruals premium would systematically 
vary over time. In Table 4.4, the return to the long-short portfolio in the overall 
sample is regressed against the UP and DOWN dummy variables. The UP and 
DOWN coefficients from the regression show that the average return to the long-
short portfolio is 0.67% per month during economic upturns, and 0.36% per month 
during downturns. Hence there is some evidence that the accruals premium is more 
pronounced during economic upturns than during downturns. However, when 
regressing the return to the long-short portfolio against the UP dummy variable and 
a constant, the constant coefficient is not statistically significant. This evidence 
suggests that the difference between the return to the long-short portfolio during 
economic upturns versus downturns is not reliable. 
Independent effects of investment irreversibility and financial constraints: 
This section reports the impact of investment irreversibility and financial 
constraints independently on the cyclical pattern of the accruals premium. This 
chapter hypothesises that if the accruals premium can be explained by an 
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explanation based on Wu et al. (2010), the cyclical pattern would be more 
pronounced among firms with high investment irreversibility (H4.3). Alternatively, 
if it can be explained by an explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009), it 
would be more pronounced among firms with low investment irreversibility.  
Section 4.5.2.1 (p. 246) suggests that the accruals premium shows the 
mispricing characteristic in the relationship with investment irreversibility. Hence 
one could expect that the cyclical pattern is more pronounced in the subsample 
with low investment irreversibility. On the other hand, the accruals premium shows 
the risk based characteristic in the relationship with financial constraints. Hence the 
cyclical pattern is expected to be more pronounced in the subsample with high 
financial constraints. 
Table 4.5 presents the time varying pattern of the returns to the long-short 
portfolios in the subsamples with different levels of investment irreversibility. 
Among the stocks with high investment irreversibility, during economic upturns, 
the return to the long-short portfolio is 0.44% per month and is statistically 
significant. During downturns, it is only 0.12% per month and is statistically 
insignificant. The gap in the return to the long-short portfolio during economic 
upturns versus downturns is 0.32% per month; however, this difference is 
statistically insignificant. 
A similar pattern is also observed among the stocks with low investment 
irreversibility. During economic upturns, the return to the long-short portfolio is 
0.84% per month and is statistically significant. During downturns it is only 0.39% 
per month and is statistically insignificant. The gap of 0.45% per month during 
economic upturns versus during downturns is higher than the corresponding gap in 
 253 
the subsample with high investment irreversibility. However it is also statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, of the statistically significant returns to the long-short 
portfolios during economic upturns in the two subsamples, the one in the low 
investment irreversibility subsample is nearly twice that in the high investment 
irreversibility subsample. Overall, there is some evidence that the accruals 
premium is cyclical, stronger during economic upturns and weaker during 
downturns, in both the subsample with high and low investment irreversibility. The 
cyclical pattern appears to be more pronounced in the low investment 
irreversibility subsample. However the evidence is not statistically significant. 
Hypothesis H4.3 is accepted among firms with low investment irreversibility. 
The cyclical pattern of the returns to the long-short portfolios in high and 
low financial constraints is presented in Table 4.6. In the subsample with high 
financial constraints, the return to the long-short portfolio during economic upturns 
is 0.84% per month, and is statistically significant. During downturns, it is only 
0.23% per month and is insignificant. The gap in the return between economic 
upturns and downturns is 0.61% per month and statistically insignificant. In the 
subsample with low financial constraints, although the return to the long-short 
portfolio is higher during economic upturns than during downturns, it is 
statistically and economically insignificant in both states. The gap in the return 
between economic upturns and downturns is also statistically and economically 
insignificant. Overall, there is some tendency that the accruals premium is cyclical 
in the subsample with high financial constraints. However, similar to the evidence 
in the subsamples by investment irreversibility, the evidence in here is also 
statistically insignificant. Hypothesis H4.3 is accepted among firms with high 
financial constraints. 
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Collective effect of investment irreversibility and financial constraints: 
 Section 4.5.2.1 (p. 246) shows that the returns to the long-short portfolios 
are economically and statistically significant when both investment irreversibility 
and financial constraints are (a) binding or (b) non-binding. The former is 
consistent with an explanation based on Wu et al. (2010) whereas the latter is 
consistent with an explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). Hence, one 
would expect the cyclicality of the accruals premium in these extreme subsamples.  
Table 4.7 presents the time varying pattern of the returns to the long-short 
portfolios in the subsamples of firms dependently sorted by investment 
irreversibility as the primary criterion and financial constraints as the secondary 
criterion. In the subsample of firms with high investment irreversibility – high 
financial constraints, the return to the long-short portfolio during economic upturns 
is 1.24% per month and statistically significant. It is only 0.09% per month and 
insignificant during downturns.  
The return to the long-short portfolio in the subsample of firms with low 
investment irreversibility – low financial constraints exhibits a similar pattern. The 
return is 1.06% per month and statistically significant during economic upturns, but 
only 0.46% per month and insignificant during downturns. The gap in the return 
during economic upturns versus downturns in this subsample is statistically 
insignificant. In the remaining two subsamples where only one inflexibility 
criterion is binding, the returns to the long-short portfolio are mostly statistically 
and economically insignificant. 
Table 4.8 provides the robustness test for the results in Table 4.7. Stocks 
are dependently sorted into subsamples by financial constraints as the primary 
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criterion and investment irreversibility as the secondary criterion. The results 
mirror those from Table 4.7. The return to the long-short portfolio during economic 
upturns in the subsample with high financial constraints – high investment 
irreversibility is 1.29% per month and statistically significant. It is only 0.06% per 
month and insignificant during downturns. The gap in the return to the long-short 
portfolio between economic upturns versus downturns is also statistically 
significant.  
The return pattern in the subsample of firms with low financial constraints 
– low investment irreversibility is less cyclical than in the corresponding 
subsample in Table 4.7. The return to the long-short portfolio during economic 
upturns is weakly significant. None of the returns to the long-short portfolios in the 
remaining subsamples with one binding inflexibility condition is statistically 
significant. The evidence suggests that hypothesis H4.3 is accepted in the subsample 
of firms with both binding and non-binding investment irreversibility and financial 
constraints. 
Discussion: 
When both investment irreversibility and financial constraints are binding, 
the return to the long-short portfolio is statistically and economically significant 
during economic upturns, whereas it is insignificant during downturns. The gap in 
the return during economic upturns versus downturns is also statistically 
significant. At the other end of the inflexibility spectrum when none of the 
inflexibility measures is binding, there is some weak evidence of a cyclical pattern 
of the return to the long-short portfolio. The return during economic upturns is 
positive and significant, while smaller and insignificant during downturns. 
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However, the gap in the return between economic upturns and downturns is 
statistically insignificant. 
Overall, the evidence in this section lends strong support to hypothesis H4.3 
when both investment irreversibility and financial constraints are binding. The 
combination of both investment irreversibility and financial constraints means that 
during downturns, firms tend to cut working capital investments to below the 
optimal level when responding to the changing discount rate, as fixed capital 
investment is difficult to reverse (Caggese, 2007). Stocks with low accruals are 
therefore less rewarded, hence the weakening return to the long-short portfolio 
during downturns. The evidence support an investment based explanation for the 
accruals premium based on Wu et al. (2010). Hypothesis H4.3 only receives weak 
support when none of the inflexibility conditions is binding. Therefore, there is 
only weak evidence that the accruals premium is due to managers of overvalued 
firms investing to prolong the overvaluation along the lines of Polk and Sapienza 
(2009). When only one inflexibility measure is imposed the results also weakly 
support hypothesis H4.3. The supporting evidence among firms with low investment 
irreversibility lends support to the explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
In addition, the supporting evidence among firms with high financial constraints 
lends support to an explanation based on Wu et al. (2010). 
The time varying characteristic analysed in this section is consistent with 
the evidence in Wu et al. (2010) that the accruals premium can be predicted using 
the variance risk premium, and to a lesser extent, using the widely used variables 
(i.e. the term spread, default spread and a derivation of the Treasury bill rate). Ali 
and Gurun (2009), Gerard et al. (2009), and Livnat and Petrovits (2009) find that 
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the accruals premium varies with investor sentiment. The analysis in this section 
brings together the time varying characteristic of the accruals premium from both a 
risk based and a mispricing perspective. The results have some implications to 
practitioners who attempt to deploy the accruals based trading strategy. Imposing 
both the inflexibility conditions on the sample and timing the strategy can 
considerably improve the performance. Wrong timing, on the other hand, can cost 
investors dearly as the accruals based trading strategy generates a return close to 
zero during downturns.  
4.5.2.3. The Accruals Premium in Different Industries 
The hypotheses in this chapter are built around the relationship between 
the impacts of firms’ investment and financing constraints on the returns to the 
accruals based trading strategy. The relationship might vary across the industries as 
firms in different industries tend to face constraints in their investment and 
financing environment to different extents. This section provides evidence for 
hypothesis H4.4 that the patterns of the accruals premium observed so far are more 
pronounced in the manufacturing industry in which firms’ investments in fixed and 
working capital plays a more crucial role than in other industries. 
Table 4.9 reports the return to the portfolios sorted by the accruals ratio 
and to the long-short portfolios in different industries. Firms are classified into 
industries using the one-digit SIC industries (for detailed information on the 
industries, refer to Appendix 4.1, p. 272). The returns to the long-short portfolios 
are positive and statistically significant only in the two manufacturing industries 
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(SIC codes no. 2 and 3). In the other industries it is non-existent56. The evidence is 
consistent with the perspective that investments in fixed capital and working 
capital are related to the accruals premium, given that they are likely to affect the 
manufacturing industries more than the other industries. 
[Insert Table 4.9 about here] 
Furthermore, the result supplements the findings in Zhang (2007) that the 
accruals premium increases monotonically with the covariance between the 
accruals and the employment growth at two-digit SIC industry level. In the sample 
examined in this chapter, the accruals premium is only statistically and 
economically significant among firms in the manufacturing industries, which 
according to Zhang (2007) belong to the highest covariance group. Along the lines 
of Zhang (2007), accruals in the manufacturing firms reflect investments in 
working capital and are more likely to reflect information about firms’ investments 
than accruals in the other industries. Hence it is likely that the accruals premium is 
affected by the factors that affect firms’ investments, including investment 
irreversibility and financial constraints. 
The accruals premium in different industries in the subsamples of firms by 
investment irreversibility is reported in Table 4.10. In both panels, the returns to 
the long-short portfolios are statistically significant only in the manufacturing 
industries, consistent with the evidence in Table 4.9. Furthermore, the returns to the 
long-short portfolios in these two manufacturing industries are higher among firms 
                                                     
56
 One exception is industry group 7, i.e. personal services, in which the return to the 
accruals based trading strategy is weakly significant at 0.43% per month. However, the 
returns of the accrual quintiles are not close to a monotonic pattern but considerably 
fluctuate.  
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with low investment irreversibility in panel B than among firms with high 
investment irreversibility in panel A (0.66% per month and 0.93% per month, 
compared with 0.34% per month and 0.39% per month). The pattern observed in 
the overall sample reported in Table 4.5 and analysed in section 4.5.2.1 (p. 246) 
therefore also concentrates in the manufacturing industries. 
[Insert Table 4.10 about here] 
 Table 4.11 shows that the pattern of the returns to the long-short portfolios 
in the subsamples of firms by financial constraints reported in Table 4.6 and 
analysed in section 4.5.2.1 (p. 246) concentrates in the heavy manufacturing 
industry (SIC code no.3). In the subsample with high financial constraints (panel 
A), the only statistically significant return to the long-short portfolio is 0.92% per 
month in the heavy industry. In the subsample with low financial constraints (panel 
B), the returns are mostly statistically insignificant57. The pattern observed in Table 
4.6 that the return to the long-short portfolio is higher among firms with high 
financial constraints than that among firms with low financial constraints also 
appears to concentrate on the heavy manufacturing industry. While it is 0.92% per 
month and significant in the subsample with high financial constraints (panel A), it 
is 0.18% per month and insignificant in the subsample with low financial 
constraints (panel B). 
[Insert Table 4.11 about here] 
                                                     
57
 The only exception is the light manufacturing industry (SIC code no. 2), with the weakly 
significant return of 0.28% per month. 
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 The patterns of the returns to the long-short portfolios in the subsamples 
where both the investment and the financing inflexibility are binding / non-binding, 
observed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 and analysed in section 4.5.2.1 (p. 246) also 
concentrate on the heavy manufacturing industry. In both Tables 4.12 and 4.13, the 
returns to the long-short portfolios in this industry are the only statistically 
significant ones among those in all of the industries.  
[Insert Table 4.12 about here] 
[Insert Table 4.13 about here] 
Finally, the time varying patterns of the returns to the long-short portfolios 
in the sample and subsamples by different inflexibility measures are mirrored in the 
manufacturing industries. In Table 4.9, the gap in the return during economic 
upturns versus downturns in the overall sample is positive and significant only in 
the light manufacturing industry. Only the returns during economic upturns of the 
two manufacturing industries are positive and significant. 
In Table 4.10, the cyclicality appears to be more pronounced in the low 
investment irreversibility subsample for the two manufacturing industries58. 
However, none of the gaps is statistically significant. The returns during economic 
upturns in the two manufacturing industries are also the only positive and 
significant ones. In Table 4.11, the cyclicality is more pronounced in the subsample 
                                                     
58
 The return is 1.10% per month during economic upturns versus 0.11% per month during 
downturns for the light industry and 1.05% per month during economic upturns versus 
0.78% per month during downturns for the heavy industry in the low investment 
irreversibility subsample. 
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with high financial constraints for the heavy industry59 (1.31% per month during 
economic upturns versus 0.44% per month during downturns, and the gap is 
statistically significant). The return during economic upturns in the heavy industry 
is also the most economically significant and statistically significant60 in the 
subsample with high financial constraints.  
Lastly, in Tables 4.12 and 4.13, the return to the long-short portfolio of the 
heavy industry appears to be cyclical in the extreme inflexibility subsamples. 
However, none of the gaps in the return during economic upturns versus downturns 
is statistically significant. The heavy industry61 is also the only industry that has the 
significant returns to the long-short portfolios, both economically and statistically, 
during economic upturns.  
Overall, the evidence supports hypothesis H4.4 and suggests that the 
evidence to support both (a) an explanation based on Wu et al. (2010), and (b) an 
explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009) presented in sections 4.5.2.1 (p. 
246) and 4.5.2.2 (p. 251) concentrate on the manufacturing industries. According to 
Zhang (2007), the accruals of the manufacturing industries reflect more 
information on firms’ investments than those of the other industries. Therefore the 
                                                     
59
 For the light industry, although the gap in the returns during economic upturns and 
downturns is significant in the subsample with low financial constraints, its magnitude 
approximates that in the subsample with high financial constraints. 
60
 The return during economic upturns of the light industry in the subsample with high 
financial constraints is also weakly statistically significant; however the returns to the 
portfolios sorted by the accruals ratio do not follow a monotonic pattern. 
61
 The returns of the light industry also show the cyclical pattern, although none of them is 
statistically significant. 
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evidence reinforces the investment based explanations, whether risk based or 
mispricing, in explaining the accruals premium.  
4.5.3. The Accruals Premium – Risk based vs. Mispricing explanations 
The evidence so far lends support to both the risk based explanation based 
on Wu et al. (2010) and the mispricing explanation based on Polk and Sapienza 
(2009), both of which relate the accruals premium to firms’ investments. This 
section examines whether the cross section of the returns to stocks of firms with 
low and high accruals can be explained by the risk based explanation or the 
mispricing explanation. If the risk based explanation based on Wu et al. (2010) 
alone can explain the accruals premium, it would be explained by an asset pricing 
model that incorporates the relevant fundamental factors, including firms’ 
investment irreversibility and their financial constraints, and the business cycle 
state (hypothesis H4.5). 
Scenario 3 in Table 4.14 adjusts returns for risks using the conditional 
Fama and French model in which the betas are conditioned on the financial 
constraints variable (the net payout ratio). In scenario 4, the betas are conditioned 
on the investments irreversibility variable (the depreciation charge ratio). The time 
series regressions in stage one are described in equation 4.2 (p. 238) with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . The risk adjusted returns are regressed against the 
firm level variables as described in equation 4.3 (p. 238). The accruals coefficients 
in both scenarios of -0.81 and -0.99 are significant, thus suggesting that the 
accruals ratio negatively predicts stock returns. The evidence suggests that the 
accruals premium exists even when accounting for risks using the Fama and French 
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model supplemented with the information about firms’ financial constraints or 
investment irreversibility. 
[Insert Table 4.14 about here] 
In scenario 5, returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model in which the betas are conditioned on the business cycle variable. 
The time series regressions in stage one are described in equation 4.2 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . The risk adjusted returns are regressed against the 
firm level variables as described in equation 4.3. The accruals coefficient of -1.14 
remains significant, suggesting that the accruals ratio continues to negatively 
predict stock returns. The accruals premium continues to exist when returns are 
adjusted for risks using the Fama and French model supplemented with the 
business cycle information. 
In scenarios 6, 7 and 8, the Fama and French model is conditioned on both 
the business cycle and the firm level variables – financial constraints, investment 
irreversibility, and both, respectively. The stage one regression is described by 
equation 4.2 in its full version. The accruals coefficients of -0.97, -1.18, and -1.02 
respectively, are significant. The evidence suggests that the accruals ratio continues 
to negatively predict stock returns, and hence the accruals premium continues to 
exist. The Fama and French model used to adjust returns for risks includes all the 
information identified as relevant. The persistence of the accruals premium 
suggests that a risk based mechanism might not be solely responsible for it. 
Both the risk based and mispricing explanations for the accruals premium 
in this chapter predict that the premium should be more pronounced during 
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economic upturns than during downturns. Scenario 9 tests if the accruals premium 
exists after removing the cyclical component of stock returns. Returns are adjusted 
for the cyclical pattern using the four widely used variables, being the term spread, 
the default spread, the aggregate dividend yield, and the short term Treasury bill 
rate62. The raw individual stock returns are adjusted for the cyclicality in the 
following OLS time series regression: 
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in which 30tR is the 30 day T bill rate in % at time t, tDef is the default spread in % 
between the returns of U.S. corporate bonds rated BAA and AAA, at time t. 
tTerm is the term spread in % between the returns of 10 year Treasury bonds and 1 
year Treasury bonds. tDy is the dividend yield of the stocks listed in NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ, calculated as ldye×100 where ldy is the natural log of the 
imputed dividend yield taken from Jacob Boudoukh’s data for the paper Boudoukh 
et al. (2007). In Boudoukh’s data, ldy is the natural log of the imputed dividend 
yield calculated from value weighted returns, including and excluding 
distributions, for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, taken from CRSP. 
 The part of returns unexplained by the four business cycle variables from 
equation 4.8 is measured as the sum of the constant and the residual terms. It is 
used as the dependent variable in the cross sectional OLS regression 4.3. The 
                                                     
62
 Examples of studies using these variables to examine the cyclical behaviour of asset 
pricing anomalies are Petkova and Zhang (2005) and Chordia and Shivakuma (2002) on the 
value anomaly and the momentum anomaly respectively. 
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regression tests whether the accruals ratio continues to predict returns, or the 
accruals anomaly exists, after the returns are adjusted for cyclicality. The accruals 
coefficient becomes statistically insignificant with the t-statistic of 0.20. Its 
magnitude is only about 25% of that in other scenarios. Hence, there is no longer a 
trace of the return predictability of the accruals ratio. The evidence confirms the 
cyclicality of the accruals premium documented so far in this chapter.  
To summarise, the accruals ratio continues to predict returns, or the 
accruals premium continues to exist, when returns are adjusted for risks using the 
Fama and French model, unconditional or conditional on the firm level variables 
and the business cycle variable. This evidence suggests that a risk based 
explanation might not be the responsible sole factor for the accruals premium. 
Hypothesis H4.5 is therefore rejected. This finding is also consistent with the 
existing literature that several asset pricing models can only partially explain the 
accruals premium. This chapter argues that the cyclicality of the accruals premium 
results from both the risk based explanation based on Wu et al. (2010) and the 
mispricing explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). Therefore, that the 
accruals ratio ceases to predict stock returns when removing their cyclicality might 
be evident for both of these explanations.  
4.6. Conclusions 
This chapter examines the impact of firms’ investments on the profitability 
of the accruals based trading strategy. Consistent with the literature, this chapter 
finds that the accruals based trading strategy is profitable in the sample examined. 
The chapter reports a raw accruals premium of 0.54% per month. 
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The literature documents the connection between the accruals premium 
and firms’ investments. This chapter extends the literature by examining the impact 
of the firm level forces that prohibit firms from investing at the optimal level on the 
accruals premium. The analysis is taken from the perspective that firms’ accruals 
reflect their investments in working capital, as suggested by Fairfield et al. (2003), 
Zhang (2007), and Wu et al. (2010). 
This chapter finds that the accruals premium is more pronounced among 
firms with high financial constraints or low investment irreversibility. The former 
is consistent with an explanation based on Wu et al. (2010) in which, due to the 
limited financial resources, firms have less flexibility in investing at the optimal 
level. The latter is consistent with an explanation based on Polk and Sapienza 
(2009) in which the management of overvalued firms invests to cater for investor 
sentiment and prolong the overvaluation.  
Furthermore, both investment irreversibility and financial constraints 
reflect financial inflexibility and may reinforce the impact of each other. This 
chapter finds that the accruals premium is most pronounced at the two extremes of 
the inflexibility spectrum. The evidence at the high end of the spectrum supports 
the explanation based on Wu et al. (2010), whereas the evidence at the low end 
supports the explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
This chapter finds some weak evidence that the accruals premium is more 
pronounced during economic upturns among firms with low investment 
irreversibility or high financial constraints. When taking into account both 
inflexibility measures, the evidence is strong for firms at the high end of the 
inflexibility spectrum, supporting the explanation based on Wu et al. (2010). The 
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evidence at the low end, which would support the explanation based on Polk and 
Sapienza (2009), is weak. 
This chapter also finds that the patterns in the relationship between the 
inflexibility measures and the accruals premium so far are concentrated in the 
manufacturing industries, especially the heavy industry. According to Zhang 
(2007), the accruals of the manufacturing industries reflect more information on 
firms’ investments than those of the other industries. This evidence reinforces the 
perspective that the accruals premium is related to firms’ investments. 
Finally, when returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French 
model, both unconditional and conditional on the business cycle and the 
inflexibility measures, the accruals ratio continues to predict stock returns. This 
relationship is evident for the profitability of the accruals based trading strategy. 
Hence, the risk-return relationship might not be solely responsible for the accruals 
premium. When isolating the cyclicality in stock returns, the accruals ratio ceases 
to predict stock returns, or the accruals premium completely disappears. Any 
explanation for the accruals premium should therefore be able to explain its 
cyclical nature. 
Implications 
The findings in this chapter have several implications. This chapter reports 
that a risk-return relationship cannot fully explain the pattern of the accruals 
premium. Hence, future stock returns can be predicted using the accruals ratio even 
when accounting for risks. Several patterns of the accruals premium can be 
explained by the management’s behaviour, i.e. catering for investor sentiment by 
means of investing (Polk and Sapienza, 2009). In the language of the market 
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efficiency literature, the market is not fully efficient with regards to the information 
about the accruals ratio. Furthermore, the profitability of the accruals based trading 
strategy is affected by firms’ investment irreversibility and their financial 
constraints. It generally suggests that the understanding of corporate finance can 
help extend the understanding of the securities markets. 
Finally, investors would benefit from the findings in this chapter. Imposing 
both investment and financing inflexibility conditions on the sample and correctly 
timing the strategy can considerably improve the performance of the accruals based 
trading strategy. Investors seeking to deploy this strategy would benefit from 
pursuing it among firms that are either highly inflexible or highly flexible in 
investment and financing. They also benefit from pursuing the strategy during 
economic upturns among firms that are highly inflexible. Wrong timing, on the 
other hand, can cost investors dearly as the accruals based trading strategy can 
generate a return close to zero. 
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Appendix 4.1: One Digit SIC Industry Classification 
 
SIC code Industry name Example 
0 Agriculture, forestry, fisheries Crops, livestock, fishing, hunting, trapping 
1 Mining & construction Coal mining, building construction 
2 Light manufacturing industry Textile, food, paper manufacturing 
3 Heavy manufacturing industry Leather, metal, industrial machineries 
4 Transportation, 
communication & utilities 
Railroad, passenger transportation, 
warehousing, communication, electric, gas 
5 Wholesale and retail trades Wholesale of durables / non-durables, food 
stores, automotive dealers 
6 Financial services Banks, security brokers / dealers 
7 Personal services Hotels, amusement and recreation services 
8 Business services Legal, engineering, accounting services 
9 Public administration Legislative government, police, justice 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Hypotheses 
The hypotheses examined in chapter 4 are summarised below: 
 
 WZZ P&S 
H4.1 Accept Accept 
H4.2 Accept Reject 
H4.3 Accept Accept 
H4.4 Accept Reject 
H4.5 Accept Reject 
 
 WZZ represents the explanation that the accruals premium is due to an 
investment based factor along the lines of Wu et al. (2010). P&S represents the 
explanation that the accruals premium is due to managers investing to cater 
investor sentiment, or the catering theory, along the lines of Polk and Sapienza 
(2009). 
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Table 4.2: Construction of Key Variables 
The key variables used in chapter 4 are constructed as follows: 
A. Key variables in portfolio sorting 
 
Key variables Construction 
Accruals ratio The total accruals used in Sloan (1996), measured as changes in 
non-cash current assets minus changes in current liabilities 
(excluding short term debts and tax payable) and depreciation, 
scaled by average total assets (described in equation 4.1, p. 238). 
Depreciation charge 
ratio 
The ratio of depreciation expense during the year to the 
beginning of the year net fixed assets. 
Net payout ratio Dividends plus repurchases minus share issuance, scaled by the 
net incomes. 
 
B. Key variables in the regression of the Avramov and Chordia (2006) framework 
The construction of these variables is described in Panel B of Table 2.2 (p. 
103). 
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Table 4.3: Sample Description 
Table 4.3 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample of non-financial, non-
utilities firms listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) 
during the period from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate 
the accrual ratio, the net payout ratio and the depreciation charge ratio in December of the 
previous year are considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or 
the market value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. 
 
 Mean Median Standard deviation 
A – Key variables in portfolio sorting    
Returns (%) 1.37 0.82 10.56 
Accruals ratio -2.28 -2.96 8.35 
Depreciation charge ratio 35.09 15.75 571.53 
Net payout ratio 4.40 18.25 1,133.21 
Correlation    
Accruals & Dep. Charge 0.008   
p-value 0%   
Accruals & Net payout -0.027   
p-value 0%   
Dep. Charge & Net payout -0.001   
p-value 72%   
    
B – Key variables in regressions    
Market capitalisation ($ billion) 3.00 0.54 9.45 
Book-to-Market ratio 0.76 0.66 0.51 
Cumulative returns, months 2 to 3 (%) 2.67 1.94 13.23 
Cumulative returns, months 4 to 6 (%) 3.95 2.85 16.29 
Cumulative returns, months 7 to 12 (%) 8.18 5.74 24.26 
Turnover, NYSE and AMEX (%) 16.04 11.30 16.06 
Turnover, NASDAQ (%) 6.86 5.30 6.00 
 
A. Key variables in portfolio sorting 
Panel A reports the statistics for the key variables used in the portfolio sorting 
methodology. Returns measure the average monthly stock returns. The construction of the 
other variables is described in Panel A of Table 4.2. Panel A also reports the correlation 
coefficients among these variables, and the two tailed p-value to test whether the 
correlation coefficients are different from zero. 
B. Key variables in the regression of the Avramov and Chordia (2006) framework 
Panel B describes the statistics for the variables used in the regression of the 
Avramov and Chordia (2006) asset pricing framework. The sample is further constrained in 
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that there should be data on stock returns, market capitalisation, and the Book-to-Market 
ratio in the current year and in the 36 months prior to the current month. The construction 
of the variables is described in Panel B of Table 2.2.  
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Table 4.4: Returns to the Accruals based Trading Strategy 
Table 4.4 presents the returns to the equally weighted portfolios of stocks sorted 
by the value of the accruals ratio as of 31st December of year t-1 in ascending order. Ten 
portfolios with equal numbers of stocks are composed and positions (long and short) are 
taken at the beginning of July of year t and held until June of year t+1. L-H represents the 
return to the portfolio that goes long in the stocks with low accruals (i.e. the portfolio with 
the lowest ranking in the accruals ratio) and short in the stocks with high accruals (i.e. the 
portfolio with the highest ranking in the accruals ratio).  
The table presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the time 
horizon and during economic upturns and downturns. The sample includes non-financial, 
non-utilities firms listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) 
during the period from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate 
the accrual ratio, the net payout ratio and the depreciation charge ratio in December the 
previous year are considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or 
the market value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. 
 All Upturn Downturn 
Low           1.56            1.20            2.03  
            5.08             3.19             3.94  
2           1.50            1.21            1.88  
            5.60             3.71             4.31  
3           1.47            1.12            1.91  
            5.63             3.62             4.33  
4           1.45            1.15            1.83  
            5.65             3.74             4.28  
5           1.38            1.01            1.84  
            5.28             3.24             4.17  
6           1.46            1.12            1.89  
            5.49             3.51             4.08  
7           1.33            1.01            1.76  
            5.03             3.03             4.01  
8           1.28            0.94            1.71  
            4.62             2.72             3.61  
9           1.27            0.84            1.81  
            4.16             2.41             3.66  
High           1.03            0.53            1.67  
            2.89             1.20             2.78  
L - H           0.54            0.67            0.36  
            4.29             3.99             1.92  
 ***  ***  ** 
   Up-Down   
 t            1.27   
 p            0.20   
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The construction of the accruals ratio is described in Table 4.2. To classify the 
time horizon into economic upturns and downturns, this chapter uses the Chicago Fed 
National Activity Index, a weighted average of 85 existing monthly national economic 
indicators with the mean of zero and the standard deviation of one. A positive index 
indicates that growth is above the trend, and a negative index indicates that growth is below 
the trend. Therefore we assign positive index to economic upturns and negative index to 
downturns. The dummy variable UP is assigned the value of 1 if the index is positive, and 
zero otherwise. The dummy variable DOWN is assigned the value of 1 if the index is 
negative, and zero otherwise.  
This chapter measures the return to the long-short portfolio during economic 
upturns and downturns by regressing it against the UP and DOWN dummy variables. The 
coefficient attached to the UP (DOWN) variable gives the average returns to the accruals 
based trading strategy during economic upturns (downturns). The return is then regressed 
against the UP dummy variable and a constant. The coefficient attached to the UP dummy 
variable measures the difference between the return to the long-short portfolio during 
economic upturns versus downturns.  
The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, and the lines not in bold are the 
associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different from zero. The table also 
reports the two tailed t-statistic and p-value to test whether the return to the long-short 
portfolio is different during upturns vs. downturns. The t-statistics are corrected for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West (1987) method. *, ** 
and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.5: Investment Irreversibility and the Accruals based Trading Strategy  
Table 4.5 presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the time 
horizon and during economic upturns and downturns in the subsamples with high versus 
low investment irreversibility (IIR). The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms 
listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) during the period 
from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate the accrual ratio, the 
net payout ratio and the depreciation charge ratio in December of the previous year are 
considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value 
falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded.  
 
 High IIR    Low IIR   
 All Up Down All Up Down 
Low 1.45 1.13 1.85 1.69 1.29 2.22 
 5.25 3.38 3.90 4.56 2.83 3.51 
2 1.41 1.07 1.86 1.59 1.22 2.07 
 5.73 3.50 4.35 4.55 2.96 3.64 
3 1.44 1.06 1.92 1.62 1.29 2.04 
 5.59 3.45 4.21 4.85 3.25 3.63 
4 1.35 1.03 1.75 1.45 1.19 1.80 
 5.36 3.38 4.25 4.39 3.06 3.31 
5 1.30 0.95 1.75 1.51 1.11 2.04 
 5.26 3.15 4.32 4.45 2.67 3.73 
6 1.44 1.11 1.87 1.49 1.13 1.94 
 5.59 3.63 4.13 4.31 2.68 3.29 
7 1.40 1.06 1.83 1.35 1.03 1.77 
 5.36 3.40 4.04 3.86 2.31 3.15 
8 1.17 0.82 1.61 1.17 0.69 1.78 
 4.63 2.66 3.69 3.25 1.62 3.14 
9 1.30 0.90 1.81 1.12 0.68 1.69 
 4.98 2.67 4.12 3.05 1.59 2.78 
High 1.15 0.69 1.74 1.05 0.44 1.83 
 3.76 1.79 3.33 2.48 0.83 2.65 
L-H 0.30 0.44 0.12 0.65 0.84 0.39 
 1.96 2.32 0.46 3.28 2.95 1.29 
 ** **  *** ***  
  Up-Down   Up-Down  
 t 1.07  t 1.06  
 p 0.29  p 0.29  
       
The construction of the depreciation charge ratio, the proxy for investment 
irreversibility (IIR) is described in Table 4.2. Firms having the depreciation charge ratio in 
the bottom 30% are included in the subsample with high investment irreversibility. Firms 
having the depreciation charge ratio in the top 30% are included in the subsample with low 
investment irreversibility. Table 4.4 describes the portfolio formation, the construction of 
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the UP and DOWN dummy variables, and the procedure to estimate the average return to 
the long-short portfolio during economic upturns and downturns.  
The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not in bold are 
the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different from zero. The table 
also reports the two tailed t-statistic and p-value to test whether the returns to the long-short 
portfolios in the subsamples by investment irreversibility are different during upturns vs. 
downturns. The t-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
following the Newey and West (1987) method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.6: Financial Constraints and the Accruals based Trading Strategy 
Table 4.6 presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the time 
horizon and during economic upturns and downturns in the subsamples with high versus 
low financial constraints (FC). The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed 
in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) during the period from 
1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate the accrual ratio, the net 
payout ratio and the depreciation charge ratio in December of the previous year are 
considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value 
falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. 
 High FC   Low FC   
 All Up Down All Up Down 
Low 1.38 0.96 1.89 1.50 1.14 1.94 
 4.14 2.22 3.57 5.20 3.38 3.94 
2 1.50 1.10 2.00 1.33 1.03 1.70 
 4.49 2.71 3.60 5.10 3.33 4.20 
3 1.37 1.01 1.82 1.54 1.26 1.90 
 4.23 2.47 3.26 6.25 4.32 4.44 
4 1.40 1.13 1.74 1.35 0.95 1.86 
 4.26 2.83 3.22 5.62 3.28 4.79 
5 1.44 1.15 1.81 1.34 0.94 1.85 
 4.40 2.78 3.27 5.50 3.11 4.44 
6 1.32 1.11 1.58 1.47 1.07 1.96 
 3.92 2.74 2.94 5.76 3.74 4.46 
7 1.40 1.03 1.85 1.35 0.97 1.81 
 4.01 2.31 3.45 5.62 3.44 4.28 
8 1.11 0.56 1.81 1.23 0.87 1.69 
 3.05 1.27 3.07 5.04 2.93 4.02 
9 1.15 0.66 1.76 1.27 0.84 1.81 
 3.00 1.49 2.78 4.83 2.67 3.99 
High 0.81 0.12 1.66 1.26 0.86 1.76 
 1.88 0.23 2.31 4.26 2.39 3.64 
L-H 0.57 0.84 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.17 
 2.70 3.29 0.66 1.62 1.57 0.78 
 *** ***     
  Up-Down   Up-Down  
 t 1.43  t 0.38  
 p 0.15  p 0.71  
       
The construction of the net payout ratio, the proxy for financial constraints (FC), is 
described in Table 4.2. Firms having the net payout ratio in the bottom 30% are included in 
the subsample with high financial constraints. Firms having the net payout ratio in the top 
30% are included in the subsample with low financial constraints. Table 4.4 describes the 
portfolio formation, the construction of the UP and DOWN dummy variables, and the 
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procedure to estimate the average return to the long-short portfolio during economic 
upturns and downturns.  
The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not in bold are 
the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different from zero. The table 
also reports the two tailed t-statistic and p-value to test whether the returns to the long-short 
portfolios in the subsamples by financial constraints are different during upturns vs. 
downturns. The t-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
following the Newey and West (1987) method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.7: Investment Irreversibility and Financial Constraints and the Accruals based Trading Strategy 
 
 High IIR – High FC High IIR – Low FC Low IIR – High FC Low IIR – Low FC 
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low 1.56 1.41 1.75 1.26 0.90 1.71 1.42 0.87 2.10 2.05 1.70 2.50 
 4.42 3.39 2.78 4.47 2.83 3.56 3.35 1.58 3.26 5.59 3.79 3.85 
2 1.55 1.29 1.88 1.48 1.10 1.98 1.62 1.38 1.92 1.24 0.85 1.73 
 4.93 2.95 3.83 6.16 3.95 5.21 3.94 2.85 2.79 3.31 2.06 2.83 
3 1.29 0.95 1.71 1.41 1.03 1.90 1.66 1.37 2.01 1.56 1.28 1.92 
 4.13 2.53 3.24 5.45 3.62 4.26 4.01 2.74 3.15 4.21 3.00 3.18 
4 1.56 1.32 1.86 1.34 0.77 2.08 1.28 0.80 1.88 1.52 1.18 1.95 
 4.81 3.23 3.14 5.31 2.50 4.83 2.98 1.49 2.69 4.84 3.13 3.85 
5 1.31 0.95 1.77 1.24 0.89 1.69 1.45 1.05 1.96 1.72 0.99 2.64 
 4.13 2.28 3.46 4.84 3.10 3.88 3.45 2.01 2.83 5.22 2.73 4.71 
6 1.70 1.33 2.16 1.26 0.78 1.87 1.40 1.16 1.69 1.60 1.33 1.95 
 5.27 3.53 4.15 4.98 2.98 4.07 3.13 2.08 2.41 5.00 3.38 3.57 
7 1.63 1.25 2.10 1.29 1.10 1.54 1.06 0.52 1.73 1.49 1.17 1.90 
 5.14 3.03 4.14 5.00 3.57 3.70 2.46 1.00 2.70 4.41 2.99 3.25 
8 1.22 0.91 1.61 1.28 0.81 1.88 1.29 0.79 1.92 1.15 0.71 1.71 
 3.70 2.20 2.99 5.02 2.85 3.96 2.98 1.68 2.67 3.20 1.62 2.74 
9 1.49 1.08 2.00 1.16 0.89 1.52 0.91 0.53 1.38 1.45 1.02 2.00 
 4.53 2.70 4.17 4.69 2.70 3.77 2.00 0.93 1.99 3.84 2.55 3.76 
High 0.83 0.17 1.65 1.39 0.96 1.94 1.15 0.24 2.28 1.25 0.64 2.03 
 2.21 0.35 2.69 4.89 2.70 3.95 2.28 0.39 2.96 3.34 1.44 3.26 
L-H 0.73 1.24 0.09 -0.13 -0.06 - 0.23 0.27 0.63 - 0.19 0.80 1.06 0.46 
 2.82 4.32 0.22 -0.60 -0.22 - 0.61 0.86 1.71 - 0.34 2.59 2.48 1.04 
 *** ***      *  *** **  
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 High IIR- High FC High IIR- Low FC Low IIR- High FC Low IIR-Low FC 
 Up-Down Up-Down Up-Down Up-Down 
t-statistic 2.22 0.36 1.21 0.89 
p-value 3% 72% 23% 37% 
 **    
Table 4.7 presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the time 
horizon and during economic upturns and downturns in the subsamples by investment 
irreversibility (as the primary criterion) and financial constraints (as the secondary 
criterion). The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main 
U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) during the period from 1972 to 2006. 
Only stocks with available information to calculate the accrual ratio, the net payout ratio 
and the depreciation charge ratio in December of the previous year are considered. The 
firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling within the 
smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. 
The construction of the net payout ratio (the proxy for financial constraints or FC) 
and the depreciation charge ratio (the proxy for investment irreversibility or IIR) is 
described in Table 4.2. Firms are first sorted by the depreciation charge ratio into the 
groups with high (bottom 30%) and low (top 30%) investment irreversibility. Within each 
group, they are further sorted by the net payout ratio into the subsamples with high (bottom 
30%) and low (top 30%) financial constraints. Table 4.4 describes the portfolio formation, 
the construction of the UP and DOWN dummy variables, and the procedure to estimate the 
average return to the long-short portfolio during economic upturns and downturns.  
In the main table, the lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that 
are not in bold are the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different 
from zero. The supplementary table reports the two tailed t-statistics and p-values to test 
whether the returns to the long-short portfolios in the subsamples by investment 
irreversibility and financial constraints are different during upturns vs. downturns. The t-
statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and 
West (1987) method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4.8: Financial Constraints and Investment Irreversibility and the Accruals based Trading Strategy 
 
 High FC – High IIR High FC – Low IIR Low FC – High IIR Low FC – Low IIR 
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low 1.61 1.34 1.96 1.36 1.01 1.80 1.28 0.96 1.68 1.85 1.46 2.34 
 4.38 3.09 2.77 3.32 1.84 3.02 4.50 3.00 3.46 5.06 3.49 3.59 
2 1.45 0.90 2.14 1.50 1.10 2.00 1.33 0.92 1.85 1.39 0.99 1.88 
 4.09 1.88 3.59 3.51 2.30 2.88 5.52 3.22 4.70 3.81 2.25 3.42 
3 1.28 0.95 1.69 1.66 1.31 2.09 1.47 1.09 1.95 1.35 1.20 1.53 
 3.84 2.24 3.30 4.01 2.60 3.20 5.84 3.77 4.38 4.06 3.33 2.84 
4 1.63 1.38 1.95 1.44 1.08 1.88 1.41 0.96 1.99 1.61 1.25 2.05 
 4.69 3.27 3.06 3.30 2.04 2.77 5.36 2.90 4.73 5.26 3.48 3.99 
5 1.28 0.84 1.83 1.20 0.86 1.62 1.17 0.80 1.63 1.59 1.18 2.10 
 3.74 1.94 3.10 2.80 1.70 2.29 4.60 2.68 3.74 4.99 2.97 3.78 
6 1.38 1.09 1.74 1.44 0.92 2.09 1.34 0.91 1.87 1.12 0.61 1.76 
 4.19 2.71 3.16 3.22 1.70 2.86 5.39 3.43 4.31 3.39 1.70 3.02 
7 1.40 1.15 1.72 1.26 0.61 2.08 1.42 1.19 1.70 1.56 1.13 2.10 
 4.40 2.92 3.40 2.77 1.04 2.99 5.66 3.71 4.08 4.67 2.76 3.80 
8 1.40 1.00 1.90 1.25 0.71 1.92 1.24 0.69 1.93 1.11 0.69 1.63 
 4.05 2.12 3.34 2.95 1.50 2.88 4.73 2.19 4.37 3.19 1.65 3.02 
9 1.22 0.83 1.70 0.81 0.18 1.60 1.14 0.92 1.41 1.29 0.81 1.88 
 3.58 1.94 3.24 1.68 0.29 2.08 4.71 3.01 3.37 3.58 1.98 3.47 
High 0.87 0.05 1.90 1.15 0.46 2.01 1.41 1.00 1.92 1.25 0.72 1.92 
 2.15 0.10 2.57 2.29 0.73 2.55 5.02 2.81 3.83 3.52 1.70 3.22 
L-H 0.75 1.29 0.06 0.21 0.56 -0.21 -0.12 -0.03 -0.24 0.60 0.74 0.41 
 2.55 4.59 0.12 0.59 1.33 -0.36 -0.58 -0.13 -0.66 2.12 1.95 1.02 
 ** ***        ** *  
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 High FC- High IIR High FC- Low IIR Low FC- High IIR Low FC-Low IIR 
 Up-Down Up-Down Up-Down Up-Down 
t-statistic 2.18 1.05 0.47 0.55 
p-value 3% 29% 64% 58% 
 **    
Table 4.8 presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the time 
horizon and during economic upturns and downturns in the subsamples by financial 
constraints (as the primary criterion) and investment irreversibility (as the secondary 
criterion). The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main 
U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) during the period from 1972 to 2006. 
Only stocks with available information to calculate the accrual ratio, the net payout ratio 
and the depreciation charge ratio in December of the previous year are considered. The 
firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling within the 
smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. 
The construction of the net payout ratio (the proxy for financial constraints or FC) 
and the depreciation charge ratio (the proxy for investment irreversibility or IIR) is 
described in Table 4.2. Firms are first sorted by the net payout ratio into the groups with 
high (bottom 30%) and low (top 30%) financial constraints. Within each group, they are 
further sorted by the depreciation charge ratio into the subsamples with high (bottom 30%) 
and low (top 30%) investment irreversibility. Table 4.4 describes the portfolio formation, 
the construction of the UP and DOWN dummy variables, and the procedure to estimate the 
average return to the long-short portfolio during economic upturns and downturns.  
In the main table, the lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that 
are not in bold are the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different 
from zero. The supplementary table reports the two tailed t-statistics and p-values to test 
whether the returns to the long-short portfolios in the subsamples by financial constraints 
and investment irreversibility are different during upturns vs. downturns. The t-statistics are 
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West (1987) 
method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
 284 
Table 4.9: Returns to the Accruals based Trading Strategy in Different Industries 
 
 I=0   I=1   I=2   I=3   I=4   I=5   I=7   I=8   I=9   
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low  278   420   420   420   420   420   420   420      
 0.98 0.81 1.18 1.49 1.17 1.91 1.55 1.30 1.87 1.63 1.37 1.96 1.25 0.93 1.67 1.47 0.96 2.13 1.84 0.93 3.01 1.72 1.04 2.58    
 1.52 0.90 1.33 3.69 2.10 2.92 5.92 4.40 4.22 5.13 3.48 3.83 3.68 2.16 2.79 4.96 2.61 3.86 4.56 1.89 4.56 4.36 2.31 4.36    
2 378   420   420   420   420   420   420   420   28   
 1.37 1.37 1.36 1.47 1.05 2.01 1.40 1.08 1.80 1.36 1.14 1.66 1.32 0.89 1.87 1.38 0.80 2.13 1.57 1.17 2.09 1.65 1.13 2.32 -1.01 -6.58 -0.35 
 2.64 2.01 1.91 3.85 2.07 3.17 6.12 4.05 4.69 4.62 3.17 3.36 4.43 2.33 3.79 4.92 2.16 4.11 4.07 2.55 3.25 4.40 2.53 3.50 -0.58 -1.74 -0.21 
3 356   420   420   420   420   420   420   415   42   
 0.42 0.27 0.62 1.60 1.21 2.10 1.40 0.99 1.93 1.41 1.15 1.74 1.37 1.15 1.66 1.45 0.93 2.11 1.44 1.18 1.79 1.62 0.95 2.51 2.77 2.75 2.78 
 0.95 0.50 0.90 4.21 2.57 3.33 6.00 3.72 4.87 4.81 3.25 3.52 4.95 3.65 3.39 5.20 2.57 4.05 4.06 2.47 3.21 3.92 1.51 3.38 2.39 1.72 3.26 
4 378   420   420   420   420   420   420   420   36   
 1.31 1.51 1.06 1.55 1.16 2.04 1.20 0.83 1.68 1.22 0.95 1.55 1.41 1.21 1.67 1.27 0.66 2.05 1.65 1.23 2.18 1.17 0.67 1.81 1.95 -1.88 2.30 
 2.75 2.79 1.33 4.29 2.58 3.30 4.86 2.95 3.92 4.02 2.57 3.07 5.10 3.61 3.79 4.34 1.80 4.06 4.15 2.28 3.55 3.14 1.41 2.89 1.43 -0.58 2.10 
High 414   420   420   420   420   420   420   419   145   
 1.13 0.57 1.84 1.33 0.63 2.23 1.23 0.70 1.91 1.11 0.70 1.64 1.43 1.17 1.75 1.28 0.77 1.94 1.40 0.76 2.22 1.44 0.65 2.45 1.54 0.67 2.46 
 2.80 1.03 3.67 3.53 1.23 3.52 4.51 2.14 4.03 3.03 1.60 2.66 4.73 3.41 3.64 3.76 1.77 3.28 3.33 1.42 3.49 2.96 1.27 2.55 1.16 0.46 1.29 
L-H 278   420   420   420   420   420   420   419      
 -0.28 -0.04 -1.03 0.16 0.54 -0.32 0.32 0.59 -0.04 0.52 0.67 0.33 -0.17 -0.24 -0.08 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.44 0.17 0.79 0.34 0.39 0.15    
 -0.38 -0.05 -1.35 0.61 1.33 -0.84 2.74 4.28 -0.20 4.26 3.84 1.85 -0.81 -0.94 -0.27 1.08 0.85 0.71 1.90 0.58 2.60 0.78 0.98 0.20    
       *** ***  *** *** *         ***       
  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down    
 t   0.89   1.64   2.87   1.40   - 0.37   -0.00   -1.44  0.28     
p  37%   10%   0%   16%   71%   100%   15%   78%     
        ***                    
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Table 4.9 presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the time 
horizon and during economic upturns and downturns in different industries. The sample 
includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ) during the period from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available 
information to calculate the accrual ratio, the net payout ratio and the depreciation charge 
ratio in December of the previous year are considered. The firm-month observations with a 
stock price below $5 or the market value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are 
excluded. 
Stocks are classified into different industry groups using the first digit of the SIC 
code (data324 in COMPUSTAT). Appendix 4.1 describes the nature of each industry 
group. Table 4.4 describes the portfolio formation and the construction of the UP and 
DOWN dummy variables and the procedure to estimate the average return to the long-short 
portfolio during economic upturns and downturns.  
The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not in bold are 
the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different from zero. The table 
also reports the two tailed t-statistics and p-values to test whether the returns to the long-
short portfolios in each industry are different during upturns vs. downturns. The t-statistics 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West 
(1987) method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 4.10: Investment Irreversibility and the Accruals based Trading Strategy in Different Industries 
 
A I=0   I=1   I=2   I=3   I=4   I=5   I=7   I=8   I=9   
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up down All Up Down All Up Down All Up down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low  132   420   420   420   420   420   408   378      
 1.37 1.80 0.75 1.71 1.54 1.93 1.56 1.21 2.01 1.44 1.28 1.64 1.22 0.83 1.72 1.30 0.86 1.87 1.58 1.10 2.24 1.56 1.20 2.01    
 1.20 1.36 0.42 4.06 2.84 2.88 6.20 3.93 4.70 4.56 3.37 3.03 3.95 1.97 3.61 4.33 2.06 3.57 3.43 1.87 3.33 3.29 2.02 2.77    
2 338   420   420   420   420   420   420   414   4   
 1.05 0.60 1.56 1.74 1.01 2.68 1.44 1.16 1.80 1.25 0.94 1.64 1.26 0.99 1.61 1.13 0.66 1.74 1.54 1.02 2.21 1.95 1.52 2.50 -10.39   
 1.97 0.89 2.09 4.00 1.83 3.80 5.93 4.18 4.56 4.10 2.55 3.12 4.47 3.30 3.31 3.88 1.82 3.17 3.77 1.88 2.78 3.99 2.40 3.06 -1.97   
3 282   420   420   420   420   420   420   394   30    
 1.08 1.38 0.79 1.31 0.83 1.94 1.33 0.93 1.84 1.26 1.08 1.50 1.32 1.19 1.49 1.58 1.07 2.22 1.25 1.14 1.38 1.67 1.28 2.16 0.44 -2.80 0.80 
 1.99 1.83 1.02 3.33 1.67 2.96 5.51 3.46 4.68 4.14 2.94 2.89 4.46 3.62 2.90 5.57 3.00 3.97 3.05 2.23 1.86 3.39 2.17 2.93 0.32 -4.19 0.79 
4 335   420   420   420   420   420   413   409   12   
 1.56 1.45 1.68 1.46 1.28 1.70 1.27 0.95 1.69 1.09 0.76 1.51 1.34 1.13 1.61 1.18 0.63 1.90 1.85 1.62 2.15 2.21 1.42 3.23 3.88 4.04 3.86 
 2.96 1.99 2.17 3.57 2.65 2.56 5.33 3.58 4.07 3.72 2.11 3.22 4.77 3.16 3.51 3.98 1.64 3.60 4.05 2.38 2.85 4.14 1.75 3.65 2.15 0.00 0.00 
High 414   420   420   420   420   420   420   418   102   
 1.14 0.41 2.05 1.52 0.80 2.45 1.23 0.87 1.68 1.04 0.76 1.41 1.36 0.96 1.88 1.26 0.59 2.11 1.39 1.16 1.68 0.57 0.25 0.98 1.91 1.81 2.00 
 2.73 0.74 3.61 3.60 1.43 3.40 4.85 2.78 3.75 3.18 1.81 2.48 4.19 2.50 3.91 3.72 1.23 3.76 3.23 1.98 2.35 1.19 0.37 1.43 1.22 1.00 1.16 
L-H 132   420   420   420   420   420   408   378      
 -0.01 0.20 -1.83 0.19 0.75 -0.51 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.52 0.23 -0.14 -0.13 -0.16 0.04 0.26 -0.25 0.31 -0.06 0.42 0.66 0.85 0.83    
 -0.01 0.30 -2.30 0.55 1.44 -1.01 2.06 1.43 1.18 2.01 2.03 0.71 -0.51 -0.32 -0.43 0.16 0.84 -0.83 0.69 -0.10 0.65 1.36 1.34 1.02    
   **    ***   *** **                 
  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down    
 t   1.83   1.79   - 0.01    0.70   0.06   1.16   - 0.55    0.01     
p  7%   7%   100%   49%   95%   25%   58%   99%     
  *   *                       
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B I=0   I=1   I=2   I=3   I=4   I=5   I=7   I=8   I=9   
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low    368   420   420   419   420   415   378       
    1.64 1.58 1.72 1.83 1.56 2.17 1.84 1.47 2.31 1.21 0.72 1.83 1.70 1.06 2.51 1.91 1.15 2.92 1.10 1.00 1.23    
    2.36 1.68 1.53 4.28 3.29 2.59 4.76 3.17 3.66 2.10 0.92 1.85 4.12 2.34 3.87 4.49 2.22 4.50 2.21 1.77 1.50    
2 7   408   420   420   420   420   420   420      
 6.30 10.18 -3.41 1.38 1.28 1.50 1.50 1.11 2.00 1.54 1.32 1.82 1.36 0.71 2.20 1.60 1.27 2.01 1.56 0.92 2.37 1.45 0.72 2.39    
 1.25 2.01 -1.54 2.52 1.74 1.60 4.26 2.70 3.49 4.02 2.92 2.97 2.86 1.34 2.60 4.28 2.51 3.24 3.56 1.75 3.84 3.41 1.42 3.78    
3 15   410   420   420   420   420   420   396      
 0.37 1.44 -2.58 1.17 0.66 1.82 1.63 1.13 2.27 1.48 1.28 1.74 1.48 0.71 2.47 1.35 0.92 1.91 1.59 1.34 1.90 1.09 0.36 2.05    
 0.10 0.52 -0.34 2.01 0.83 1.96 4.36 2.51 3.91 3.62 2.64 2.62 3.47 1.41 3.38 3.56 1.80 3.14 3.87 2.50 3.14 2.35 0.59 2.64    
4 12   412   420   420   420   420   420   409      
 -3.33 -0.29 -18.51 2.23 1.97 2.55 1.11 0.66 1.70 1.27 0.89 1.77 1.52 1.22 1.92 1.26 0.75 1.90 1.46 0.73 2.40 1.60 0.65 2.77    
 -0.68 -0.06 -13.57 4.00 2.84 2.99 2.83 1.40 2.66 3.23 2.01 2.75 4.08 2.45 3.43 3.26 1.57 3.20 3.19 1.16 3.67 2.96 1.08 2.74    
High 133   409   420   420   418   420   420   408      
 0.77 2.26 -1.42 0.61 -0.30 1.72 1.16 0.46 2.06 0.91 0.43 1.53 1.28 1.11 1.49 1.52 0.84 2.39 1.54 0.97 2.28 1.05 0.60 1.68 1.60 -0.51 5.15 
 0.89 2.11 -1.39 1.19 -0.49 2.17 3.18 1.01 3.38 2.08 0.81 2.13 2.95 2.36 2.16 3.60 1.55 3.15 3.26 1.63 3.18 2.22 1.04 2.28 0.61 -0.21 1.03 
L-H    357   420   420   417   420   415   378      
    1.03 1.74 -0.30 0.66 1.10 0.11 0.93 1.05 0.78 -0.05 -0.40 0.35 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.50 0.18 0.57 -0.04 0.31 -0.49    
    1.46 2.06 -0.31 2.15 2.80 0.20 4.78 4.07 2.77 -0.09 -0.57 0.40 0.45 0.52 0.21 1.61 0.48 1.08 -0.08 0.53 -0.52    
     **  *** ***  *** *** ***                
     Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down    
t     1.53    1.55    0.74    -0.67    0.16    -0.62    0.72      
p     13%   12%   46%   50%   88%   54%   47%     
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Table 4.10 presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the 
time horizon and during economic upturns and downturns in different industries within the 
subsamples with high versus low investment irreversibility. The sample includes non-
financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ) during the period from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information to 
calculate the accrual ratio, the net payout ratio and the depreciation charge ratio in 
December of the previous year are considered. The firm-month observations with a stock 
price below $5 or the market value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are 
excluded. 
The construction of the depreciation charge ratio, the proxy for investment 
irreversibility (IIR) is described in Table 4.2.  
 Firms in Panel A have the depreciation charge ratio in the bottom 30% and hence are 
included in the subsample with high investment irreversibility.  
 Firms in Panel B have the depreciation charge ratio in the top 30% and hence are 
included in the subsample with low investment irreversibility.  
 Within each subsample, stocks are classified into different industry groups using the 
first digit of the SIC code (data324 in COMPUSTAT). Appendix 4.1 describes the 
nature of each industry group.  
Table 4.4 describes the portfolio formation, the construction of the UP and DOWN 
dummy variables, and the procedure to estimate the average return to the long-short 
portfolio during economic upturns and downturns. 
The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not in bold are 
the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different from zero. Each panel 
also reports the two tailed t-statistics and p-values to test whether the returns to the long-
short portfolios in each industry are different during upturns vs. downturns. The t-statistics 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West 
(1987) method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 4.11: Financial Constraints and the Accruals based Trading Strategy in Different Industries 
A I=0   I=1   I=2   I=3   I=4   I=5   I=7   I=8   I=9   
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
 Low   12   414   414   414   414   414   414   414      
 -1.38 1.42 -6.97 1.14 0.98 1.35 1.28 0.81 1.87 1.75 1.45 2.12 1.33 1.20 1.49 1.49 0.81 2.35 1.52 0.79 2.43 1.69 0.91 2.67    
 -0.34 0.42 -3.35 2.37 1.36 1.79 3.83 2.03 3.31 4.70 3.16 3.49 3.14 2.12 2.05 3.81 1.60 3.29 3.36 1.41 3.61 3.47 1.53 3.67    
2 18   414   414   414   414   414   414   414      
 -1.45 -2.42 1.07 1.40 0.57 2.43 1.43 1.18 1.74 1.31 1.19 1.46 1.18 0.54 1.97 0.94 0.48 1.52 1.52 0.90 2.30 1.52 0.85 2.36    
 -0.56 -0.77 0.29 3.01 0.92 3.19 4.62 3.22 3.06 3.55 2.65 2.32 2.67 0.88 2.64 2.63 1.13 2.44 3.47 1.71 3.31 3.04 1.21 2.83    
3 140   414   414   414   414   414   414   409      
 0.77 0.54 1.08 1.14 0.69 1.70 1.44 1.09 1.88 1.22 1.04 1.44 1.27 1.03 1.56 1.16 0.51 1.98 1.45 1.35 1.58 1.99 1.20 3.02    
 0.83 0.52 0.74 2.27 1.11 1.99 4.47 2.88 3.80 3.21 2.29 2.29 3.09 2.17 2.15 3.33 1.21 3.29 3.15 2.25 2.19 3.62 1.56 3.51    
4 36   414   414   414   414   414   414   403      
 -0.39 -2.10 3.01 1.53 0.97 2.23 1.36 1.13 1.65 1.33 0.99 1.76 1.76 1.48 2.12 1.33 0.74 2.07 1.36 0.98 1.83 1.59 0.16 3.30    
 -0.19 -0.96 2.09 3.33 1.70 2.85 4.13 2.60 3.52 3.28 2.10 2.54 4.77 3.29 3.61 3.45 1.68 3.24 2.83 1.53 2.52 2.79 0.25 3.11    
High 270   414   414   414   414   414   414   399   11 9 0 
 0.56 0.57 0.54 1.34 0.62 2.25 1.07 0.25 2.10 0.83 0.15 1.68 1.41 1.27 1.58 1.11 0.58 1.78 1.26 0.64 2.05 1.09 0.41 2.01 -0.70 -6.31 6.03 
 0.83 0.69 0.61 2.77 0.99 2.96 3.00 0.56 3.53 1.84 0.27 2.30 3.44 2.71 2.51 2.65 1.13 2.32 2.40 0.95 2.81 2.19 0.68 2.48 -0.11 -0.96 0.54 
L-H 12   414   414   414   414   414   414   399   0 0 0 
 -3.47 -0.49 -0.79 -0.20 0.36 -0.90 0.21 0.56 -0.22 0.92 1.31 0.44 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 0.38 0.23 0.57 0.25 0.15 0.38 0.42 0.51 0.80    
 -0.60 -0.59 -0.86 -0.44 0.55 -1.42 0.72 1.68 -0.50 4.89 4.80 1.59 -0.21 -0.15 -0.16 1.27 0.63 1.21 0.63 0.32 0.67 0.85 0.86 1.05    
        *  *** ***                 
  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down    
t  0.24    1.39    1.39    2.14    0.02    -0.55   -0.31   -0.30     
p  81%   17%   16%   3%   98%   58%   76%   76%     
           **                 
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B I=0   I=1   I=2   I=3   I=4   I=5   I=7   I=8   I=9   
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low  35   410   414   414   414   414   364   315      
 2.65 3.00 1.63 1.63 1.16 2.23 1.44 1.20 1.73 1.48 1.18 1.85 1.05 0.68 1.50 1.34 0.97 1.80 1.56 1.05 2.18 1.25 0.71 1.83    
 1.13 1.26 0.56 3.43 1.79 2.58 5.76 3.99 4.20 5.00 3.13 3.92 2.73 1.40 2.14 4.22 2.80 3.08 3.37 2.09 2.60 1.80 0.88 1.80    
2 114   411   414   414   414   414   386   363      
 1.54 0.14 3.54 1.45 0.73 2.37 1.42 1.12 1.79 1.37 1.07 1.74 1.29 0.97 1.69 1.39 1.00 1.89 1.86 1.29 2.62 1.43 0.43 2.60    
 1.55 0.13 2.16 3.05 1.59 3.18 6.45 4.44 5.13 5.00 3.23 3.74 3.92 2.60 3.16 4.79 2.63 3.66 3.74 2.35 3.40 3.11 0.85 4.42    
3 153   414   414   414   414   414   378   377   12   
 1.55 1.16 2.12 1.56 1.21 1.98 1.45 0.91 2.13 1.34 0.94 1.85 1.22 0.79 1.77 1.63 1.12 2.26 2.58 2.33 2.86 1.06 0.93 1.21 -0.05   
 1.79 1.00 1.74 3.65 2.43 3.00 6.06 3.76 5.56 4.65 2.63 3.72 4.01 2.03 3.42 5.39 3.02 3.75 5.98 4.33 3.88 2.25 1.57 1.72 -0.02   
4 114   414   414   414   414   414   390   366      
 1.30 1.79 0.61 1.73 1.28 2.30 1.35 0.88 1.93 1.13 0.87 1.45 1.33 1.01 1.73 1.67 1.20 2.26 1.50 1.12 1.98 1.25 1.28 1.22    
 1.30 2.06 0.31 3.95 2.04 3.66 5.82 3.38 4.72 4.18 2.75 3.22 4.77 2.94 3.68 5.45 3.04 4.34 3.47 1.99 3.32 2.91 2.24 1.98    
High 324   414   414   414   414   414   414   411   36   
 0.76 0.91 0.60 1.14 0.77 1.61 1.15 0.65 1.79 1.29 0.93 1.75 1.12 0.93 1.35 1.24 0.63 2.01 1.33 0.91 1.85 1.21 1.00 1.48 1.89 2.72 1.52 
 1.63 1.62 0.96 2.81 1.56 2.33 4.52 2.15 4.03 4.25 2.48 3.51 3.38 2.36 2.40 3.62 1.49 3.80 2.98 1.61 2.78 2.36 1.33 2.47 0.47 0.39 0.47 
L-H 35   410   414   414   414   414   364   312      
 -0.60 -0.45 -0.50 0.57 0.39 0.58 0.28 0.55 -0.06 0.18 0.25 0.10 -0.07 -0.25 0.15 0.09 0.34 -0.21 -0.03 0.00 0.09 -0.26 -0.49 0.04    
 -0.24 -0.71 -0.76 1.19 0.64 0.83 1.81 2.64 -0.24 1.15 1.37 0.36 -0.19 -0.53 0.25 0.32 0.89 -0.51 -0.07 0.00 0.11 -0.33 -0.56 0.05    
       * ***                    
  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down    
t  0.06  -0.20  1.99  0.46  -0.51  0.98  -0.09  -0.43    
p  95%   84%   5%   64%   61%   33%   93%   67%     
        **                    
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Table 4.11 presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the 
time horizon and during economic upturns and downturns in different industries within the 
subsamples with high versus low financial constraints. The sample includes non-financial, 
non-utilities firms listed in the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) 
during the period from 1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate 
the accrual ratio, the net payout ratio and the depreciation charge ratio in December of the 
previous year are considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or 
the market value falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. 
The construction of the net payout ratio, the proxy for financial constraints (FC) is 
described in Table 4.2.  
 Firms in Panel A have the net payout ratio in the bottom 30% and hence are included 
in the subsample with high financial constraints.  
 Firms in Panel B have the net payout ratio in the top 30% and hence are included in 
the subsample with low financial constraints.  
 Within each subsample, stocks are classified into different industry groups using the 
first digit of the SIC code (data324 in COMPUSTAT). Appendix 4.1 describes the 
nature of each industry group.  
Table 4.4 describes the portfolio formation, the construction of the UP and DOWN 
dummy variables, and the procedure to estimate the average return to the long-short 
portfolio during economic upturns and downturns.  
The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not in bold are 
the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different from zero. Each panel 
also reports the two tailed t-statistics and p-values to test whether the returns to the long-
short portfolios in each industry are different during upturns vs. downturns. The t-statistics 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West 
(1987) method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 4.12: Investment Irreversibility and Financial Constraints and the Accruals based Trading Strategy in Different Industries 
A I=0   I=1   I=2   I=3   I=4   I=5   I=7   I=8   I=9   
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low  12   414   414   414   408   414   363   302      
 -1.38 1.42 -6.97 2.20 1.70 2.83 1.55 1.09 2.13 1.90 1.71 2.14 1.27 0.81 1.83 1.51 1.44 1.59 1.54 0.97 2.21 1.38 1.27 1.52    
 -0.34 0.42 -3.35 4.19 2.71 3.39 4.16 2.55 3.09 4.45 3.27 3.12 2.46 1.11 2.50 3.73 2.80 2.28 2.55 1.25 2.48 2.25 1.32 1.89    
2 48   414   414   414   414   414   378   366      
 2.95 5.54 -0.67 1.53 0.63 2.65 1.64 1.44 1.89 1.60 1.56 1.65 1.11 0.43 1.97 0.46 -0.28 1.39 1.64 0.96 2.49 1.54 1.17 2.02    
 0.84 1.06 -0.45 2.90 0.96 3.14 5.08 3.52 3.40 3.89 3.05 2.39 2.80 0.94 3.03 1.19 -0.61 1.88 3.41 1.53 3.96 2.89 1.78 2.56    
3 101   414   414   414   414   414   401   342      
 1.54 0.92 2.18 1.39 1.11 1.74 1.59 1.39 1.83 1.04 0.65 1.54 1.57 1.62 1.51 1.77 1.45 2.17 1.10 0.46 1.85 2.63 1.18 4.13    
 1.31 0.54 1.34 2.80 1.84 2.09 4.68 3.37 3.44 2.60 1.14 2.39 4.24 3.83 2.48 4.79 3.15 3.37 2.02 0.70 2.21 4.11 1.33 4.14    
4 48   414   414   414   414   414   370   370      
 1.03 -0.12 2.63 1.55 0.76 2.55 1.71 1.50 1.97 1.15 0.97 1.37 1.50 1.59 1.38 0.96 0.17 1.95 1.24 0.96 1.57 1.77 1.66 1.90    
 0.58 -0.06 1.67 3.20 1.36 3.35 5.05 4.23 3.53 2.94 2.02 2.44 3.73 3.40 2.29 2.37 0.37 3.11 2.35 1.42 1.95 3.24 2.42 2.12    
High 286   414   414   414   414   414   414   407   46 44 0 
 1.19 0.92 1.53 1.90 1.32 2.63 1.11 0.59 1.77 0.92 0.27 1.73 1.35 0.84 1.99 1.42 0.75 2.26 1.08 1.30 0.81 1.47 0.79 2.34 0.74 0.94 0.34 
 1.90 1.22 1.68 3.52 1.82 2.83 3.31 1.31 3.16 2.07 0.53 2.16 2.95 1.49 2.83 3.51 1.37 3.35 1.81 1.37 0.80 2.59 1.09 2.46 0.66 0.76 0.18 
L-H 12   414   414   414   408   414   363   302      
 -5.02 -0.85 -1.74 0.30 0.38 0.20 0.44 0.50 0.37 0.98 1.44 0.41 -0.06 -0.05 -0.16 0.09 0.69 -0.67 0.94 -0.47 1.20 0.15 0.10 -1.13    
 -1.22 -1.11 -1.81 0.63 0.64 0.27 1.26 1.12 0.54 2.70 3.29 0.64 -0.12 -0.08 -0.21 0.25 1.71 -1.40 1.50 -0.48 1.22 0.22 0.12 -1.09    
   *       *** ***      *           
  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down    
t  0.76   0.20   0.16   1.28   0.10   2.18   -1.14   0.94     
p  45%   84%   88%   20%   92%   3%   25%   35%     
                 **           
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B I=0   I=1   I=2   I=3   I=4   I=5   I=7   I=8   I=9   
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low     90   420   420   240   359   312   240      
    1.57 -1.49 4.24 1.63 1.34 2.00 1.95 1.81 2.13 2.56 2.97 2.06 1.20 0.88 1.59 2.20 1.77 2.72 0.89 1.10 0.63    
    1.20 -0.89 2.29 3.98 2.69 2.68 4.90 3.53 3.49 2.48 1.78 1.70 1.92 1.15 1.57 4.42 3.10 3.32 1.25 1.29 0.74    
2    169   420   420   351   382   372   284      
    0.14 -1.31 1.90 1.55 1.54 1.56 1.18 0.74 1.74 1.55 1.52 1.60 1.52 0.96 2.30 1.46 0.84 2.23 1.19 0.25 2.58    
    0.17 -1.28 1.51 4.13 3.33 2.61 3.29 1.67 2.92 2.22 1.87 1.11 2.57 1.29 2.34 2.92 1.64 2.98 1.88 0.35 2.57    
3    160   420   420   314   382   360   298      
    3.04 2.59 3.60 1.32 0.70 2.13 1.46 1.23 1.75 1.57 0.70 2.80 2.31 2.44 2.15 2.07 1.98 2.17 1.24 0.92 1.60    
    2.38 1.34 2.22 3.04 1.56 2.90 3.33 2.72 2.66 1.75 0.81 1.84 4.67 3.30 3.00 4.67 3.36 3.67 1.98 1.36 1.66    
4    174   420   420   345   398   372   312      
    0.46 0.51 0.40 1.56 0.87 2.46 1.42 0.97 2.00 1.75 1.41 2.20 1.37 0.28 2.79 1.94 1.62 2.35 1.93 1.29 2.75    
    0.53 0.51 0.28 3.66 1.83 3.29 3.41 2.31 3.05 3.54 2.12 2.89 2.54 0.40 3.46 4.22 2.88 3.49 3.57 2.11 4.20    
High 70 68 0 317   420   420   392   418   399   374      
 1.52 3.95 -2.13 1.74 1.26 2.44 1.30 0.62 2.18 1.06 0.46 1.84 1.64 1.25 2.19 2.08 0.99 3.47 1.44 1.13 1.83 0.88 0.55 1.32    
 1.37 2.55 -1.23 2.49 1.72 1.87 2.97 1.29 2.98 2.70 1.02 2.69 2.98 2.08 2.24 4.25 1.61 4.64 3.06 1.98 2.75 1.82 0.92 2.15    
L-H    90   420   420   240   359   312   230      
    0.01 -1.59 -0.86 0.33 0.72 -0.17 0.89 1.36 0.29 1.31 0.47 -0.82 -0.66 -0.25 -2.06 0.76 0.21 0.38 0.50 0.13 -0.86    
    0.01 -2.18 -0.58 0.77 1.34 -0.28 2.73 3.17 0.59 1.11 0.45 -0.74 -0.88 -0.32 -1.98 1.54 0.37 0.51 0.54 0.17 -1.14    
     **     *** ***       **          
     Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down    
 t      -0.42   1.03   1.55   0.91   1.41   -0.18   0.90     
p     68%   30%   12%   36%   16%   86%   37%     
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Table 4.12 presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the 
time horizon and during economic upturns and downturns in different industries within the 
subsamples with high versus low investment irreversibility (primary) and financial 
constraints (secondary). The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the 
three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) during the period from 1972 to 
2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate the accrual ratio, the net payout 
ratio and the depreciation charge ratio in December of the previous year are considered. 
The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling within 
the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. The construction of the net payout ratio (the 
proxy for financial constraints or FC) and the depreciation charge ratio (the proxy for 
investment irreversibility or IIR) is described in Table 4.2. Firms are first sorted by the 
depreciation charge ratio into the groups with high (bottom 30%) and low (top 30%) 
investment irreversibility. Within each group, they are further sorted by the net payout ratio 
into the subsamples with high (bottom 30%) and low (top 30%) financial constraints.  
 Firms in Panel A have the depreciation charge ratio in the bottom 30% and the net 
payout ratio in the bottom 30%, and hence are included in the subsample with high 
investment irreversibility – high financial constraints.  
 Firms in Panel B have the depreciation charge ratio in the top 30% and the net payout 
ratio in the top 30%, and hence are included in the subsample with low investment 
irreversibility – low financial constraints. 
 In each subsample, stocks are classified into different industry groups using the first 
digit of the SIC code (data324 in COMPUSTAT). Appendix 4.1 describes the nature of 
each industry group. 
Within each industry group, the accruals based trading strategy is formed. Table 
4.4 describes the portfolio formation, the construction of the UP and DOWN dummy 
variables, and the procedure to estimate the average return to the long-short portfolio during 
economic upturns and downturns.  
The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not in bold are 
the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different from zero. Each panel 
also reports the two tailed t-statistics and p-values to test whether the returns to the long-
short portfolios in each industry are different during upturns vs. downturns. The t-statistics 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West 
(1987) method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 4.13: Financial Constraints and Investment Irreversibility and the Accruals based Trading Strategy in Different Industries 
A I=0   I=1   I=2   I=3   I=4   I=5   I=7   I=8   I=9   
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low     400   413   414   395   414   299   262      
    1.48 1.12 1.92 1.43 0.87 2.12 2.18 1.77 2.70 1.43 1.55 1.27 1.48 0.93 2.16 2.91 2.09 3.86 1.09 0.86 1.40    
    2.57 1.50 2.17 3.23 1.72 2.59 4.97 3.34 3.54 2.18 1.72 1.26 3.38 1.63 2.50 3.83 2.36 3.31 1.72 0.93 1.57    
2 24   414   414   414   410   414   364   340      
 -2.23 -0.61 -4.94 1.46 0.37 2.82 1.56 1.09 2.16 1.59 1.31 1.95 0.78 0.04 1.70 1.02 0.43 1.77 0.67 0.34 1.05 1.61 1.35 1.88    
 -0.98 -0.30 -1.58 2.69 0.61 3.06 4.33 2.47 3.42 3.48 2.27 2.46 1.82 0.06 2.67 2.58 0.86 2.57 1.18 0.44 1.45 2.66 1.74 2.06    
3 51   412   414   414   404   413   381   350      
 1.14 -0.39 2.21 1.56 0.73 2.62 1.43 1.30 1.59 1.30 1.11 1.55 0.87 0.58 1.25 1.25 0.91 1.69 1.24 1.09 1.40 2.51 0.16 5.15    
 0.61 -0.18 0.99 2.71 1.03 2.65 3.68 2.70 2.63 3.33 2.25 2.65 1.67 1.13 1.28 3.30 1.96 2.61 2.13 1.59 1.60 4.05 0.19 5.26    
4 24   414   414   414   414   414   364   344      
 -1.01 -3.68 3.43 1.52 0.77 2.45 1.59 1.23 2.04 1.09 1.16 1.00 1.63 1.53 1.75 0.97 0.15 2.01 1.21 0.87 1.62 2.07 2.89 1.16    
 -0.41 -1.28 1.81 2.66 1.18 2.59 4.47 3.12 3.47 2.72 2.31 1.68 3.47 2.67 2.25 2.14 0.27 2.78 2.02 1.17 1.69 3.54 4.23 1.14    
High 182   413   414   414   413   414   410   403   4   
 0.99 0.93 1.07 1.64 1.26 2.11 1.12 0.30 2.13 0.52 -0.39 1.66 1.51 1.29 1.78 1.35 0.88 1.95 0.62 1.00 0.14 1.46 0.61 2.58 -10.39   
 1.22 0.92 1.07 3.08 1.85 2.44 2.91 0.61 3.40 1.19 -0.76 1.98 2.99 2.01 2.00 3.12 1.68 2.58 0.99 0.98 0.14 2.39 0.78 2.51 -1.97   
L-H    399   413   414   394   414   295   262      
    -0.18 -0.17 -0.26 0.28 0.56 -0.02 1.66 2.16 1.05 -0.20 0.18 -0.55 0.12 0.06 0.20 2.02 0.45 2.78 -0.25 -0.05 -1.68    
    -0.32 -0.26 -0.33 0.64 0.95 -0.02 4.07 4.59 1.35 -0.30 0.23 -0.50 0.31 0.11 0.33 2.32 0.42 2.39 -0.32 -0.06 -1.52    
          *** ***        **  **       
     Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down    
 t      0.08   0.58   1.20   0.55   -0.18  -1.45  1.13     
p     94%   56%   23%   59%   86%   15%   26%     
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B I=0   I=1   I=2   I=3   I=4   I=5   I=7   I=8   I=9   
 All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down All Up Down 
Low     96   414   414   237   342   293   238      
    1.13 -2.82 4.48 1.43 1.22 1.69 1.82 1.58 2.12 2.13 2.28 1.94 0.76 -0.03 1.76 2.30 2.06 2.61 0.18 0.12 0.25    
    0.88 -1.65 2.29 3.60 2.56 2.33 5.01 3.28 3.85 2.10 1.40 1.49 1.19 -0.04 1.53 4.37 3.56 3.19 0.23 0.15 0.30    
2    141   414   414   317   360   340   307      
    1.78 -0.16 3.80 1.45 1.29 1.65 1.30 1.12 1.52 1.79 0.92 2.87 1.90 1.77 2.08 0.92 0.48 1.44 1.51 0.16 3.08    
    1.69 -0.15 1.71 4.05 2.90 2.92 3.84 2.73 2.70 2.97 1.31 2.91 3.42 2.45 2.26 1.63 0.81 1.63 2.34 0.22 2.83    
3 9   167   414   414   306   401   342   281      
 3.41 4.66 -6.60 1.26 -0.12 2.87 0.93 0.37 1.62 1.52 1.04 2.12 1.97 0.63 3.64 2.18 1.62 2.85 2.33 1.73 3.12 1.44 1.57 1.30    
 0.57 0.00 0.00 1.26 -0.09 1.95 2.39 0.93 2.28 4.07 2.53 3.59 2.37 0.73 2.57 4.49 2.77 3.90 5.14 2.99 4.42 2.23 2.45 1.35    
4    140   414   414   336   362   342   316      
    1.24 0.96 1.55 1.27 0.52 2.21 1.13 0.68 1.68 1.76 1.06 2.55 1.56 1.11 2.16 1.58 1.25 1.98 0.78 0.59 0.99    
    1.40 1.09 1.17 3.13 1.21 3.17 2.86 1.63 2.65 2.21 1.07 1.91 2.93 1.82 2.59 2.93 1.74 2.72 1.51 0.89 1.47    
High 81   365   414   414   389   400   390   360      
 1.49 3.65 -1.67 1.98 2.67 1.08 1.13 0.50 1.91 1.22 0.63 1.97 1.21 0.81 1.75 2.36 2.03 2.74 1.04 0.59 1.60 1.03 0.36 1.77    
 1.36 2.65 -1.02 2.93 3.23 1.08 2.92 1.19 2.73 3.39 1.42 3.30 2.62 1.57 2.05 4.90 3.24 4.56 2.05 0.91 2.24 1.83 0.53 2.55    
L-H    96   414   414   237   342   293   232      
    0.38 -3.27 0.38 0.30 0.72 -0.22 0.60 0.96 0.16 0.76 0.56 -0.55 -1.19 -2.06 -1.29 0.98 0.98 0.34 -0.71 -0.28 -1.57    
    0.27 -3.95 0.33 0.77 1.51 -0.36 2.03 2.42 0.35 0.69 0.54 -0.56 -1.60 -2.44 -1.25 1.74 1.57 0.46 -0.69 -0.36 -1.93    
     ***     ** **      **  *     *    
     Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down  Up-down    
 t      -2.57   1.20   1.25   0.80   -0.57   0.65   1.09     
p     1%   23%   21%   42%   57%   52%   28%     
     **                       
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Table 4.13 presents the returns to the accruals based trading strategy across the 
time horizon and during economic upturns and downturns in different industries within the 
subsamples with high versus low financial constraints (primary) and investment 
irreversibility (secondary). The sample includes non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in 
the three main U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) during the period from 
1972 to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate the accrual ratio, the net 
payout ratio and the depreciation charge ratio in December of the previous year are 
considered. The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value 
falling within the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. 
The construction of the net payout ratio (the proxy for financial constraints or FC) 
and the depreciation charge ratio (the proxy for investment irreversibility or IIR) is 
described in Table 4.2. Firms are first sorted by the net payout ratio into the groups with 
high (bottom 30%) and low (top 30%) financial constraints. Within each group, they are 
further sorted by the depreciation charge ratio into the subsamples with high (bottom 30%) 
and low (top 30%) investment irreversibility.  
 Firms in Panel A have the net payout ratio in the bottom 30% and the depreciation 
charge ratio in the bottom 30%, and hence are included in the subsample with high 
financial constraints - investment irreversibility.  
 Firms in Panel B have the net payout ratio in the top 30% and the depreciation charge 
ratio in the top 30%, and hence are included in the subsample with low financial 
constraints – low financial constraints. 
 In each subsample, stocks are classified into different industry groups using the first 
digit of the SIC code (data324 in COMPUSTAT). Appendix 4.1 describes the nature of 
each industry group. 
Within each industry group, the accruals based trading strategy is formed. Table 
4.4 describes the portfolio formation, the construction of the UP and DOWN dummy 
variables, and the procedure to estimate the average return to the long-short portfolio during 
economic upturns and downturns.  
The lines in bold are the portfolio returns, whereas the lines that are not in bold are 
the associated two tailed t-statistics to test whether they are different from zero. Each panel 
also reports the two tailed t-statistics and p-values to test whether the returns to the long-
short portfolios in each industry are different during upturns vs. downturns. The t-statistics 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity following the Newey and West 
(1987) method. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 298 
Table 4.14: The Return Predictability of the Accruals Ratio 
  
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 
Accrual -1.36 *** -1.03 *** -0.81 ** -0.99 *** -1.14 *** -0.97 *** -1.18 *** -1.02 *** 0.26  
 -3.79  -2.95  -2.16  -2.80  -3.32  -2.72  -3.51  -3.02  0.20  
Control variables                   
Book-to-Market 0.18 ** 0.02  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.05  -0.05  0.10  
 2.33  0.26  0.02  -0.29  -0.30  -0.60  -1.02  -1.04  0.48  
Size -0.15 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 *** -0.88 *** 
 -3.74  -4.19  -3.79  -3.89  -4.23  -3.98  -4.11  -3.87  -7.42  
Return 2_3 0.36  0.53 * 0.56 * 0.51 * 0.45  0.47  0.46  0.49 * -1.53 * 
 1.01  1.66  1.81  1.66  1.43  1.54  1.51  1.63  -1.84  
Return 4_6 0.76 ** 0.73 *** 0.71 *** 0.67 *** 0.66 *** 0.67 *** 0.61 *** 0.65 *** -1.03  
 2.41  2.68  2.80  2.62  2.53  2.70  2.45  2.68  -1.21  
Return 7_12 0.83 *** 0.86 *** 0.89 *** 0.83 *** 0.81 *** 0.87 *** 0.82 *** 0.88 *** -0.56  
 3.33  3.92  4.25  3.99  3.82  4.34  4.04  4.45  -0.79  
TO_ NASDAQ 0.05  0.07  0.06  0.04  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.06  1.40 *** 
 0.65  1.30  1.30  0.85  1.59  1.61  1.37  1.24  5.05  
TO_NYSE/AMEX -0.02  -0.07  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.06  -0.07  -0.06  0.33 *** 
 -0.35  -1.47  -1.36  -1.42  -1.39  -1.33  -1.53  -1.32  3.26  
NASDAQ 0.15  0.24 *** 0.23 *** 0.23 *** 0.26 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 *** 0.23 *** 2.58 *** 
 1.56  3.66  3.81  3.84  4.22  4.22  4.19  4.21  6.24  
Intercept 1.30  0.05  0.08  0.09  0.04  0.07  0.09  0.11 * 2.58  
 5.10  0.64  1.16  1.44  0.58  1.17  1.45  1.91  9.24  
Adjusted R2 6.76%  3.45%  3.26%  3.16%  3.30%  3.13%  3.09%  3.03%  6.07%  
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Table 4.14 presents the results of the regressions of risk adjusted returns on the 
accrual ratio and other firm level variables using the framework of Avramov and Chordia 
(2006). The sample covers non-financial, non-utilities firms listed in the three main 
exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ) in the U.S. market during the period from 1972 
to 2006. Only stocks with available information to calculate the accrual ratio, the net payout 
ratio and the depreciation charge ratio in December of the previous year are considered. 
The firm-month observations with a stock price below $5 or the market value falling within 
the smallest NYSE size decile are excluded. The sample is further constrained in that there 
should be data on stock returns, market capitalisation, and the Book-to-Market ratio in the 
current year and in the 36 months prior to the current month.  
This chapter uses the Fama and French (1993, 1996) model as the base model in 
the general model specification described in equation 4.2 (p. 238). The part of returns 
unexplained by the asset pricing model in equation 4.2 is regressed against the accrual ratio 
in a cross sectional regression to assess the explanatory power of the model with regards to 
the accrual anomaly, i.e. the negative relationship between current stock returns and 
cumulative past stock returns. Size, the Book-to-Market ratio, the cumulative returns, and 
stock turnovers are included in the cross sectional regression to control for the predictability 
of stock returns with regards to these variables. The regression is described in equation 4.3 
(p. 238). The construction of the key variables in stage two is described in Table 4.2. Their 
transformation is described in section 4.4.2 (p. 236). 
The settings of the regressions in two stages for the scenarios are as follows: 
 Scenario 1: Returns are not adjusted for risks, hence no stage one regression is 
run. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 4.3. 
 Scenario 2: Returns are adjusted for risks using the unconditional Fama and 
French model. The regression is described in equation 4.2 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3,,2, === fjfjfj βββ . In stage two, the regression is 
described in equation 4.3. 
 Scenarios 3 and 4: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama 
and French model. The regression is described in equation 4.2 with the 
constraint 0
,4,,3, == fjfj ββ . In scenario 3, the variable 1, −tjFirm refers to 
the financial constraint variable; in scenario 4 it refers to the investment 
irreversibility variable. In stage two, the regression is described in equation 
4.3. 
  Scenario 5: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama and 
French model on the business cycle variable. The regression is described in 
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equation 4.2 with the constraint 0
,4,,2, == fjfj ββ . In stage two, the 
regression is described in equation 4.3. 
 Scenarios 6, 7, 8: Returns are adjusted for risks using the conditional Fama 
and French model as described in equation 4.2. In scenario 6, the variable 
1, −tjFirm refers to the financial constraint variable; in scenario 7 it refers to 
the investment irreversibility variable; and in scenario 8, to both the financial 
constraint and the investment irreversibility variables. In stage two, the 
regression is described in equation 4.3. 
 Scenarios 9: The cyclical component of returns is isolated using four macro-
economic variables including the term spread, the default spread, the 
aggregate dividend yield, and the short term Treasury rate. The regression is 
described in equation 4.8 (p. 264). In stage two, the regression is described in 
equation 4.3.  
The coefficients and t-statistics are reported. The coefficients are multiplied by 
100. The two tailed t-statistics are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
following the Newey and West (1987) method to test whether a coefficient is different from 
zero. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions 
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This thesis has examined whether the value-growth, momentum and 
accruals based trading strategies generate positive and significant profits, and how 
these profits are influenced by the financial inflexibility in firms’ investment and 
financing environment. The thesis builds on the recent literature on how the 
frictions at the firm level investment and financing environment affect their 
investments (for example Kiyotaki and Moor (1997), Almeida and Campello 
(2007) and Caggese (2007)) to shed light on the relationship between firms’ 
investments and stock returns. The thesis also builds on the literature on how stock 
market prices affect firms’ investments, started in Morck et al. (1990), and 
extended in Baker et al. (2003), Polk and Sapienza (2009), and Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell (2009). 
The findings suggest that all three trading strategies examined generate 
positive and significant excess returns to investors63. The results also support a 
relationship between the performance of these strategies and the lack of investment 
and financing flexibility at the firm level. There is also some evidence that different 
aspects of inflexibility actually interact with each other in influencing the 
profitability of the trading strategies. As these frictions impact upon firms’ 
investments, this thesis also sheds light on how firms’ investments and stock 
returns are related. The findings specific to the investigation into each of the three 
strategies are presented below. 
                                                     
63
 Ideally, while estimating the profitability of a trading strategy the returns should be 
adjusted for transactions costs. However, readily available data do not allow for precise 
estimation of such costs and hence the estimates reported in this thesis refer to gross 
returns. Therefore, the reported gains may or may not be realisable for frequent traders (e.g. 
speculators) but are meaningful for liquidity traders who incur transaction costs anyway. 
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5.1. Firms’ Investment, Financing Flexibility, and the Value-Growth 
Trading Strategy 
This thesis first, in chapter 2, investigated whether the value-growth 
trading strategy is profitable, and how this profitability (if any) is affected by firms’ 
investment and financing flexibility. The strategy generates a positive and 
significant gross value premium of 1.55% per month. The strategy is also evidently 
profitable given the positive and significant relationship between individual stock 
returns and the Book-to-Market ratio. When stock returns are adjusted for risks 
using the unconditional Fama and French three factor model, the relationship 
remains positive and significant, suggesting that the Fama and French factor model 
cannot explain the profitability of the value-growth trading strategy. 
Consistent with Zhang (2005), firms’ investment irreversibility is relevant 
to the profitability of the value based trading strategy. It is more difficult for value 
firms to reverse their investments than for growth firms. Furthermore, out of the 
three dimensions of investment irreversibility (the depreciation charge ratio, the 
rental expense ratio, and the disinvestment ratio), the first two denote that the 
higher the gap in investment irreversibility between value and growth firms, the 
higher the value premium.  
When returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French three factor 
model conditioned on both investment irreversibility and the business cycle 
variables, the relationship between the risk adjusted stock returns and the Book-to-
Market ratio becomes marginally insignificant. This evidence supports the theory 
in Zhang (2005) that the success of the value-growth trading strategy is due to the 
difference in value and growth firms’ investment irreversibility. It is also broadly 
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consistent with the conjecture in Cooper (2006) and Carlson et al. (2004) that 
firms’ investment inflexibility explains the value premium. When measuring 
investment inflexibility using operating leverage and excess capacity, i.e. the two 
variables describing investment flexibility in Carlson et al. (2004) and Cooper 
(2006) respectively, the findings reject the claim that these measures help explain 
the profitability of the value-growth trading strategy.  
The findings also reject the conjecture that financial constraints play a 
primary role to the profitability of the value-growth trading strategy. The net 
payout ratio, which proxies for firms’ financial constraints, does not follow any 
pattern across the portfolios sorted based on the Book-to-Market ratio from the 
growth portfolio to the value portfolio. Also, there is no clear relationship between 
the payout gap of the value and growth firms and the value premium. Moreover, 
when returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French model conditioned 
on the financial constraints variable, the relationship between risk adjusted returns 
at the firm level and the Book-to-Market ratio remains positive and significant. 
This relationship is evident for the profitability of the value-growth trading 
strategy. Hence, the risk-return relationship that takes into account firms’ financial 
constraints is insufficient to explain the value premium. 
On the other hand, there is some evidence for the supplementary role of 
financial constraints to the relationship between investment irreversibility and the 
value premium. The univariate evidence rejects the hypothesis that the value 
premium is higher among firms with higher financial constraints. However, when 
returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French model conditioned on (a) 
financial constraints and investment irreversibility, and (b) the business cycle 
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variable, the relationship between the firm level risk adjusted returns and the Book-
to-Market ratio becomes statistically insignificant, rendering the value-growth 
strategy no longer reliably profitable. 
5.2. Firms’ Investment, Financing, and the Momentum Trading Strategy 
The next issue examined in this thesis (chapter 3) is whether the 
momentum trading strategy is profitable and whether this profitability (if any) can 
be explained by firms’ investment patterns. The findings provide evidence of 
momentum profit. All the momentum strategies with the formation and the holding 
periods of three to twelve months, with and without a month between the two 
periods, generate positive and significant momentum profits. The widely successful 
6 x 6 strategy which skips a month between the formation and the holding period 
generates a statistically significant momentum profit of 1.21% per month. 
The findings show that the momentum profit could be explained by the 
difference in the investment activities of past winners and past losers based on 
three different explanations – the explanation using the credit multiplier effect 
based on Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) / Hahn and Lee (2009), the 
explanation using the share issuance channel based on Baker et al. (2003), and the 
explanation using the catering theory based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). All of 
these explanations link past stock prices with firms’ investments and future stock 
prices. 
The findings lend support to a combination of the above explanations. Past 
winners invest more than past losers, and the investment gap is higher during 
economic upturns than during economic downturns, consistent with all the three 
explanations. Compared to the investment gap between past winners and past 
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losers among the firms with low financial constraints, the gap is higher among the 
firms with high financial constraints. Moreover, the speed of change of the 
investment gap among the firms with high financial constraints is positive, whereas 
that among the firms with low financial constraints approximates zero. The 
momentum profit is positive and significant among firms with high financial 
constraints but insignificant among firms with low financial constraints. The above 
observations are consistent with the explanation based on Ovtchinnikov and 
McConnell (2009) and the explanation based on Baker et al. (2003), while 
inconsistent with the explanation based on Polk and Sapienza (2009).  
However, the subsample of firms with medium financial constraints 
generates a positive and significant momentum profit, and its investment gap has a 
positive speed of change. Of the three explanations, this evidence can only be 
reconciled with the one based on Polk and Sapienza (2009). The catering theory in 
Polk and Sapienza (2009) does not require firms to be financially constrained. 
Management can cater for investor sentiment as long as firms are not too 
financially constrained. The patterns of the investment gap and the momentum 
profit during economic upturns generally amplify those averaging across economic 
upturns and downturns. This evidence lends support to all the three explanations 
tested in this thesis. 
Finally, there is evidence that cumulative returns can predict future returns 
even when risks are controlled for using the unconditional Fama and French three 
factor model. This finding is evident for the profitability of the momentum trading 
strategy. The return predictability is weak when the betas are conditioned on firms’ 
financial constraints and the business cycle variable. When returns are adjusted for 
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risks using the Fama and French model conditioned on firms’ investments, 
cumulative returns retain their predictability. This evidence suggests that at least 
part of the information on firms’ investments is not relevant to the momentum 
profit through a risk-return channel. The momentum profit is explained when (a) 
controlling for risks using the Fama and French model conditioned on firms’ 
financial constraints and the business cycle variables, and (b) accounting for the 
interaction between the momentum profit and firms’ investments as suggested in 
the explanations based on Polk and Sapienza (2009) and Baker et al. (2003). 
5.3. Firms’ Investment and Financing Flexibility, and the Accruals based 
Trading Strategy 
The final issue investigated in this thesis (chapter 4) is whether the accruals 
based trading strategy is profitable and how the profitability (if any) is affected by 
firms’ investments. Given the existing evidence on the relationship between the 
profitability of the accruals based trading strategy and firms’ investments, this 
thesis examines the relationship between the success of the strategy and the firm 
level forces that prohibit firms from investing at the optimal level.  The findings in 
this thesis support the arguments in Fairfield et al. (2003), Zhang (2007), and Wu 
et al. (2010) that firms’ accruals reflect working capital investments. 
The accruals based trading strategy is found to be profitable, generating an 
average return of 0.54% per month. The accruals premium is more pronounced 
among firms with high financial constraints or low investment irreversibility. Firms 
with high financial constraints have less flexibility in investing at the optimal level. 
Wu et al. (2010) suggest that the stocks of firms with high accruals are subject to a 
higher level of an investment risk factor than those of firms with low accruals. 
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Hence the more pronounced accruals premium among firms with high financial 
constraints is consistent with an explanation based on Wu et al. (2010). 
By contrast, the pronounced accruals premium among firms with low 
investment irreversibility is consistent with an explanation along the lines of Polk 
and Sapienza (2009). These authors concede that the management of overvalued 
firms invests in both fixed capitals and working capitals to prolong the 
overvaluation. Low investment irreversibility would make it easier for management 
to cater for investor sentiment. Hence, firms with high accruals are more likely to 
be overpriced, particularly when their investment irreversibility is low. 
Furthermore, along the lines of Caggese (2007), both investment 
irreversibility and financial constraints reflect the inflexibility and may reinforce 
the impact of each other on firms’ investments. This thesis finds that the accruals 
premium is most pronounced at the two extremes of the inflexibility spectrum. The 
evidence at the high end of the spectrum supports the explanation based on Wu et 
al. (2010) whereas the evidence at the low end supports the explanation based on 
Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
There is some weak evidence that the accruals premium is more 
pronounced during economic upturns among firms with low investment 
irreversibility or high financial constraints. When taking into account both 
inflexibility measures, the evidence is strong for firms at the high end of the 
inflexibility spectrum, supporting the explanation based on Wu et al. (2010). The 
evidence at the low end, which would support the explanation based on Polk and 
Sapienza (2009), is weak. 
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The patterns in the relationship between the inflexibility measures and the 
accruals premium documented so far is concentrated in the manufacturing 
industries, especially the heavy industry. According to Zhang (2007), the accruals 
of the manufacturing industries reflect more information on firms’ investments 
than those of the other industries. This evidence reinforces the perspective that the 
accruals premium is related to firms’ investments. 
Finally, when returns are adjusted for risks using the Fama and French 
model, both unconditional and conditional on the business cycle and the 
inflexibility measures, the accruals ratio continues to predict stock returns. This 
constitutes evidence in favour of the profitability of the accruals based trading 
strategy. Hence, the risk-return relationship might not be solely responsible for the 
accruals premium. When isolating the cyclicality in stock returns using the term 
spread, the default spread, the aggregate dividend yield, and the Treasury bill rate, 
the accruals premium completely disappears. Any explanation for the profitability 
of the accruals based trading strategy should therefore be able to explain its 
cyclical nature. 
5.4. Implications of the Findings 
The results of this thesis have several implications for the understanding of 
the sources of the profitability of the value-growth, momentum, and accruals based 
trading strategies. Given that these strategies are widely deployed among the 
investing public, investors might also benefit from the results of this thesis in 
designing these strategies. 
The profitability of the value-growth, momentum, and accruals based 
trading strategies are sometimes known as evidence against the efficient market 
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hypothesis and are often referred to as anomalies. This thesis reports that the 
sources of the profitability of the trading strategies sometimes can be traced back to 
a risk-return relationship based on the fundamental information about the firm and 
the economy, and the behaviours of firms’ managements.  
In the context of the market efficiency literature, the market is efficient 
with regards to the information about the Book-to-Market ratio, since future stock 
returns cannot be predicted using this ratio when risks are taken into account. 
However, future returns can be predicted using information about past stock returns 
and firms’ accruals even when returns are adjusted for risks. This return 
predictability can be explained by the management’s behaviours. Hence the market 
is not fully efficient with regards to the information about past stock returns and 
firms’ accruals. Furthermore, the findings in this thesis suggest that the profitability 
of the three trading strategies is affected by the inflexibility in the investment and 
financing environment at the firm level. In other words, the understanding of 
corporate finance can help extend the understanding of the securities markets.  
The results from this thesis can benefit investors who attempt to profit 
from the value-growth, momentum, and accruals based trading strategies. The 
profit from the value-growth trading strategy can be improved if investors pursue 
the strategy using value and growth firms with bigger gap to the extent to which 
firms’ assets are irreversible. The profit can be completely explained when risks 
are controlled for using the asset pricing model conditioned on these 
characteristics. Hence, investors should bear in mind that the improved 
performance might just be a compensation for higher risks.  
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Investors would benefit more from pursuing the momentum trading 
strategy among firms with high financial constraints and in economic upturns than 
among those with low financial constraints and in downturns. Implementing the 
trading strategy among past winners and past losers that are far different in their 
current investment activities can also improve the performance of the strategy. The 
momentum profit can be partially explained when risks are controlled for using the 
asset pricing model conditioned on these financial inflexibility characteristics. 
Hence investors should bear in mind that part of the improved performance of the 
momentum trading strategy might just be a compensation for higher risks, i.e. 
higher exposure to the credit multiplier effect.  
Finally, imposing both investment and financing inflexibility conditions on 
the sample and correctly timing the strategy can considerably improve the 
performance of the accruals based trading strategy. Investors seeking to deploy this 
strategy would benefit from pursuing it among firms that are either highly 
inflexible or highly flexible in investment and financing. They also benefit from 
pursuing the strategy during economic upturns among firms that are highly 
inflexible. Wrong timing, on the other hand, can cost investors dearly as the 
accruals based trading strategy can generate a return close to zero. 
5.5. Areas for Future Research 
The results of this thesis strengthen the conjecture that the profitability of 
style investing may be rooted from the “real” activities at the firm level, such as 
firms’ investment and financing activities. An interesting research direction into 
the future would be to extend the scope of the “real” activities to examine their 
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impacts on the profitability of trading strategies. These “real” aspects might include 
factors in the labour market and firms’ product markets. 
There are several similar characteristics between the commitment or 
inflexibility caused by fixed capital investments and labour contracts. Labour 
contract commitments are related to the investment inflexibility examined in this 
thesis. Furthermore, this thesis reported that investment irreversibility together with 
financial constraints affect the success of the value-growth strategy. It also reported 
that they affect the success of the accruals based trading strategy. It is therefore 
possible that the value-growth trading strategy and the accruals based trading 
strategy could be affected by labour market commitments.  
Furthermore, the characteristics of the product market could affect several 
aspects of firms’ performance. Peress (2010) argues that the stock prices of firms 
with higher market power are more informative. This thesis provided the empirical 
evidence to test the rational explanation for the momentum profit based on the 
argument in Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) that stock prices reflect firms’ 
investment opportunities. The momentum profit among firms with high financial 
constraints can be explained by the exposure to the credit multiplier effect of 
Kiyotaki and Moor (1997). If firms with high market power have more informative 
stock prices, it is likely that both financial constraints and market power can affect 
the momentum profit.  
Another direction could be to investigate how company fundamentals 
interact with the macroeconomic factors. This is because the activities at the firm 
level, from hiring, financing, investing to competing in the product market, vary 
across the business cycle. In turn, the business cycle is driven by the 
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macroeconomic factors. Furthermore, as discussed above, the performance of the 
investment strategies is potentially affected by the factors in the labour and product 
markets. Therefore, an understanding of how these company fundamentals interact 
with the macroeconomic factors would also help better design and time these 
investment strategies to improve their performance. 
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